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Through a case study analysis of 19th and 21st century communitarian innovation 
groups, this dissertation develops a business model that promotes innovation without the 
incentives of monopoly profits provided by patents.  Social Utopian communities of the 
19th century and Free and Open Source Software development communities share similar 
contributors’ incentives and comparable organizational structures which provides a 
foundation for a business model that can be transported to other industries, specifically 
biotechnology.  Communitarian innovation groups already exist within the biotechnology 
sector but have not yet been proven effective or capable of applying the communitarian 
business model through all stages of research and development.  This dissertation 
provides the business model for communitarian innovation as well as recommendations 
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“… The essence of open source is not the software.  It is the process by which software is 
created … Production processes, or ways of making things are of far more importance 
than the artifacts produced because they spread more broadly.” (Weber, 2004, p 56) 
 
Finding an organizational structure for successful communitarian innovation can 
be an important step in achieving societal goals such as developing effective drugs for 
neglected tropical diseases and improving the developing world’s food supplies. 
According to Ostrom (1990, pp. 89-90), an important component of understanding 
cooperation is an understanding of the institutional “design principles,” or organizational 
characteristics, that lead to successful cooperative innovation.  Ostrom contends that a 
comparison of organizational design characteristics within cooperative communities will 
help academic understanding move toward a general theory of cooperation.  In this 
dissertation I develop an organizational (or business) model for cooperative innovation 
within communitarian case study groups.  The model is formed by collecting the strands 
of academic inquiry in the fields of innovation and cooperation and tying together the 
communitarian movements of the 19th and 21st centuries. 
In order to move toward an understanding of an organizational structure for 
communitarian innovation, I select six case study communities, three each from the 19th 




understanding of the organizational structure of communitarian innovation groups 
initiates a theoretical model that explains complexities of economic behavior beyond 
existing theories of innovation (Ostrom, 2010). 
To explain the world of interactions and outcomes occurring at multiple levels, we 
also have to be willing to deal with complexity instead of rejecting it. … When the 
world we are trying to explain and improve, however, is not well described by a 
simple model, we must continue to improve our frameworks and theories so as to be 
able to understand complexity and not simply reject it.  (Ostrom, 2010, p. 25)  
 
The case study analysis forms the basis for a theory of organizational structure or 
a business model for successful communitarian innovation groups in order to export this 
model to different industries and to achieve societal goals as yet unattained through 
current business models.   The communitarian innovation business model is a method of 
knowledge creation much different than the status quo which relies on Intellectual 
Property Rights (IPRs) to protect private property.  The communitarian innovation model 
works within the existing economic structure of market and commercial incentives; 
however, the communitarian organization promotes innovation and knowledge creation 
based on incentives that promote community agendas and societal goals.  
Chapter 2 of this dissertation looks at the importance of innovation to the US 
economic system and the role of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) in motivating 
innovation.  The impact of IPRs on the incentive to innovate has been an important part 
of academic inquiry and I review this literature as well as the academic literature on 
cooperative communities that investigates the organizational structure of cooperative 
innovation communities.   
In Chapter 3 of this dissertation, I examine the theoretical and historical 




intellectual property.   By connecting the histories and theories of real property with 
those of intellectual property, I provide a framework of economic thought regarding 
property ownership and the creation of common resource communities.  I also review the 
historical development of common resource communities in the United States. 
Chapter 4 reviews the historically extraordinary period of communitarian growth 
in 19th century USA and provides background and context for a detailed discussion of 
cooperative innovation within three case study communities.  In Chapter 5 I identify and 
analyze three FOSS case study groups and discuss the historical development of the 
communities and the impact of the cooperative innovation on the software industry.  
Chapter 6 connects the 19th century communitarian groups with the current 
communitarian FOSS groups by showing comparable incentives to participate and 
contribute to the community. My study of journal entries, interviews and other primary 
and secondary sources provides insight into the incentives of cooperative innovation 
contributors within the case study communities.  The 19th century case study contributors’ 
incentives are then linked to the Free and Open Source Software (FOSS) contributors’ 
incentives. These five incentives to contribute are to: 
• meet contributors’ unfilled need;  
• enhance contributors’ own or community reputation;  
• provide contributors with fun and enjoyment;  
• promote contributors’ personally important social agenda; and 
• encourage commercial potential of the innovation. 
 
The three 19th century and three FOSS case study groups form the foundation on 
which I develop my organizational structure for cooperative innovation presented in 
Chapter 7.  Based on my analysis of the 19th century case study communities, I identify 




influenced the success of communitarian innovation leading to leading to specified social 
outcomes: 
• Governance and Leadership 
o Motivational Leadership 
o Shared Leadership 
o Adaptive Leadership 
• Socioeconomic Structure 
o Fundamental equality 
o Property distribution 
• Organization of Labor 
o Method of organizing labor 
o Sub-group structure 
• Communication and Evaluation 
o Open communication 
o Peer review 
• Member Commitment 
o Membership levels 
o Member agreements 
 
Chapter 7 then compares the elements of each organizational attribute found in 
the 19th century case study communities to the FOSS case study communities which 
reveals the comparable identifying organizational structure across all case study 
communities.  From this analysis, I conclude that these characteristics form the necessary 
organizational structure to promote communitarian innovation. 
In Chapter 8 I introduce biotechnology communitarian innovation groups and 
explore the portability of the five organizational characteristics to biotechnology 
innovation communities.  In this chapter I analyze three biotechnology case study 
communities and assess the importance of the organizational structure on the success of 
innovation.  In conclusion, I provide recommendations for biotechnology communitarian 
groups to succeed at their societal goal of developing and delivering life-saving 




traditional pharmaceutical research model.  The communitarian innovation business 
model shows that the profit incentive can be used to achieve social goals rather than 



















































If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others of exclusive 
property, it is the action of the thinking power called an idea… that ideas should 
freely spread from one to another over the globe, for the moral and mutual 
instruction of man, and improvement of his condition seems to have been 
peculiarly and benevolently designed by nature. (Thomas Jefferson as quoted in 
Foley, 1900, p. 433) 
 
In his classic work, “The Theory of Economic Development,” Schumpeter (1934) 
analyzed the role of innovation and entrepreneurs in capitalism’s future.  He argued that 
profit is created through entrepreneurial innovation of methods, systems and products that 
produce competitive advantages.  It is this innovation that, according to Schumpeter, will 
provide the means for capitalism to continue to grow and even continue to exist.  Without 
it, profits will gradually decrease to zero and the highly productive capitalist system will 
collapse.   
Knowledge creation, or innovation, has moved humankind forward for millennia.  
Innovation has been the foundation of modern industrialized nations which has led to a 
deep interest in the motivation of individuals to seek new knowledge and to innovate.  
Some assume that the promise of financial reward is a necessary and sufficient 
motivation to innovate.  However, as shown in the academic literature there is increasing 




Given that knowledge is nonrival, nonexcludable and has high initial costs of 
production, many economists assume that within a market free of government 
intervention incentives to produce knowledge would provide considerably less innovation 
than optimal.  It is understandable that knowledge creation and innovation should attract 
the attention of a wide segment of society due to its impact on economic growth, wealth 
and well-being, without which life-saving pharmaceuticals and labor-saving software 
would not exist.   The framers of the US Constitution recognized the importance of 
innovation to the national well-being and, in order to encourage innovation, included 
Article I Section 8 to the Constitution which states, “Congress shall have power . . . To 
promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors 
and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.” 
The topic of “exclusive rights” for “limited times” has generated a great deal of 
discussion regarding the impact of patents on innovation and the dissemination of 
knowledge.  Economic, legal and social studies literature abounds with academic papers 
criticizing or condoning the impact of current IP regimes on innovation.  The question 
commonly posed by this literature is whether or not innovators would be sufficiently 
motivated to invent without the incentive of monopoly rights.  Put another way, the 
question is whether monopoly protection created by IPR regimes provide the optimal 
method for motivating innovation. The recent success of open source knowledge creation 
has rekindled interest in the question of incentives and motivation. 
While it is important to understand the motivation to innovate, equally important 
is the question of what societal and organizational structures motivate innovation.  Even 




successfully innovate.  For the remainder of this chapter, I look at the impact of the 
current patent structure on innovation – in Section 2.1, I provide an overview of IPRs, 
specifically, patents.  Section 2.2 begins the literature review on the impact of patents on 
innovation.  I first look at the research supporting patent rights as a key incentive for 
innovation, and then discuss the literature on the reasons why patents can hinder 
innovation.  I then review the relatively limited literature on understanding the non-
traditional innovation model.  
 
2.1.  Intellectual Property Rights 
“Intellectual Property” (IP) is a current catch-phrase which combines together 
patents, copyrights, trademarks and trade secrets. The types of protection the laws afford 
each of these “properties” are vastly different, making for an imprecise analysis when 
they are all categorized together (Gay, 2002).   For example, trademarks and trade secrets 
have no definite termination of their property rights while copyright laws provide a much 
longer protection than patents. Patent protection is very different from copyright, 
trademark or trade secret protection in that a patentee must prove novelty and utility prior 
to the granting of property protection. This dissertation deals mostly with the existing 
patent system and its impact on innovation.  This section briefly reviews the US patent 
system and the increased emphasis on international enforcement of patent rights. 
Traditionally, it has been assumed that the modern patent system exists for two 
reasons: (1) to stimulate innovation through monopoly protection and (2) to provide 
detailed descriptions of new ideas to other inventors thus furthering overall innovation 




question whether patent protection slows the transfer of knowledge, and therefore retard 
progress. Nobel Prize recipient, Joseph Stiglitz, has been a high-profile critic of 
developed nations’ IPR regimes, especially as imposed on developing nations.  He 
contends that strong IPRs not necessary for innovation and that they may indeed impede 
innovation and progress because of the monopoly power conferred to the IP holder.  
(Rosenzweig, 2009)   
Given that innovation can accelerate economic growth and that IPRs, by 
definition, create barriers to entry and provide opportunity for monopoly rents, 
economists have attempted to reconcile the apparently conflicting goals of stimulating 
innovation and maximizing social welfare.  Most researchers recognize that it is not 
ethical to place profits above human lives, and many also concede that society should not 
prioritize profits above unfettered access to knowledge, technology and innovation.  
However, many of the same researchers also question whether innovation would exist at 
all without monopoly protection of government enforced IPRs.  The question remains 
whether innovation relies on a strong IPR regime and potential for monopoly rent.  
Finding a solution to the “motivation vs. social welfare” problem has produced a wide 
range of economic discussions.  Mainstream economists generally assume that without 
IPR protection, little incentive exists for innovation and therefore production of 
knowledge is limited.  On the other hand, because innovation produced under patent laws 
excludes those who cannot afford monopoly prices, some researchers find the social costs 
to be unacceptably high for patented knowledge. Additionally, because the social 




IPRs, social goals such as lifesaving drugs for the poor are often unachieved in the status 
quo. 
 
2.1.1 IPR Status Quo 
The number of patent applications filed and issued has increased significantly 
over the past two decades.  Based on data collected from the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO), Figure 2.1 shows the annual patents granted worldwide increased 
nearly twofold from 1985 to 2008 ("WIPO Resources", 2011). 
           This increase raises the concern that the current patent system is ill-equipped to 
handle the increase of patent filings.  Critics point out inefficiencies of the patent system 
including the numerous patents that are filed on “technology” that is without merit as a 
“useful art.”  One example of an apparently frivolous patent is the “Method of exercising 
a cat” (US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) patent number 5,443,036) which 
explains that the method consists of “directing a beam of light” from a hand-held laser 
onto the wall or floor in an “irregular way fascinating to cats.” ("USPTO Patent Full-Text 
and Image Database", 1995, Abstract).   Another example (USPTO patent number 
5,934,226) is a patent for a “Bird diaper” featuring “an enclosed pouch for receiving and 
containing excrement, and apertures to accommodate both the wings and the tail of the 
bird.”  ("USPTO Patent Full-Text And Image Database", 1999, Abstract).   Beyond the 
frivolous, there are many patents that are never commercialized.  One study shows that 
more than 95% of patents have “little economic value” (Adelman, 2006).  The relatively 
small percent of patents that represent commercialized technology have, however, packed 





FIGURE 2.1 – Total Patent Grants 1985-2008 
 
slows the IPR process and potentially increases the reliance on litigation to resolve 
property disputes. 
The granting of a large number of questionable patents has increased the 
likelihood that a given invention will infringe one or more existing patents, thus 
provoking a barrage of litigation.  Moreover, since the mid-1990s, the delay in 
processing patents has increased by more than 50 percent, and the backlog of 
applications has more than doubled. (Gallini, 2002, p. 147) 
 
            In 2011, President Obama signed into law H.R. 1249, “America Invents Act” 
which is intended to reduce the number of frivolous patents, protect the rights of “early 
inventors,” and also provide more incentive to manufacturers to implement innovations. 
The law changes the method of granting patents – rather than granting a patent to the first 
to invent which often resulted in costly litigation to prove invention timelines, the new 
law grants patents to the “first to file.”  Additionally, H.R. 1249 intends to “reduce the 































































(“United States House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary”, 2011, America 
Invents Act of 2011, H.R. 1249 One-Page Bill Summary). 
At its core, the prevailing IP regime presumes that the promotion of the useful arts 
is contingent on a period of enforced exclusivity for the patent holder. This presumption 
has resulted in a recent effort to standardize patent protection across all nations.  The 
World Trade Organization (WTO), which promotes the goal of global free trade, has 
promoted the agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) (UNDP, 2000). 
Under TRIPS, member nations of the WTO must “provide patent protection for 
any invention, whether a product (such as a medicine) or a process (such as a method of 
producing the chemical ingredients for a medicine), while allowing certain exceptions.” 
(World Trade Organization, 2006, Obligations and Exceptions).  As a result of TRIPs, 
patented innovations have obtained the protected legal status of government sanctioned 
monopolies in most developed and developing countries around the globe.  The 
justification for promoting a globally harmonized patent system is the desire to encourage 
continued innovation; however, it is far from unanimous that the current system is a 
success in this respect.  (See Appendix A “Global Harmonization of IPRs” for further 
discussion on TRIPS.) 
 
2.1.3 Innovation Communities 
If, in fact, innovation is motivated only through private property rights, then the 
goal of increased social welfare via uninhibited access to new knowledge and technology 




protected monopoly regimes does occur.  Community based cooperative innovation and 
knowledge creation has a solid historical basis of innovation that has succeeded outside 
the boundaries of strong IPRs.  Communities have created and shared beneficial 
knowledge without the protection of monopoly power for millennia.  Specifically, 
innovation developed by aboriginal groups, currently defined as Traditional Knowledge 
(TK), has been developed and managed by communities for generations.  Additionally, 
19th century communitarian groups recorded examples of innovation without patent-
enforced monopolies. 
A current example of communitarian innovation is the open source movement 
(most notably software development) which has kindled academic inquiry into 
cooperative innovation and its incentives.  Several academic studies have examined the 
economic incentives to contribute knowledge to Free and Open Source Software (FOSS).  
Even so, there has been little attempt to connect FOSS with its intellectual predecessors 
of community based cooperative innovation throughout history.  The 19th century 
communitarian groups are connected with the modern FOSS communities by showing 
common incentives to contribute and equivalent business models. 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
The incentive to innovate is central to the academic inquiry of patents and 
cooperative innovation.  Although the debate is still evolving, there is a large body of 
literature on the impact of IPRs on innovation.  In this section I first review the literature 




through patent protection.  This literature shows not only how the patent system 
motivates innovation but also the negative impact on innovation.   
I have organized the literature conceptually rather than historically or 
methodologically.  The literature is broadly divided into studies contending that a strong 
patent system is necessary to motivate innovation, and studies that argue IPRs retard 
innovation. The literature is categorized into opposing sides of the debate that support the 
arguments.  The limited literature on organizational structure of successful innovation 
communities is also reviewed.  
 
2.2.1 Arguments that Strong IPRs Motivate Innovation 
Innovation is motivated by the profit incentive based on traditional neoclassical 
economic thought.  There are studies that correlate IPRs with increased innovation. 
Patent monopoly protection is assumed to increase incentives to innovate and the 
literature identifies this incentive as the most important rationale for a patent system with 
strong IPRs.  However, there are few studies that directly measure the relationship of 
incentives with patents. 
 
2.2.1.1 Patents Motivate New Innovation and Disseminates Knowledge 
The US patent system, in return for patent protection, requires the patentee to 
disclose the patented technology and the best method of implementation.   This disclosure 
of knowledge within the patent filing is made available to a wide audience and allows the 




area (Moser, 2005).  In return for the disclosure of knowledge, a patent provides 
monopoly protection for a period of time.   
The debate regarding incentives and the current patent system is complicated due 
to the lack of a clear measurement of innovation.  Several proxies for measuring 
innovation have been proposed in the academic literature, each with its own problems.  
Two measurement candidates used have been research and development expenses (R&D) 
(Griliches, 1984) and patents (Marasco & Boyer, 2001).  Measuring the number of 
patents filed and granted is straightforward; however, measuring quantity and quality of 
innovation is much less straightforward. Patents are a problematic measure of innovation 
since not all innovation is patented; also, not all patents represent viable innovation.  On 
the other hand, R&D is not an accurate measure because the reporting of R&D is not 
uniform across firms or across industries (Marasco & Boyer, 2001).   
Royalties paid on patent licensing is another measurement method used by 
researchers to measure innovation that is commercially successful (Rosenzweig, 2009).   
Although this is arguably a fair measure of commercial viability and, therefore, value of 
an innovation, not all valuable innovations are licensed.  Many useful innovations are 
freely available without license and others are patented but not licensed by the original 
patentee and therefore do not represent a correct measure of innovative activity.  Another 
consideration is change in legal structure of the patent system as with the Bayh Dole Act.  
In 1980, Congress passed the Bayh Dole Act, which allowed universities, and other 
government funded entities, to maintain control of the intellectual property produced by 
such funding.   Based on the level of royalties collected by academic institutions funded 




innovation has increased as a result of the change in law (Rosenzweig, 2009).  
 
2.2.1.2 Design Around 
The most commercially successful patented products tend to spark increased 
attempts to innovate and find noninfringing alternatives, which may, in turn, be 
patentable.   Because of this ability to “design around” the patented technology, those 
who support a strong IPR system do not consider patents as a disincentive to innovation 
(Epstein & Kuhlik, 2004).  Indeed one researcher (Lee, 2004) cited the patent system as a 
means of forcing new would-be innovators to find a completely new research paradigm 
and advance the science even further because of the forced change from the existing 
limited scope of knowledge.   
 
2.2.2 Arguments that Strong IPRs Hinder Innovation 
Although there is little empirical research, there is significant theoretical 
discussion that strong IPRs actually slow innovation for several reasons including patent 
thickets, royalty stacking, overly broad claims, transaction costs, and patent races. 
 
2.2.2.1 Shot gun, Scarecrow and Dragnet   
Although the debate among academics has intensified in the past decade, many of 
the same issues were identified over 70 years ago by Alfred Kahn in his article 
Fundamental Deficiencies of the American Patent Law, published in 1940.   
A single … monopoly of a minor cog in that huge mechanism of interlocking 
processes and contributions which make up an advancing art can for [the life of 
the patent] seriously retard continued research… industry after industry has been 




patent both as a basis for production and as a stimulus and reward for invention. 
(Kahn, 1940, p. 482) 
 
Kahn identified three basic problems of the patent system, each of which is 
employed to deter competition and effectively limit new innovation. (1) The shotgun – a 
company that uses patents to scare off competitors. “From a business standpoint they are 
patent factories: they manufacture the raw material of monopoly” (Kahn,1940, 485); (2)  
the scarecrow – a company that uses a patent which appears to protect an important 
innovation but, in fact, represents little or no contribution to the art and its presence is for 
no other purpose than to threaten legal action; (3) the dragnet – a company that files a 
large number of patents with the patent office covering all potential aspects of the field 
and continuously revises those applications to cover any new invention subsequently 
developed in the field and “then take[s] out the patents as their own and sue[s] to protect 
them” (Kahn, 1940, p. 485).   
 
2.2.2.2 Patent Thickets and Royalty Stacking 
Large numbers of patents are filed and granted in certain fields which tend to 
create difficulties in designing around a given technology because of the potential of 
infringing one or more of the numerous patents.  As the number of patents increase in a 
field creating a so called “patent thicket,” the incentive to innovate in the field is stifled.  
Patent thickets hamper future R&D as potential innovators, fearing the possibility of 
unwittingly infringing an existing patent, choose not to innovate in the field rather than 
risk litigation.  New technological advances are avoided because there are so many 
patents and patents pending that it is increasingly difficult and potentially impossible to 




technology (Gay, 2002).  Patent thickets have slowed innovation in certain fields because 
“each patent holder [has] a potential veto right over the innovations of others” (Epstein & 
Kuhlik, 2004, p. 1).  
Patent thickets may not be a problem for large corporations with a portfolio of 
patents that can be used as a cross licensing tool (Epstein & Kuhlik, 2004).  Through 
cross licensing, the firms obtain needed technology and, perhaps more importantly, 
protection from potential litigation.  However, this same opportunity is usually not 
available for an inventor with few patents who cannot leverage a small portfolio of 
patents against a large patent portfolio (Gay, 2002).  A single patent is rarely “large 
enough to exploit by itself” (Kahn, 1940, p. 481). 
Similar to patent thickets, royalty stacking can retard new innovation.  Within 
complex technology sectors it is rare that any single technology is comprised of only one 
patent. Royalty stacking is the consequence of many patent licenses on a single product 
and a large number of patents comprised in a single product can stall incentives to 
innovate because the increased risk of litigation.  Further, the profits of such a product are 
already consumed in the royalties paid to the many existing patent holders leaving little, 
if any, available to new innovators (Gay, 2002).   
 
2.2.2.3 Litigation and Broad Claims 
The USPTO reviews every patent filing to determine novelty and non-
obviousness.  The reviewing patent clerk may issue the patent with narrowly or broadly 
defined claims delineating the scope of property rights assigned to the patent holder.  




over future innovation in the field. By definition, a broad claim encompasses a very large 
scope and has few limits on the coverage of property rights.  Patents with broad claims 
leave little room for additional innovation in the corresponding field due to patent 
infringement concerns. In a field with broad claim patents, even non-patented innovations 
cannot be implemented because of the scope of property rights awarded to the existing 
patent holder (Wu, 2006).  For example, the USPTO issued a patent to Thomas Edison 
for the incandescent light with very broad claims.  The broad claims of Edison’s patent 
are seen to have slowed the progress of innovation in incandescent lighting and 
centralized the investment decision for an entire technology onto the individual patent 
holder (Wu, 2006).  Broad claims issued by the USPTO may block the best ideas from 
being commercialized in the future because of patent restrictions (Wu, 2006).  
Furthermore, if the patent holder is unwilling to license pioneering technology to other 
inventors, incremental innovation could be negatively impacted due to the legal 
restrictions on using the existing technology (Duffy, 2004). 
 
2.2.2.4 Patent Races 
Current US patent law awards patent rights to the inventor who is first to file with 
the USPTO (HR 1249).  One outcome of this law is the creation of races between 
companies to be the first to file and can lead to over-investment in R&D as firms are 
motivated to be the first to file.  Only the winner of the patent race will have IPR 
protection leaving other competing firms with R&D expenses that may be redundant and, 
if implemented, infringing on the patentrace winner’s IPR (Maurer & Scotchmer, 2002).  




resulted in inefficient use of R&D and eliminate those resources for innovation in other 
fields (Duffy, 2004).  
 
2.2.3 Organizational Structure of Cooperative Innovation Communities 
Organizational structures provide the foundation upon which economic motives 
are realized.  The existing organizational structure of IPRs has led to innovation 
outcomes based on financial incentives through government enforced monopoly 
protection. There are other organizational structures that motivate innovation such as that 
seen in FOSS and other communitarian innovation groups.  The literature on the 
organizational structure of these groups is limited but includes a discussion on 
“horizontal innovation networks” of collaborating innovators who work on separate 
pieces of a project while improving each others’ work through feedback and input (von 
Hippel, 2007).   Knowledge production in cooperative innovation communities often 
improves quality outcomes through the iterative process of peer review and “open critical 
discussion” (Lave & Wenger, 1991; see also Brown & Duguid, 1991). 
Other researchers identified cooperative innovation communities as 
“Communities of Practice” (CoP) which are defined as communities that create their own 
cultural norms and practices for the innovation process.  These innovator community 
cultures provide the foundation of cooperation and act as a “social control mechanism” 
within the community to create rules and quality outcomes (Ash & Roberts, eds, 2008).   
CoPs are “A group of people bound together by their interest in a common working 
practice. Social groups organized around a certain activity (practice). Groups sharing a 




eds, 2008, p. 1). Examples of CoPs include government funded projects such as 
ARPANET which is the precursor to the modern internet.  Other examples include 
industry consortia such as sporting equipment communities.   
Similar to CoPs, the term “Collaborative Innovative Networks” (COINs) has been 
used to define cooperative groups which utilize electronic networking structures such as 
the internet so that “each team member can be reached quickly.”  There is very little 
hierarchical structure and the groups are “self organizing, unified by a shared vision, 
shared goals, and a shared value system” (Gloor, 2006, Ethic codes in small worlds) 
These common values act as a substitute for conventional management 
hierarchies, directing what every COIN member “has to do.”  COINs have 
internal rules by which they operate, for how members treat each other, for how 
supportive behavior is rewarded, and for how members are punished when they 
do not adhere to the code.  There is a delicate internal balance of reciprocity, and a 
normally unwritten code of ethics with which members of the COIN comply. 
(Gloor, 2006, Ethic codes in small worlds) 
 
COINs include so called “breakthrough technology communities” which establish 
themselves during the exploration phase of a new technology.  Sharing during this phase 
creates huge learning potential among participants (Osterloh & Rota, n.d.).  However, 
often the breakthrough technology communities will separate during the commercial 
phase of development in order to capitalize commercially on the technology (Osterloh & 
Rota, 2007.).   Gloor (2006, p 90) also states that “…meritocracy, consistency, and 
transparency comprise the defining elements of an organizational culture for COINS, 
swarm creativity, an ethical code, and a small-world network of trusted relationships 
among team participants.”  
The research on COINs and COPs provide some insight into components of 




limits to the effectiveness of cooperative innovation such as large, expensive projects that 
cannot be easily divisible among many contributors are likely not a good candidate for 
open source development (Maurer & Scotchmer, 2002). Also, some have hypothesized 
that innovation fields not already covered by strong IPR are the only areas in which 
successful cooperative innovation can occur (Maurer & Scotchmer, 2002).   
Collective action efforts have certain benefits over market solutions.  In the area 
of proprietary software, bugs are more difficult to find in private software because the 
source code is kept secret from the beta testers and end users.  Open systems also 
promote student learning and can allow commercial opportunities for third party 
developers of complementary services and products (Shapiro & Varian, 2003).  In 
pharmaceutical testing, market solutions to FDA requirements lead to outsourcing which 
“gives contract researchers obvious incentives to suppress and even falsify data to keep 
test programs alive.”  Nonmarket solutions avoid this problem by relying on volunteers 
who have no incentive to keep the project alive (Maurer & Scotchmer, 2006). 
The patent system and its impact on innovation have received significant 
academic attention – the literature shows both positive and negative influence of patents 
as a motivator to innovate. To motivate innovation, alternatives to the patent system exist 
but the academic literature is limited on the structure of these organizations. With the 
success of FOSS, the question of cooperative innovation is becoming more prevalent in 
the economic literature and there are advantages to cooperative innovation over the status 












THEORIES OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 
 
[J]ust as a feast to which many contribute is better than a dinner provided out of a 
single purse.  For each individual among the many has a share of excellence and 
practical wisdom, … for some understand one part, and some another, and among 
them they understand the whole.  Aristotle (Quoted in Walden, 1995, p. 564) 
 
An invention of humans, property “rights” removed property from its primal state 
of public domain into legally enforced private ownership. Legal scholars carefully define 
property rights as distinct from private property powers, privileges and immunities (Cole, 
2002). Indeed, legal property rights can be quite different than economic property rights 
as is shown in the example of the thief who has economic use of the stolen property in 
spite of the fact that he does not possess legal rights to the property (Cole, 2002).  Even 
with these differences in perspective, much of the legal and economic foundation for 
private property rights is based on theories of specialization, efficiency and improved 
output (Cole, 2002).  Even so, throughout modern history there have been groups that 
have organized with the premise of converting individual property rights into community 
property rights.  This devolution of property rights has occurred with real and intellectual 
property in several communitarian eras in the US and is currently occurring with 




In Section 3.1 of this chapter I discuss the evolution and theoretical development 
of real private property starting with commonly held property and progressing to private 
property laws.  In Section 3.2, I analyze the evolution of knowledge as personal property, 
moving from common to private ownership.  I look at the impact that real property rights 
have had on intellectual private property rights specifically with regard to the US patent 
system.  Section 3.3 considers the “devolution” of private property rights based on 
economic and theoretical grounds.  The devolution from private property rights to 
commonly held property is exemplified in historical communities that have rejected 
individual private property rights and instead emphasized common pool resources among 
their membership.  I review the major US historical eras of common pool communities in 
the US beginning in the 1690s with the Colonial Period through the 1970s “Free 
Thinking” or “Hippie” era. 
 
3.1  Private Property 
Property rights began with commonly held property and progressed to semi-
commons and then to private property (Levmore, 2002).  As complexity of production 
and output increased so did the rationale for private property rights – land type and 
availability of technology helped motivate the legal structure enforcing private property 
rights.  
Locke’s classic theory of private property begins with the hypothetical primitive 
or natural state of mankind wherein “God-granted goods” are held in common.  In this 
primitive state, there are enough goods to go around and no one need infringe on goods 




“exerting labor upon them.”  This labor adds value in such a way that the goods can be 
enjoyed by humans (Hughes, 1988).   
As long as there is “enough and as good” property for others, everyone is only 
limited by the amount of labor they are willing and able to apply to make the property 
their own.  This “enough and as good” condition works in Locke’s theory because the 
capacity of work by a single individual naturally limits the amount that can be 
appropriated through labor.  Locke also provides a “nonwaste” condition that condemns 
waste as an “unjustified diminution of common stock of potential property” and violates 
the “Law of Nature.” (Hughes, 1988, p. 8).     This labor theory, in its primitive state, 
turns into a meritocracy where those who are willing to do the work can obtain as much 
property as they are capable (Hughes, 1988).    
Many ancient groups allowed “ownership” of consumption goods but held to 
moral beliefs that precluded ownership of goods in excess of ones own personal needs.  
Any excess beyond that needed by an individual or family was viewed as common 
property and shared with the community (Levmore, 2002).  Property rights in ancient 
communities evolved as society progressed through various stages of production and 
distribution.  During the hunting and foraging stage of production, community property 
rights developed due to the nature of production.  However, as communities moved away 
from hunting and foraging, common property was no longer seen as efficient and 
individual property rights developed as a means to promote land improvement during the 
agricultural and farming stage of production (Demsetz, 2002; see also Levmore, 2002).1   
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 Both Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas addressed the apprehension of unequal property distribution as 
morally unjustifiable.   However, both recognized the need for private property in order to promote the care 




Types of property also determined how property rights developed.  For example, 
as settlers entered the North American continent, those settling in the Northeast 
encountered vastly different land qualities than in the Great Plains regions and, as a result 
of the differing land endowments, different property rights developed.  The forested areas 
of the Northeast resulted in overhunting which was ameliorated by private property 
rights; however, on the “Great Plains and Southwest, where animals ranged over large 
tracts of land, private rights to land did not develop because land ownership could not 
confer effective control of animal stocks” (Demsetz, 2002, p. S656). Private property 
rights in these areas were ineffective until technology provided low-priced barbed wire 
fencing allowing control of property and animals.  Other technology also motivated 
change from the commons to private property.  Along with fencing, tree cutting and 
irrigation technology provided economic incentive to create farms and increased the 
value of the land and intensified the motivation for private property (Levmore, 2002).  
As cultures evolved and expanded to more complex legal property rights, issues 
of inheritance, distribution, as well as, the moral and ethical aspects of property 
ownership became increasingly relevant (Levmore, 2002).  Underlying theories of 
property rights developed into differing legal foundations. For example, French and 
British colonization of numerous countries extended corresponding interpretation of 
                                                                                                                                                 
God’s natural law but is rather in addition to God’s law and is made by human agreement.  He deemed 
private property as necessary for human life because ownership produces more care, more orderly conduct 
and resulted in better preserved peace among people. Aquinas also made clear that the use of property must 
be at the service of the common good and not for the “private interests of one or more citizens” 
(Dougherty, 2003).  Similarly, Aristotle emphasized that property ownership is stewardship and concluded 
that the best method of property distribution is to enforce private property rights but make the use of 
privately held property available for the good of all. 
 
Further, Christian and Muslim scholars recognized that without private property it would not be possible to 





property rights.  Depending on which country brought the ruling law, a very different 
concept of property rights evolved in the colonized country.  Historically, French civil 
law minimized judicial interpretation and emphasized the rights of the state resulting in a 
state-oriented system within the French colonies (Levine, 2005).  Early French economic 
theorists, the Physiocrats, viewed private property as essential to the prosperity of the 
economic system and that all institutions resulted from property rights.  They held that 
private property was the basis of wealth and happiness but also recognized that property 
rights were determined by the state and considered that social and public utility was the 
supreme law and superseded the individuals’ right to private property (Samuels, 1961).  
On the contrary, British property rights, through its courts and political system, 
developed into British common law which was “predominately a law of private property” 
(Levine, 2005).  During the British Industrial Revolution, increased productivity reaped 
from specialization further motivated and economically justified the concept of private 
property rights. As a result, British colonies developed a stronger personal property law 
(Demsetz, 2002). 
The strong British private property laws played a prominent role in Adam Smith’s 
theory of the production process and class structure of the capitalist system.  From 
Smith’s class theory of capitalists, landowners and laborers, subsequent economists 
developed opposing theories of value: the utility theory and labor theory.  Importantly, 
the perspective on value, whether based on utility or labor, leads to very different 
philosophical, social and economic theories on property rights.  The labor theory of value 
is based on the concept that labor power is the only ‘force’ that can produce a surplus, i.e. 




generating a surplus (Hunt, 2002).  The labor theory of value also recognizes the various 
classes of the capitalist society and emphasizes the struggle between the capitalists, 
landlords and labor classes.  Referring back to Locke’s theory of property rights, 
“exerting labor” is the means by which individuals transform goods into private property.  
However within the capitalist system, wealth created by labor and its attendant property 
rights does not remain with the laborer but transfers to the capitalist class.  This 
perspective of the labor theory of value has led to criticism of capitalism wherein the 
capitalists retain the surplus value created by labor power thus concentrating property in 
the capitalist class. 
John Stuart Mill saw the capitalist system of production as an individualistic and 
competitive system and as “essentially vicious and anti-social” because it was based on 
opposition of interests rather than harmony of interests (Mill, 1879/1987).  The efforts of 
the capitalist to amass wealth and property necessarily placed the laborer and capitalist at 
odds.  Mill wrote that the condition of workers under the capitalist system in France and 
England were worse than the conditions “the most savage tribes” had ever known (Mill, 
1879/1987).  Individualism and opposition of interests were the foundation of capitalist 
property distribution, Mills wrote: 
[Capitalism] is the principle of individualism, competition, each one for himself 
and against all the rest.  It is grounded on opposition of interests, not harmony of 
interests, and under it every one is required to find his place by a struggle, by 
pushing others back or being pushed back by them.  … Morally considered, its 
evils are obvious.  It is the parent of envy, hatred, and all uncharitableness; it 
makes a natural enemy of all others who cross his path, and everyone’s path is 
constantly liable to be crossed.  Under the present system hardly any one can gain 
except by the loss or disappointment of one or of many others. (Mills, 1879/1987, 





Marx agreed with Mills and also believed that creation of wealth and property 
was an “inherently social process” which should join people together – rather than tear 
them apart (Crain, 2000).  
The individual and isolated hunter and fisherman, with whom Smith and Ricardo 
begin, belongs among the unimaginative conceits of the eighteenth-century 
Robinsonades… In this society of free competition, the individual appears 
detached from the natural bonds etc which in earlier historical periods make him 
the accessory of a definite and limited human conglomerate. (Marx, translated 
1953, "Independent Individuals. Eighteenth-century ideas") 
 
Although morally attracted to a more cooperative creation and distribution of 
property, Mill saw a host of problems with the emerging theories of socialism and 
communism.  According to Mill, one of the most significant problems facing the 
socialists was motivating work from the “natural man” with a tendency to laziness.  
Without an incentive to work for more wealth, there may be problems in the socialist 
structure.  Furthermore, there would be no incentive for the most capable individuals to 
take upon themselves the added responsibilities of management.  The ideal system 
needed a leader that would divide the work fairly and justly according to capabilities -- 
but again, human nature caused Mill to question whether fraud and bribery would make 
even this fundamental aspect fail.  To make socialism work, Mill thought there needed to 
be a “dispensing power, an authority competent to grant exemptions from the ordinary 
amount of work, and to proportion tasks in some measure to capabilities” (Mills, 
1879/1987, p 128).  Mill writes of another concern with the proposed socialist 
communities, that is whether the “joint management will be as efficient as the 
‘managements of private industry by private capital” (Mills, 1879/1987, p 118-19).  Mill 
recognized the need for a new social order and encouraged trial experiments in order to 




encouraged by the communitarian ideas of Fourier and Owen.  (See Appendix B “Three 
Short-lived 19th Century Communitarian Groups” for a discussion on these 
communitarian experiments.)  
Possibly due to these problems with community ownership, Modern economic 
studies based on the theory of efficient markets and rational self interest take a simplistic 
view of property rights and assume the existence and necessity of private property rights. 
An overview of neoclassical economic theories reveals very little on the concept of 
private property rights other than an assumption of optimum property rights system based 
on market equilibration theories and rational behavior (Demsetz, 2002).  However, some 
economists recognize the need for more robust economic theories of production and 
property rights including those based on the concept of cooperation.  
Almost all [neo-classical] economic models assume that all people are exclusively 
pursuing their material self-interest and do not care about “social” goals per se.  This 
may be true for some (maybe many) people, but it is certainly not true for everybody.  
By now we have substantial evidence suggesting that fairness motives affect the 
behavior of many people. …Reality provides many examples indicating that people 
are more cooperative than is assumed in the standard self-interest model (Fehr & 




3.2  Knowledge as Property 
Over time, as real property rights developed, knowledge and intellectual property 
rights also expanded.  Locke’s three propositions that provided theoretical foundation for 
real private property also have been used to explain the justification of intellectual 
property.  Locke’s three propositions applied to knowledge as private property are: 1) 
innovation and knowledge require labor, 2) knowledge is “appropriated from a ‘common’ 




made property without violating the nonwaste condition (Hughes, 1988).  Similar to real 
private property, the development of intellectual private property has evolved from 
commons to semicommons to legally enforced private property. 
 
3.2.1 Knowledge as Common and Semicommon Property 
Before knowledge creation became private property, indigenous communities 
created ideas and innovation through community cooperation.  The use of early 
technology – the rudimentary tools – provided the foundation for cooperation and “gave 
rise to uniquely human traits such as advanced intelligence and speech.” (Crain, 2000, p. 
217)  Communities formed and led to social production through cooperation and use of 
technology. “Tool-use also led to new modes of cooperation and communication.  As 
technologies advanced, people discovered the advantages of working together.  For 
example, they found that they could more effectively build a hut or a boat by joining 
forces.”  (Crain, 2000, p. 217). 
Historically, communities developed innovative knowledge, or Traditional 
Knowledge (TK),2 over many centuries that was passed down from generation to 
generation (Correa, 2001). Indigenous groups have relied on TK for centuries for health 
remedies, work procedures and agricultural methods.  Many of these groups continue to 
increase knowledge cooperatively and freely share that knowledge without any property 
rights limitations (Correa, 2001).  TK continues to impact these communities and 
provides knowledge benefitting the health and food needs of millions of people in 
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 WIPO defines TK as scientific, literary, or artistic works and other scientific and artistic innovations and 




developing countries who rely on this ancestral knowledge for their day-to-day wellbeing 
(Correa, 2001). 
Indigenous groups have found in the past several decades that commonly held TK 
without legally protected property rights has led to exploitation by individuals and 
corporations.  
Indigenous people often believe that intellectual property law is neither a 
necessary, nor a desirable, means of encouraging innovation within their 
communities. As a consequence, they are sometimes easily willing to share this 
knowledge, which leads to its exploitation… This situation gives raise to concern 
because, although the original holders have not acquired any benefit, the 
exploiters have benefited from the knowledge…. (Ragavan, n.d., “Traditional 
Knowledge and Indigenous Societies”, Para. 8)  
 
 
Recently, TK has earned a high profile in world trade discussions because of its 
continued inferior legal status as protected property in world courts as compared to 
formally copyrighted, trademarked and patented knowledge.  There are several cases of 
TK used for holistic remedies in indigenous groups that have been appropriated and 
patented by corporations. Examples include neem, turmeric, rosy periwinkle, ayahuasca, 
and sangre de drago (United Nations Development Programme, 2000). Unless the 
originators of the TK also benefit from any commercialization of this knowledge, this 
misappropriation for economic gain is referred to as biopiracy. (See Appendix A “Global 
Harmonization of IPRs” for further discussion on TK and biopiracy.) Some consider 
biopiracy as comparable to the imperialism practiced by various conquerors in earlier 
centuries – the assets are taken by the conqueror and used for their sole benefit (Hafstein, 
2004).  This attitude is seen historically in the takings of real property from indigenous 
groups in North America.  In spite of strong private property laws, the US Supreme court 




merely “inhabitants.”  Justice Thurgood Marshall stated that the original inhabitants had 
no ownership rights either individually, collectively or as a nation but only the right of 
“occupancy” thus legally justifying the taking of the real property (Bratspies, 2004). This 
imperialist attitude toward indigenous groups and forcible control of real property rights 
is comparable to the attitude currently applied to intellectual property created by original 
inhabitants of many countries.   
As civilizations developed, the common ownership of TK evolved into a semi-
commons arrangement among particular crafts and trades.  Production and commercial 
advantages often required keeping some of the knowledge secret from competitors.  In 
Greece and Rome, families passed down craft knowledge through many generations, 
requiring that production information to be kept as proprietary knowledge (Long, 1991). 
Craft guilds also developed in medieval Europe as communities of artisans combined 
together to share craft secrets and innovations.3   
With increasing technological advancements, some countries provided property 
protection of innovations.  Because of differing intellectual property policies, the type of 
intellectual property protection available in a country helps determine the path of 
technological innovation and the nature of resulting inventions. Historically, countries 
with weak IPR systems produced industries that tended to protect their inventions as 
trade secrets and encouraged highly complex technology that was difficult to reverse 
engineer – such as Switzerland and its specialty in watches. This pattern can be seen at 
least as far back as the Industrial Revolution, when regions of the world focused on 
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 Guild members provided intercessory prayers for the souls of deceased members which contributed 
greatly to the discipline of guild members – sanctions were put into place to reduce future prayers if guild 




specific technological advances.  England, for example, with its property protection of 
innovation developed textile manufacturing technology in the early 1800s and 
Switzerland, due to its reliance on trade secrets, became known for precision mechanics 
(Moser, 2005).   
 
3.2.2 Knowledge as Private Property 
Throughout much of the history of innovation, patent monopoly was absent and 
the incentive to innovate was based on utility, reputation, pleasure, duty or other 
motivation. However, many countries gradually moved knowledge and innovation into a 
government protected monopoly status.  In the US, the Constitution grants the 
government power to enforce monopoly rights for innovators and the judicial system has 
upheld a strong IPR system.  Knowledge as property was confirmed in the 1834 Supreme 
Court ruling Wheaton v. Peters when the Justices agreed that intellectual property rights 
are not “natural” rights that were passed down from before civilization, but were 
creations of civilization as rights of government legislation (Mossoff, 2007, p.6).  The 
Court held to the idea that labor creates property in both real and intellectual arenas, 
“[t]hat every man is entitled to the fruits of his own labor must be admitted; but he can 
enjoy them only, except by statutory provision, under the rules of property, which 
regulate society, and which define the rights of things in general” (Mossoff, 2007, p.6). 
The Court continued to interpret the concept of patent rights as equivalent to real property 
throughout the 19th century.  In 1846, the court “instructed the jury that “[a]n inventor 
holds a property in his invention by as good a title as the farmer holds his farm and flock” 




As intellectual property rights were enforced by the courts, the perception of 
knowledge creation shifted away from a social community based process to a solitary 
individual process.  The enforcement of strong IPRs has fragmented the social aspect of 
innovative knowledge into individual components – promoting the concept that inventors 
are individual lone geniuses rather than one component of a long incremental process.  
Freidrich Hayek noted in 1945 that knowledge cannot be concentrated in a single mind 
but rather is dispersed among many people (as cited in Cole & Lee, 2003).  Even the 
most profoundly transformative innovations are based to some degree on existing 
knowledge and prior art.  Thus, building on previous work, innovators sequentially 
developed new and better technology (Boyd & Richerson, 1985).  
  
3.3 Devolution of Property Rights 
Some groups have responded to the social and financial cost of private property 
by creating communities that reject private property and have returned to the practice of 
common property.  One theory in real property rights may help explain this so called 
“devolution” of property rights based on transaction costs (Levmore, 2002). A toll road, 
for example, at one point may have a geographic monopoly which encourages private 
property; however, as competition builds other routes and more efficient transportation 
methods are developed, the upkeep of the toll road exceeds its income and it is therefore 
more advantageous for the private property owners to abandon the road and allow it to 
become common property with common upkeep (Levmore, 2002).   
Historically, some communities have returned personal property rights back into 




19th and 20th centuries such as the Amish, Owenites, Fourierists, Shakers and “hippie” 
communities of the 1960s and 70s.  Anthropologists have identified five periods of 
communitarian social experimentation in the United States referred to as “intentional” 
communities (Brown, 2002).    
1) The Colonial Period (1620-1776) with the Amish, Moravian Brethren, and the 
Shakers;  
2) The “Shaker Influx” Period (1790-1805), references the growth of Shaker 
communities and rise of other communitarian systems at the turn of the 19th century; 
3) “Utopian Socialist” Period (1824-48) which included “Bible Socialist” experiments 
founded on Christian ideals and secular communitarian experiments; 
4) “Anarchist Movement” at the turn of the 20th century; and 
5) “Free-Thinking” movement of the 1960s and 70s (associated with the “Hippie” 
movement) which was based on a radical rethinking of prevailing social values. 
 
Applying the theory of the devolution of real property rights to intellectual 
property, there is evidence that transaction costs have caused knowledge creation, in 
some cases, to move away from government enforced monopoly protection.  There is 
evidence of historical common resource communities that cooperated to innovate without 
protection of monopoly exclusivity (Von Hippel, 2002).  Additionally, during the last 
decades of the 20th century to the present, thousands of intentional communities have 
formed over the internet to develop innovation knowledge, most prevalently FOSS.   I 
have identified this period of FOSS creation as a sixth period of intentional communities 
with common-pool resources.  FOSS communities include geographically dispersed 
community members who typically do not maintain common real property but rather 
common-resource intellectual property.  I refer to this period as the “Online Innovation 
Movement” and add it to the previous five eras of intentional communities as shown in 
Figure 3.1. 
6) “Online Innovation Movement” includes geographically disperse contributors who 






FIGURE 3.1 – Intentional Communities with Common-Resource Property Rights 
 
The above timeline is based on the previously identified five periods of 
intentional communities (Brown, 2002) with updated information to include the “Online 
Innovation Movement.”  Online innovation communities are comparable to the previous 
five periods of intentional communities in that people combine efforts to achieve a 
common social agenda and to share common-pool resources.  Online communities differ 
from their predecessor communities in that real property is not held in common but rather 
participants’ intellectual property is contributed to the community and held in common.  
No physical location of the online community is required because the innovation 
knowledge is collected via the internet and only a portion of the participants’ time and 
effort is contributed to the common cause of the community.  Because real property is not 
held in common, a complete lifestyle focused on the intentional community is not 
required in these knowledge creation communities. Online communities narrow the focus 
of the community more specifically to the creation of common resource intellectual 




In summary, strong property rights developed over time based on production 
efficiencies, available technology and types of property.  Legal protection of private 
intellectual property rights grew out of real private property theories.  IPRs follow a 
similar historical development to real private property with increased protection based on 
theories of production methods and innovation incentives.   
Some have criticized strong real private property rights based on inequitable 
distribution of property.  Based on economic and social concerns private property rights 
in some cases have devolved to common-property rights.  Similarly, private intellectual 
property rights have devolved into common-pool intellectual property within some 







COOPERATIVE INNOVATION: SOCIAL UTOPIAN  
CASE STUDY COMMUNITIES 
 
As to their cooperative mode of working and living, who can say that there is not 
in it the germ of a principle which will yet be needed to reform the evils of 
money-grabbing and monopoly?  (Staff Correspondent, 1881, p. 5) 
 
In Section 4.1 of this chapter, I introduce 19th century US communitarian groups 
and identify three case study communities that also have record of communitarian 
innovation: Shakers, Mormons and Oneida Perfectionists.  Each of these three case study 
communities were founded as religious communities during the Shaker Influx and 
Utopian Socialist periods (as discussed in Chapter 2) and overlapped in time and 
geographic region during the 1800s in the Northeastern United States. Primary and 
secondary source records for each of these communities provide evidence of cooperative 
innovation outside the incentives created by patent monopolies.  In Sections 4.2 – 4.4 I 
provide an overview of each group’s socioeconomic foundation and the communitarian 







4.1 19th Century Communitarian Groups 
A map of the world that does not include Utopia is not even worth glancing at 
for it leaves out the one country at which humanity is always landing. (Wilde, 1891, p. 
16) 
The burnt over district of upstate New York, so called because of the extreme 
religious upheaval fomented by numerous itinerant preachers, gave birth to several Bible 
Socialist communities.  During this time, not only were communitarian groups formed by 
domestic idealists, but also many religious and economic refugees from Europe came to 
the United States anxious to put into practice the communitarian theories not allowed in 
their home countries.  “No other period comes close to matching the record of the first 
half of the nineteenth century,” for the creation of communitarian experiments (Bestor 
1953, p. 506).4    
 America experienced an intense wave of social reform in the decades leading up 
to the Civil War.  This wave broke in many directions: antislavery, temperance, 
Christian revivals, new religious sects, communal living, socialism, Fourierism, 
San Simonism, feminism.  … [and] others branched off into experiments with 
new types of communities.  What is noticeable is the role that formal 
organizations played in all these efforts. … [S]ome reformers… looked forward, 
and sought ways to reconcile market freedom with moral frameworks of order 
inherited from republicanism through “modern” methods, particularly methods of 
organization.  Through organization, they did not reject the market, but rather 
sought to rationalize it. (Lipartito & Sicilia, eds., 2004, pp. 95 - 96) 
 
Table 4.1 below is created from two contemporaneous publications of the 19th 
century: “American Communities: Brief Sketches of Economy, Zoar, Bethel, Aurora, 
Amana, Icaria, The Shakers, Oneida, Wallingford, and The Brotherhood of the New  
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 During the first half of the 19th century there is record of over 100 communitarian experiments in the 
United States.  Some of these experiments took place in the frontier states of Indiana, Wisconsin, Missouri 
and Illinois; however, many more took root in the more established states of New York, Pennsylvania and 
Ohio, giving reason to question the theory that the prospect of the harsh frontier life motivated 




TABLE 4.1 – 19th Century Communitarian Groups 
Community Name Location 
Amana Homestead, Iowa 
Aurora Aurora, Oregon 
Bethel Bethel, Missouri 
Fountain Grove Santa Rosa, California 
Salem-on-Erie Brocton, New York 
Harmony Economy, Pennsylvania 
Icarian Corning, Iowa 
Oneida Oneida, New York 
Wallingford Wallingford, Connecticut 
Zoar Zoar, Ohio 
Alfred (Shaker) Alfred, Maine 
Canterbury (Shaker) Shaker Village, New Hampshire
Enfield (Shaker) Enfield, New Hampshire 
Enfield (Shaker) Thompsonville, Connecticut 
Gloucester (Shaker) West Gloucester, Maine 
Groveland (Shaker) Sonyea, New York 
Hancock (Shaker) West Pittsfield, Mass. 
Harvard (Shaker) Ayer, Mass. 
Mt. Lebanon (Shaker) Mt. Lebanon, New York 
North Union (Shaker) Cleveland, Ohio 
Pleasant Hill (Shaker) Pleasant Hill, Kentucky 
Shirley (Shaker) Shirley Village, Mass. 
South Union (Shaker) South Union, Kentucky 
Union Village (Shaker) Lebanon, Ohio 
Watervliet (Shaker) Shakers, New York 
Watervliet (Shaker) Preston, Ohio 
Hopedale Millford, MA 
Owenites Harmony, Indiana 
Fourierists Brook Farm, NY and others 
Skeneateles Community Unknown 
Beizel’s Community Unknown 
Snowberger Community Unknown 
Ebenezer Community Unknown 






Life” (Hinds, 1878) and “The Oneida Community and American Socialism” (Estlake, 
1900). This list provides representation of the diversity of communities and locations but 
is not exhaustive of the many communitarian projects implemented in the 19th century. 
Although the 19th century was unprecedented for the number of geographic 
communitarian experiments that were initiated, most of these experiments did not last 
beyond a few years.  These “utopian settlements above all else [were] attempts to change 
structures and thereby to change the conditions under which individuals act and live” 
(Cooper, 1987, p 2). The practice of common-pool resources attracted a large number of 
participants based on ideals of equitable distribution and social agendas; however, the 
organizational structure of these communities did not always lead to successful 
community building.  (See Appendix B for a discussion on three short-lived 19th century 
communitarian groups.) 
A serious concern for the success of these communities, as noted by John Stuart 
Mill, was the lack of incentive to work and especially the lack of incentive for the most 
qualified individual to undertake difficult leadership responsibilities. However, the 
influence of the Second Great Awakening on social reform in the 19th century provided 
significant member motivation and charismatic leadership to many of these 
communitarian groups.   The evangelical movement of the early 1800s had a profound 
impact on communitarian experimentation.  The founders of religious movements 
accepted the onus of community leadership along with the position of religious leadership 
as a call from God.  Indeed, a religious tenet was a focus on salvation and millennial hope 
by preparing a better society of people (Cook, 1985).  Charismatic religious leaders 




Charismatic religious leaders headed many of the most successful communities, 
including Father Rapp (Rappites), Joseph Smith (Mormons), John Humphrey Noyes 
(Oneida Perfectionists) and Ann Lees (Shakers). 
Many of the religious communitarians adapted to harsh conditions and established 
new policies and locations when social and economic forces required. Some experiments, 
such as the Mormons in the Great Salt Lake Basin, deliberately established in areas 
considered so hostile that no other group would bother to challenge their religious, social 
or economic system.  Others, to preserve economic solidarity and social isolation, settled 
in populated areas but maintained their own foreign language upon moving to America 
rather than learn English.  Examples include the Rappites and Amana Colonists who kept 
their native language to isolate themselves from the surrounding world.  These were 
attempts to preserve community organization and structure from the often hostile attacks 
of the outside world. 
Furthermore, several communities created innovative knowledge and developed 
new technology used to ease their own labor or improve the community’s financial status 
through commercial success.  Based on the available record of innovation, three 
communities were chosen for use as case studies: the Shakers, Mormons and Oneida 
Perfectionists. 
 
4.2  Shakers 
A group of Quakers in Manchester England accepted Ann Lees (shortened to Lee 
after immigrating to the US) as the “Mother in Christ.”  Lee and eight followers left 




several new members to join their small group (Blinn, 1884).  Late in the 18th century, 
Shakers began the move to communitarian principles and shared property.  One Shaker 
Elder wrote, “The time is come to give up yourselves and your all to God – your 
substance, your temporal property -- to possess as though you possessed not” (Cosgel, 
Miceli, & Murray, 1997, p 132).  In 1795, the Shakers’ first community covenant asked 
members to give all their worldly property to the “Joint interest of the Church.”  Based on 
the communitarian principles, all members would have equal rights and there would be 
no differences based on what any individual brought to the community (Cosgel, Miceli 
and Murray, 1997, p 132). By the early 19th century when Father Joseph Meacham and 
Mother Lucy Wright became co-leaders the Shakers were practicing the communitarian 
ideal of shared property (Alexander & Keep, 1995).    
The change to communitarian principles and common property was successful for 
the Shakers and by 1888 (at the publication of the autobiography of Shaker Elder 
Frederick Evans) the Shakers had grown significantly and amassed a fair amount of 
wealth.  At that time, there were approximately 70 small Shaker communities with 
several (three to eight communities) located closely together with adjoining land to form 
a Society.  There were 17 Societies of US Shakers comprised of “between four and five 
thousand individuals” located in New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New 
Hampshire, Maine, Ohio, and Kentucky (Evans, 1888, p 260).    
As an offshoot of the Society of Friends (Quakers), the Shakers believed in many 
of the same concepts such as “the peace principles, the no poverty principle, the plainness 
of dress and language” but also added celibacy as a means to a higher spiritual perfection 




celibacy but only those of a higher spiritual nature.  Celibacy was considered an 
important step to spiritual perfection and was also considered a practical measure to curb 
global overpopulation (Evans 1888, p 215).  
A “central idea” of the Shaker religion was the “duality” of the “Deific Essence” 
defined as a male and female god (Evans, 1888).  Based on this doctrine, within Shaker 
communities women had equal religious, economic, social influence and power as men.  
The Shaker community was one “where woman has absolutely the same freedom and 
power as man in every respect” (Evans 1888, p. 268). Communities were organized into 
groups referred to as “families” with leadership responsibilities shared between the male 
and female members.  Families varied in size and economic circumstances depending on 
geographic location, business ventures and abilities (Cooper, 1987, p. 4). 
…each of these communities was further divided into semi-autonomous 
subdivisions called Families.  Each Shaker community consisted of two to six 
Families, units ranging in size from about ten to more than one hundred persons. 
… Those living in a Family worked and consumed together, sharing income and 
assets.  (Cosgel, Miceli, & Murray, 1997 p. 133) 
 
Shakers strongly believed in effective use of time and implemented labor saving 
devices of their own design and others.  During the 1800s, Shakers were widely 
considered as savvy inventors of technology which they used to improve efficiency and 
production of quality goods.  Shaker Elisha Myrik (as cited in Becksvoort & Sheldon, 
2000, p. 11) explains the Shaker attitude toward innovation as “every improvement 
relieving human toil or facilitating labor [gives] more time and opportunity for moral, 
mechanical, scientific and intellectual improvement and the cultivation of the finer and 
higher qualities of the human mind.”  Based on historical records including newspaper 




The New York Daily Tribune reported in 1881 (Staff Correspondent) that Shakers 
invented the machine manufacture of “wire cards” for wool and flax.  
Additionally, The Shaker, a community produced newsletter, reported in 1877 (as 
cited in Buckingham, 1877) that Shakers invented the:  
• manufacture of corn-brooms and improved the process for creating broom 
handles; 
• planing-machine;  
• self-acting cheese press; 
• Clothes-pins; 
• Shaker washing machine;  
• Mowers and reapers;  
• machinery for twisting whip handles; 
• pea-sheller;  
• printing presses used by the Shakers of Lebanon and Watervliet for printing 
seed bags and herb papers; and  
• machine for filling seed-bags,  
 
The Shaker (as cited in Buckingham, 1877, p. 59) also reported that “the first 
circular saw ever made was invented by the Lebanon Shakers, and may be seen to-day in 
the "State Geological Department," at Albany, N. Y., where it was deposited by Bro. G. 
M. Wickersham.”   In an interview published in The Boston Sunday Globe (as cited in 
Rothschild, 1981, p 314-15), Eliza Babbit (a Shaker Eldress) remembers her cousin 
Tabitha Babbit as the innovator of the circular saw in 1810: 
One day while watching the men sawing wood, she [Tabitha Babbit] noted that 
one half the motion was lost and she conceived the idea of the circular saw.  She 
made a tin disk, and notching it around the edge, slipped it on the spindle of her 
spinning wheel, tried it on a piece of a shingle and found that her idea was a 
practical one, and from this crude beginning came the circular saw of today. Sister 
Tabitha’s first saw was made in sections and fastened to a board.  A Lebanon 
Shaker later conceived the idea of making the saw out of a single piece of metal. 
 
The Globe Republic of Springfield, Ohio reported in 1886 that the Shakers invented cut 




as “Sister Tabitha” watched the men manufacture nails she realized that nails could be cut 
from a sheet of iron; the idea was “worked out to a success” to produce cut nails (as cited in 
Carson, Lanier, & Carson, 2000). 
The St. Paul Daily Globe (1895, n.a.) printed that the Shakers invented a cure for 
dyspepsia and also reported in 1905 (n.a.) that the Shakers were credited with inventing: 
• A type of alloy metal;  
• Rotary harrow;   
• Modern harness; and the    
• Stove lid lifter   
 
Other inventions attributed to the Shakers by modern researchers, among many others, 
include “hair caps” for balding Shaker men; a device for paring, coring and quartering 
apples; revolving oven; machines for box cutting and basketry; and, a dough-kneading 
machine (Carson, Lanier, & Carson, 2000). 
The list of inventions is extensive because Shakers were motivated to improve 
their conditions.  Father Meacham stated, “We have the right to improve the inventions of 
man, so far as is useful and necessary, but not to vain glory or anything superfluous” (as 
cited in Andrews & Andrews, 1974, p. 152). 
  Based on the available information, there is evidence that Shakers practiced 
communitarian innovation among those who worked on the circular saw and the cut nails. 
Also, different Shaker communities cooperated together to innovate.  The Lebanon 
community of Shakers invented the printing presses for printing seed bags and herb 






4.3  Mormons 
Founded in New York by Joseph Smith in 1830, the Mormon religion, like many 
others at that time, was a response to the millennial hope of a perfect society.  Fleeing 
persecution, Mormons established successive communities in New York, Ohio, Missouri, 
Illinois/Iowa, and finally Utah. The Mormons practiced formal communitarian principles 
during two of those periods: one in Missouri and the other in Utah (Gardner, 1922).   
The first period of Mormon communitarian practice came about after Mormon 
missionaries converted an Ohio Campbellite preacher, Sydney Rigdon, and his 
congregation.  Rigdon had formed a Utopian Socialist experiment called “The Family” 
based on Robert Owen’s Indiana experiment (Cook, 1985).5   After meeting Rigdon, 
Joseph Smith introduced communitarianism to the Mormon membership with the 
revelation of the “Law of Consecration” (Cook, 1985).   The Law explained that all 
property rightfully belonged to God and individuals were only “stewards.” Soon after 
Smith announced the law some members implement the concepts by assigning all of their 
property to the community and received back only according to their needs and 
capabilities.  Members were expected to sign deeds of gift and contract with the bishop (a 
community leader responsible for members’ welfare) who would in turn guarantee 
provision for the steward and his family in case of infirmity or old age (Arrington, 1976).   
Mormons who “consecrated” their property to the group would then receive back 
only the amount needed for their family.  Any excess output at the end of the year would 
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again be consecrated to the group.6  The idea was to place all families on equal 
psychological and physiological footing -- “considering the family obligations, 
circumstances, needs and ‘just wants’” (Arrington, 1976, p. 15). In this way each person 
maintained responsibilities of ownership but gave all excess to the group.  As stewards of 
property, individuals were responsible for what they did with their allocation.  Goods 
were provided free of charge from the storehouse to members in need and any excess was 
sold outside of the community for profit (Cook, 1985).7  Even if distribution of resources 
was not exactly equal based on quantity, it was intended to be equal based on need 
(Romney, 1966).  Similar to the other case study communities, Mormon leaders 
implemented a nontraditional family structure.  Several male leaders practiced polygamy 
and married women who were otherwise unmarried.  Although strongly rejected by 
outsiders, polygamy provided a means to include women in the socioeconomic structure 
created by the Law of Consecration. 
                                                 
6
 Another problem considered by Smith was that consecrating the surplus back to the community could 
threaten the incentive for profit.  Nevertheless, he felt that the annual negotiation with the bishop for the 
‘needs’ of each family could indeed influence the profit motive of the stewards and raise the living standard 
of all in the community (Cook, 1985). 
7
 Section 42, verses 32-33, of The Doctrine and Covenants (Smith, 1981, p. 72), a Mormon scripture, 
explains the process of consecration and the stewards’ responsibilities.  Also, the scripture discusses the use 
of excess property.   
32) And it shall come to pass, that after they are laid before the bishop of my church, and after that 
he has received these testimonies concerning the consecration of the properties of my church, that 
they cannot be taken from the church, agreeable to my commandments, every man shall be made 
accountable unto me, a steward over his own property, or that which he has received by 
consecration, as much as is sufficient for himself and family.   
 33) And again, if there shall be properties in the hands of the church, or any individuals of it, 
more than is necessary for their support after this first consecration, which is a residue to be 
consecrated unto the bishop, it shall be kept to administer to those who have not, from time to 





Mormons implemented varying degrees of the Law of Consecration once they 
were forced out of Missouri and removed to Illinois, Nebraska and Iowa.  Although the 
practice of the law ultimately failed due to practical and legal problems, it remained an 
ideal to which each member was to aspire (Arrington, 1971).  The practice of tithing, 
payment of “one-tenth of all their interest annually” (Smith, 1981, p. 238), was 
introduced to prepare community members for the complete practice of the Law of 
Consecration at a later time.  The Mormon scripture explains: 
The Lord had previously given to the Church the law of consecration and 
stewardship of property, which members (chiefly the leading elders) entered into 
by a covenant that was to be everlasting.  Because of failure on the part of many 
to abide by this covenant, the Lord withdrew it for a time and gave instead the law 
of tithing to the whole Church. (Smith, 1981, p. 238) 
 
Getting to the Great Salt Lake Basin was a life threatening matter which required 
extensive cooperation among members.  The attitude of cooperation included an example 
of cooperative innovation that occurred during the exodus from Nauvoo to the Rocky 
Mountains.  The Mormons left their settlement, Nauvoo, founded on the East shore of the 
Mississippi in Southern Illinois to make their way toward the Rocky Mountains.  The 
first group leaving for the Rocky Mountains created daily travel logs in order to facilitate 
travel by later groups.  William Clayton, one of several mileage log keepers in the group, 
counted the revolutions of a wagon wheel and kept records of each revolution in order to 
calculate the distance travelled (Wright 1997-98).  At the end of each day there were 
widely divergent estimates from those keeping track of the distance travelled.  This 
variance motivated Clayton to initiate an innovation that would more accurately measure 




The personal journals of William Clayton, Orson Pratt and Appleton Harmon 
provide record of cooperation among the members of the wagon train to create a device 
that measured the distance traveled during each day and from landmark to landmark 
(Wright 1997-98).8  Because numerous people were involved in the creation of the 
odometer, there is debate among a few scholars today as to who should actually receive 
credit as “inventor” of the Mormon odometer or the “roadometer.”  Based on primary 
source journals and several secondhand accounts I have reconstructed some of the events 
surrounding the cooperative invention of the Mormon odometer and found that no single 
person can be credited with devising the entire invention but rather several individuals 
collaborated throughout each stage of invention:  concept, design, manufacture, 
reworking and refining.  
During the idea and design stage, Clayton (1921) recorded in his journal on 
Monday April 19th that he had “advanced” the idea of an odometer to several other men 
in the party who seemed to agree that idea had merit.  On April 22nd, Clayton (1921) 
further discussed the idea of an odometer and described the concept of the machine he 
had in mind: 
I again introduced the subject of fixing machinery to a wagon wheel to tell the 
distance we travel, describing the machinery and the time it would take to make it 
&c several caught the idea and feel confident of its success.  
 
There was no further report of progress on an odometer until May 8th when 
Clayton (1921) reported in his journal that he is more certain that the mileage estimates 
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 Although available for purchase in England and elsewhere, the Mormons failed to bring an odometer with 
them on the trail westward.  However they did have other measuring and scientific tools including: “one 
circle of reflection, two sextants, one quadrant, two artificial horizons, one large refracting telescope, 
several smaller ones, two barometers, several thermometers, besides nautical almanacks [sic], books, maps, 




of others were too high, increasing the need for a more precise measure obtained from an 
odometer: 
This morning I determined to take pains, to know for a certainty how far we travel 
to day. Accordingly I measured the circumference of the nigh hind wheel of one 
of brother Kimballs wagons being the one I sleep in, in charge of Philo Johnson. I 
found the wheel exactly 14 feet 8 inches, in circumference, not varying one eighth 
of an inch. I then calculated how many revolutions it would require for 1 mile and 
found it precisely 360 not varying one fraction which somewhat astonished me. I 
have counted the whole revolutions during the days travel and I find it to be a 
little over 11¼ miles. (20 revolutions over.) … Some have past the days travel at 
13 and some 14 miles, which serves to convince more strongly that the distances 
are overrated. I have repeatedly suggested a plan of fixing machinery to a wagon 
wheel to tell the exact distance we travel in a day, and many begin to be sanguine 
for carrying it into effect, and I hope it will be done.  
 
With wagon wheel measurements and calculations of revolutions required to 
measure a mile, Clayton developed an initial design for the measuring device.   Two days 
later, on May 10, 1847, Orson Pratt wrote in his journal that Brigham Young wanted Pratt 
to design a device to record more accurate mileage (as cited in Wright 1997-98). There is 
no record of Clayton’s specifications for his odometer design; however, Pratt did provide 
in his journal a detailed specification of an odometer design.   The outcome of the final 
instrument was significantly different than that proposed by Pratt and was very likely 
modified by a team working on the creation of the device as the original design proved to 
be impractical (Wright 1997-98).  
At this stage of the innovation Appleton Harmon, a skilled wood worker, became 
involved with building the odometer from wood and likely provided input regarding the 
practical implementation of the original design.  Upon completion of the wooden 
odometer, Amasa Lyman wrote in his journal that the communitarian innovation included 




Another design improvement was necessary once the instrument was exposed to 
rain which caused the wood to expand and resulted in cogs that would not work properly 
and break.  The problem was solved by creating a wooden housing to protect the cogs 
from the weather. Later, Clayton (1921) wrote in his journal that the roadometer did not 
work properly on steep descents but that the next day he got the roadometer fixed during 
a breakfast break. Once arriving in the Salt Lake valley, the Mormons improved and 
repaired the roadometer in preparation for a group of men who were to return and help 
others make their way to the valley.  William King manufactured a new machine with an 
additional improvement of measuring one thousand miles (Wright 1997-98). Records also 
show that along with King others were involved in this stage of improving the instrument 
including Clayton and Orson Whitney (Egan, 1917). 
There is no evidence that any of the roadometer innovations or improvements 
were patented but a guidebook titled “The Latter-day Saints' emigrants' guide” was 
published based on the mileage records obtained from the improved roadometer 
(Crawley, 2005).9   
 
4.4 Oneida Perfectionists 
Similar to the many other utopian experiments of the mid-19th century, the Oneida 
Perfectionists established a community of common property and equal work 
opportunities.  As with the Mormon community, some of its social practices implemented 
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 The complete title is: The Latter-day Saints' emigrants' guide: being a table of distances, showing all the 
springs, creeks, rivers, hills, mountains, camping places, and all other notable places, from Council Bluffs, 
to the Valley of the Great Salt Lake. Also, the latitudes, longitudes and altitudes of the prominent points on 
the route. Together with remarks on the nature of the land, timber, grass, &c. The whole route having been 
carefully measured by a roadometer, and the distance from point to point, in English miles, accurately 





in later years were highly controversial and ultimately contributed to the dissolution of 
the community in 1881.   
As a student at Yale Divinity School in 1834, John Humphrey Noyes declared 
over the pulpit that he had no sin.  His perception of sin was much different than the 
typical Congregational Church view at Divinity School and Noyes was expelled due to 
his unorthodox teachings (Oneida Association, 1849, p.3).  
By 1848, Noyes and a small number of followers (several family members and a 
few other believers) established a communitarian society in Oneida, New York.  In its 
First Annual Report  (Oneida Association, 1849) the community reported businesses of 
saw mills and lumber operations to finance their association but did not expect these 
operations “or any other labors to meet the expenses of the year, but looked mainly to the 
capital coming in with its members, and the subsidies of its friends” (Oneida Association, 
1849, p. 6). Comparable to the many other struggling contemporary communitarian 
groups, Oneida Perfectionists’ ability to become self-sustaining depended on the arrival 
of new members with assets which they would commit to the society.  Unlike most 
contemporary groups of the time, Oneida not only became self-sufficient but also 
financially successful.   
Even though the Community optimistically reported in 1849 (Oneida Association) 
that it would become self-supporting by the following year, it was another seven years 
before its operations in lumber, fruit bottling, silk machinery, and especially animal traps 
provided sufficiently for its members (Oneida Community, 1867).10  For the Oneida 
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Perfectionists, the concept of communitarian property included sharing food and living 
quarters with each other in a large community family.  For Noyes, a logical outcome of 
the concept of shared property was to establish the doctrine of “complex marriage” where 
every man and woman in the community was shared with each other and only 
discouraged “exclusive relationships” between one man and one woman (Oneida 
Association, 1849).    
Oneida Perfectionists gathered into groups and practiced what was referred to as 
“Mutual Criticism”.  This practice provided a forum to group members to air grievances 
and give feedback to other group members regarding their behavior and performance in 
work, religious and social interactions (Oneida Community, 1876).  An alignment of 
several important factors brought about the success of animal trap manufacturing for 
Oneida.  First, the move to Oneida NY brought the group of Perfectionists within a few 
miles of Samuel Newhouse’s farm.  At that time, Samuel Newhouse had been making 
and improving traps since his teenage years and established a local reputation as a quality 
trap maker (Noyes, J. H., Ed. 1865). 
In 1835 Newhouse married one of the members of the Oneida Community and 
converted to the Perfectionist views (Noyes, J. H., Ed. 1865).   He became a resident and 
member of the Oneida community and for the first several years as Community member, 
                                                                                                                                                 
 “… Oneida was not, for the first eight years of its existence, self supporting, owing to many 
causes, such as the lack of well-organized businesses, the printing of a free paper, extortions of 
seceders, outside enemies, etc.; but since 1857 there has been a gradual improvement in its 
circumstances. … Community members are employed in the different mechanical branches carried 
on. Beside the ordinary businesses of carpentry, blacksmithing, shoemaking, tailoring, dentistry, 
etc., there is a large satchel-factory on the site of the old Indian saw-mill. At another location there 
is an iron foundry and saw-mill. At another there are large machine-shops and extensive trap-
works, where are annually made many thousands of Newhouse's celebrated steel traps... The 





Newhouse was forbidden to make traps, possibly to prove his loyalty to the Association 
and belief in its ideals or possibly because trapping did not coincide with the community 
belief in nonviolence. However, when a letter arrived for Newhouse requesting a 
production order of 500 traps, Noyes recognized the potential for financial gain and 
decided to begin the business of trap-making (Newhouse,1865). 
Beginning in 1855, the Community began manufacturing traps for commercial 
purposes and within a short period of time the Newhouse trap provided much needed 
financial success to the Community.  Along with the good fortune of gaining a member 
with trap making skills, the rise in fur prices and the Westward expansion in the US 
greatly increased the demand for traps. Noyes was prescient enough to realize that the 
success of his community depended on a strong business venture and focused efforts on 
improving the manufacturing process and the performance of the traps (Newhouse, 
1865). 
Through the cooperation of several within the Community, “mechanical 
appliances” were invented to more efficiently manufacture the traps and increase 
production.  Members of the group invented machines for “cutting or stamping the 
various parts, which quickly do the hand-work of ten or fifteen men.”  (Oneida 
Community, 1867).  Several unnamed “young men” along with Newhouse and Noyes 
invented machinery that took the production of traps from a handmade process to a 
machine driven process and dramatically increased the output of traps (Newhouse, 1865).   
Among them were several young men, who, together with Messrs. Noyes and 
Newhouse exercised their inventive powers in devising mechanical appliances to 
take the place of hand-labor in fashioning the different parts of the trap.  A power-
punch was the first machine introduced, then a rolling apparatus for swaging the 





In addition to making the manufacture of traps more efficient through 
mechanization, the Oneida Community also collaboratively improved the traps.  The type 
of materials used and the mechanism of the spring component were improved upon by 
the Community efforts.   
Soon it was found that malleable cast-iron could be used as a substitute for 
wrought-iron, in several parts of the traps.  … One by one the difficulties in the 
way were overcome by the ingenuity of our machinists, until at length the whole 
process of forming the spring, from its condition as a steel bar to that of the bent, 
bowed, tempered and elastic article, ready for use, is now executed by machinery 
almost without the blow of a hammer.  (Newhouse, 1865, p. 117) 
 
Through cooperative innovation the production and function of the animal traps 
were improved and commercialized to become one of the most successful traps of the 
time.  The Oneida traps gained national and international reputation and, in a short time, 
demand exceeded the ability of the Community to supply the traps which drove the 
community to increase mechanization of the trap production.  In 1856, the community 
moved production to a bigger space with more efficient production machinery and in 
1857 the community produced 26,000 traps, which was more than the total combined for 
the first 5 years (Wonderley, n.d.).  Although there is no clear record that the Oneida 
Perfectionists rejected patent protection on religious or moral principles, a review of the 
US Patent and Trademark Office records shows no filing for a patent by Newhouse or 
Noyes for the trap innovations.  Additionally, there is evidence that the Oneida 
Perfectionists rejected IP projection based on competitors that pirated the name and 
design of the trap. 
The reputation which has come to [Newhouse] on this basis, has made it seem 
desirable to other manufacturers, in some instances, to pirate his name to give 





Due to outside pressures against Complex Marriage and internal strife, in 1880 the 
community disassembled as a communitarian group and restructured as a stock company 
with five businesses – “the making of spool silk, traps, chains, canned fruit, and 
silverware” (Lowenthal, 1927, p. 114). 
In summary, although there were many communitarian experiments in the 1800s, 
I have chosen three for case study analysis based on available records of innovation and 
successful communitarian socioeconomic structure.  I have reviewed the Shaker, 
Mormon and Oneida Perfectionist social and economic organization along with the 









COOPERATIVE INNOVATION: FOSS CASE STUDY COMMUNITIES 
 
In the previous chapter, I selected three historical communitarian groups as case 
studies for communitarian innovation.  In this chapter, I look at FOSS communities that 
promote intellectual common-pool resources. Section 5.1 reviews the origins of FOSS 
culture beginning in the mid-20th century and discuss the impact of strengthening IPRs on 
the development of FOSS.  Of the thousands of FOSS communities established in 
response to the privatization of software innovation, I identify three communities for case 
study analysis, Linux, Apache and Firefox, which have created successful community 
structures and produced innovation that is widely implemented. Sections 5.2 – 5.4 
provide an overview of each FOSS case study community and briefly discuss each 
community’s invention. 
 
5.1  Software Intellectual Property Rights 
During the early history of computers, from WWII to 1975 (when IBM separated 
its operating system software from its hardware), cooperation among innovators of 
software was expected and considered common practice.  Developers continuously 
shared modifications with each other and code changes were made available to anyone 




source software became a topic of discussion, a technical paper presentation introduced 
the Multics System software (Corbato & Vyssotsky, 1965, The Multics System).  This 
presentation provides insight into the foundations of software creation and the then 
current FOSS psychology.  The paper and presentation explained that the Multics System 
should be freely available in order to “withstand public scrutiny” and to “make the inner 
operating system as lucid as possible” for current and future users (Corbato & Vyssotsky, 
1965).   Code that was accessible to everyone increased the potential that the software 
could become even better. 
The system will evolve under the influence of the users and their activities for a 
long time and in directions which are hard to predict at this time... It is expected 
that most of the system additions will come from the users themselves and the 
system will eventually become the repository of the procedure and data 
knowledge of the community. (Corbato & Vyssotsky, 1965, Conclusions) 
 
As computers became faster, smaller and more powerful, an important part of the 
software developer and academic culture in the 1960s and 70s was the persistent free 
sharing of computer code.  The source code was made freely available with the 
understanding that it would be subjected to further changes and modifications which, in 
turn, would be made available to all others who may want to use it as is, or modify it 
further.   
Unix, a timesharing software system, is an example of the openness in which 
software was developed at that time. Bell Laboratories developed Unix and provided the 
software to universities and research labs at very low cost and allowed them open access 
to the code which encouraged users to fix bugs and share enhancements to the software.   




Distributions (BSD) and added network capabilities and other features (UNIX Operating 
System, 2003).   
The openness of the Unix system, together with its popularity in academic circles, 
has always encouraged its users to fix bugs and to add new tools freely in the 
spirit of mutual cooperation. Important and useful utilities were frequently 
replaced by more sophisticated and extended versions. (UNIX Operating System, 
2003, Evaluation) 
 
During this same timeframe, the US military’s Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (ARPA) initiated a system to network long distance computers.  Its growth and 
evolution was motivated by users of the system who shared ideas resulting in the 
ARPAnet, the precursor to the internet.  “Request for Comments” (RFCs) became 
standard solicitations for ARPAnet contributors to review each other’s work and 
collaboratively build several standard operating procedures of the internet such as, 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), IP (Internet Protocol), and Simple Mail Transfer 
Protocol (SMTP) (Taylor, 1996).   
Despite this foundation of freely shared software code, in the 1970s and 1980s 
many software companies began publishing proprietary software which hid code from 
users and developers and prohibited modifications or improvements.  Even Unix, which 
started as an open code system, ultimately limited the accessibility of its code and made it 
unavailable for changes or the ability to share the modifications with other developers 
and users (Wheeler, 2007).11 
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 At about this same time, in the late 1970s  a Stanford math professor and computer enthusiast, Donald 
Knuth, was writing a math book and was interested in finding an appropriate digital font that could handle 
mathematical and scientific equations.    Over a course of 10 years he researched and wrote the code to a 
font, TEX, which has been used widely by commercial, academic and private entities.  Knuth wanted a 
system that could be changed by others to meet their own needs and would be widely used in the scientific 
publishing industry.   The TEX code has been integrated into several proprietary products.  Although not 
originally organized as cooperative innovation, the process of developing the source code came about 




The incentive to keep source code restricted through proprietary IP increased as 
the courts increased IPR protection.  Initially, copyrights were used to enforce software 
intellectual property rights and any modification to proprietary source code was restricted 
through copyright law (Gay, 2002).  Any written work is protected by copyright law and 
copyright law is less restrictive than patent law in terms of obtaining IP protection. 
However, copyright legal protection covers only the manner of expression and not the 
ideas or innovation.  Alternatively, patent protection covers the manner and method of the 
invention and restricts use by would be competitors thus providing the potential of 
significant economic profits.  Patent protection provides the patent owner the ability to 
prevent others from “making, using or selling” the patented invention compared to 
copyrights that only prevent copying of an expression of an idea.  Copyright protection 
does not prevent the invention of other software based on the same idea (Tysver, 1996-
2008, II.A).   
The U.S. courts gradually shifted their interpretation on the validity and legality 
of software patents.  In the 1960s the USPTO held that computer programs were “mental 
steps” and not patentable and created specific guidelines formalizing its position on 
software patents which was frequently challenged in court.  One such challenge, 
Gottschalk v. Benson (1972), resulted in a decision by the Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals (CCPA) which stated that a software program effectively turns the computer into 
a “new machine” and therefore is patentable.  However, the Supreme Court disagreed 
with the CCPA and denied patentability.  The Supreme Court decision was based on the 
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concern that mathematics is an abstract idea and, therefore, not patentable because the 
software algorithm used math to convert binary-coded decimal numbers to true binary 
numbers. The 1978 Supreme Court decision in Parker v. Flook confirmed that algorithms 
were not patentable even with an additional step beyond the mathematical calculation 
(Tysver, 1996-2008, “History of Software Patents”).   
In 1981, however, the US Supreme Court decided Diamond v. Diehr in favor of 
software patentability and forced the USPTO to grant a patent on software.  The 
invention was a software code that controlled the heating and curing of rubber and also 
included additional steps on rubber processing.  The Supreme Court ruled that the 
invention was more than a mathematical algorithm and was actually a “process” for 
manufacturing rubber.  The Court stated that the algorithm (the Arrhenius equation) did 
not preempt other uses for the equation because the claimed use was only for “a process 
for curing rubber” (Tysver, 1996-2008, II.A).   The Court stated:   
[The inventors] do not seek to patent a mathematical formula. Instead, they seek 
patent protection for a process of curing synthetic rubber. Their process 
admittedly employs a well-known mathematical equation, but they do not seek to 
pre-empt the use of that equation. Rather, they seek only to foreclose from others 
the use of that equation in conjunction with all of the other steps in their claimed 
process. (Tysver, 1996-2008, II.A)   
 
In 1998, further legal clarification and strengthening of software patentability 
came in the Court decision State Street & Trust v. Signature Financial Group.  Signature 
Financial had obtained a patent on software which computed mutual fund returns and 
distributed the percent of ownership to a variety of proprietary portfolios.  The Court 
upheld the patentability of the business method and solidified the ability to patent 
software (Tysver, 1996-2008, II.A).  In late 2008 many hoped for a reversal on software 




court decision only set forth requirements for determining patentability: "(1) it is tied to a 
particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into a different 
state or thing" (Tysver, (1996-2008), II.A).   
Not everyone in the software development community was happy with the closing 
of software code and strengthening of software IPRs.  Richard Stallman, a researcher at 
MIT’s Artificial Intelligence Lab, decided to leave his position rather than become a part 
of the proprietary software system and refused to sign nondisclosure employment 
documents.  Stallman left MIT to create free software in 1983 as a protest to the closing 
of software code among fellow developers (Gay, 2002, p. 19).  Stallman, considered by 
many as the author of the FOSS movement, wrote the free software manifesto 1983 to 
explain and clarify his position on the importance of freely accessible software code.   
His goal was to create code that was freely available and open to changes in order to 
counter the closed proprietary software.  In 1984, he initiated the GNU (“Gnu Not Unix”) 
project.  The project created many software tools through collaborative efforts and grew 
as the internet allowed more access to users and contributors (Gay, 2002).  In 1985 
Stallman initiated the Free Software Foundation (FSF) and, in order to further promote 
the concept of free software among developers and to keep the software code freely 
available, he created the GNU General Public License (GPL) which is widely used by 
many other FOSS projects (Wheeler, 2007). This license included in a “viral” term that 
required all changes to also remain freely accessible. 
GNU is not in the public domain.  Everyone will be permitted to modify and 
redistribute GNU, but no distributor will be allowed to restrict its further 
redistribution.  That is to say, proprietary modifications will not be allowed.  I 





During the 1990s and into the 21st century many more “free” software projects 
were developed without monopoly incentives.  One of the best known and most widely 
used is Linux which began in 1991 when Linus Torvalds, a university student in Finland, 
posted the beginning of the kernel to a Unix based system on the internet inviting others 
to contribute and make comments.  
The term originally applied to these projects was “free software;” however, some 
felt that using the word “free” implied that there was no cost to obtain the software.  
Contrary to that misperception, free software did not mean that there was no cost but 
rather that the code was freely accessible to users and developers and that modifications 
could be freely made and shared.  Free did not mean non-commercial but rather free to 
use the program as best suits the user needs and share the improvements with others as 
desired (Wheeler, 2007). Some leaders of the cooperative software community were 
concerned regarding confusion surrounding the term “free” and in 1997 they coined the 
term “open source” to express the open nature of the code. Not everyone, however, has 
adopted the term and therefore software with open code is often referred to as “free and 
open source software” or FOSS.12 
In the early stages of FOSS development, some questioned whether a free 
software program could compete against proprietary software in terms of quality and 
technical support.  One of the advantages of the FOSS organizational structure is that 
every user has access to the source code providing the opportunity for each user to find 
and repair defects (“bugs”) in the code.  Because FOSS code is easily accessed by 
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anyone, finding bugs and defects can be quicker than with comparable proprietary 
software.  Additionally, quality of the code is increased due to the many contributors who 
review and fix it.   
Within the past two decades, thousands of FOSS communities have formed online 
to innovate cooperatively based on incentives other than government protected 
monopoly.  SourceForge.com – a major internet site for FOSS community creation – 
reported that in 2011 over 2.7 million developers and over 260,000 FOSS projects 
(Sourceforge, 2011, About, para. 2).   Some of these communities attract many members 
and others are unable to attract sufficient members to complete the cooperative 
innovation project.  Based on the number of downloads, the most popular FOSS project 
on Sourceforge is eMule which has been downloaded over 500 million times.  Some of 
the other popular projects registered with Sourceforge  (2011, top all time) are shown in 
Table 5.1. 
I have chosen three FOSS projects for my case study analysis: Linux, Apache and 
Mozilla Firefox (each of which have their own development site and are not registered 
with Sourceforge).  Although there are thousands of FOSS communities, I have selected 
these three based on the success of each community and its innovations, longevity and 
available information. For the remainder of this chapter, I provide background 
information on each of the three FOSS case study communities and create a foundation 
for analyzing the organizational attributes of successful cooperative innovation 





TABLE 5.1 – Sourceforge Top Software Downloads 
Project Name Downloads 
eMule 569,340,646 
Azureus / Vuze 515,256,618 
VLC media player 341,641,184 
Ares Galaxy 300,271,005 
Smart package 184,141,774 
7-Zip 142,816,233 
FileZilla 126,324,459 
MinGW  108,623,884 
PortableApps.com 102,309,644 





















5.2  Linux 
As discussed above, Stallman began the FOSS movement with his Manifesto and  
GNU software in the early 1980s; however, at that time there was no freely available 
operating system on which to use the GNU tools.   August 25, 1991 Linus Torvalds sent a 
post to the MINIX (a proprietary operating system) online newsgroup stating:  
Hello everybody out there using minix [sic] – I’m doing a (free) operating system 
(just a hobby, won’t be big and professional like gnu) for 386(486) AT clones.  
This has been brewing since april [sic], and is starting to get ready.  I’d like any 
feedback on things people like/dislike in minix, as my OS resembles it somewhat 
(same physical layout of the file-system (due to practical reasons) among other 
things).  (Hasan, “New Baby”, 2005, para. 6) 
 
A few weeks later, in mid-September, Linux version .01 was released on the internet.  
Many code writers downloaded and tested the software returning their findings to 
Torvalds who on October 2nd of that year released version .02 of Linux with a post on the 
Minix newsgroup stating where the source code could be found on the internet and 
provided the full kernel without any proprietary code.  Two months later, in December, 
Linux contributors had improved the code sufficiently to release version 0.10 (Hasan, 
2005).  
The Linux operating system was powered by the various programs developed in 
the GNU project and was itself licensed under the GNU General Public License (GPL).  
By 1996 Los Alamos National Laboratory chose Linux to power a super computer 
comprised of 68 connected PCs.  The cost was one-tenth what it would have been with 
proprietary software and the machine was able to function at 19 billion calculations per 
second in a very stable environment. By 2005, four of the world’s five fastest super 




Linux is a well-known and highly successful example of freely-available code 
that has brought the concept of FOSS to the attention of academics and theorists.  
Linux – based on the commercially available Unix server – provides software that 
is free of charge and that can be changed or modified to meet the needs of the 
user. (About Linux Foundation, 2009)    
 
In addition to the high perceived quality of Linux, cost savings is an important 
reason that many implement the software.  A survey found that the major reason (77%) 
for companies implementing Linux is the low cost.  Nearly as many (73%) implemented 
Linux software in response to security issues.  A majority of Linux users (74%) found the 
software to be “secure or very secure” while significantly fewer users (38%) found 
Microsoft’s proprietary server to be “secure or very secure” (Wheeler, 2007, p. 52-54). 
Many commercial vendors such as Red Hat and VA Linux provide technical 
support or have developed software programs based on Linux and support the continued 
development of Linux by providing financial support and software developers.  (Lerner 
& Tirole, 2002). Linux has obtained a reputation for stability and quality which many 
businesses have modified and implemented the operating software for their specific 
needs.  The Linux Foundation estimated that the GNU/Linux “ecosystem” would reach 
$50 billion in 2011 (Gerloff, 2010). 
 
5.3  Apache 
Rob McCool of the National Center for Supercomputing Applications (NCSA) 
developed the public domain HTTP daemon (HTTPD).  Progress on the software stalled 
in 1994 after McCool left NCSA.  Because the HTTP server source code was freely 
available to everyone and the license allowed user modifications and free redistribution 




individuals formed in order to provide technical support and improve the software 
through online collaboration (Apache, 2011).  Individual webmasters continued to use the 
HTTPD software and shared patches and bug fixes – two of the webmasters, Brian 
Behlendorf and Cliff Skolnick, created a mailing list to share information between the 
developers.  Only eight core contributors formed the original HTTPD development group 
(Apache, 2011).  The software code fixes and modifications contributed by the group 
members were referred to as “patches” which some believe led to the name of the project, 
“Apache” (Apache, 2011).13    
The HTTPD software development group developed into Apache software and by 
April 1995 the group released its first version software which became very popular and 
the Apache user community grew rapidly.  By August of that year, the group had already 
released another two versions and by December 1, 1995, after extensive beta testing, 
Apache 1.0 was released (including a new set of documentation).  Apache software 
became the most used web server software and in 1999 the Apache Group created the 
Apache Software Foundation (ASF) as a means of providing “organizational, legal and 
financial” support to the software efforts. The ASF provides the structure for users and 
developers to provide new code and bug fixes (Apache, 2011; see also Taft, 2010).  From 
the original eight contributors, the Apache Foundation currently reports more than 800 
contributors to the Apache Server project (Apache, 2011). 
One of the goals of the ASF was to encourage wide usage of the Apache Software 
including commercial organizations.  There are no reciprocal requirements that the 
adopting company contribute to future development of the software (Licenses – The 
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Apache Software Foundation, 2010).  As of April 2007, the Apache software was found 
on nearly 114 million sites representing nearly 60% of the market share with Microsoft’s 
competing proprietary software representing slightly more than 31% of the market share 
(Wheeler, 2007).   By January 2011 Apache software had increased to 161.5 million 
domains representing 59% market share with Microsoft falling to 21% market share 
(March 2010 Web Server Survey – Netcraft, 2010).14 
The Apache projects do not include any positions that are compensated including 
officers of the foundation.  However, some contributors to the software code are paid for 
their time by other companies that employ them to work on the Apache project (Apache, 
2011). 
 
5.4  Mozilla Firefox 
Another example of cooperative FOSS innovation is the Mozilla project which 
provided the kernel for Firefox internet browser.  Firefox was originally designed as the 
commercially produced software, Netscape, and was a pioneer in the internet browser 
software and gained a large portion of the market share for internet browsers.  However, 
by 1998 Microsoft’s Internet Explorer dominated the browser arena with faster software 
(Freedman 2007).  The FOSS movement was growing during the 1990s with Linux and 
other FOSS projects as high quality competitors to commercial software.  Netscape saw 
an opportunity to keep Microsoft from obtaining a monopoly in the browser industry by 
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taking the proprietary software into open source development (Freedman 2007).15  In 
1998 the Mozilla project was established to “coordinate the open source development of 
the Netscape Communicator 5.0 source code” (Ten years ago today:  Netscape launches 
mozilla.org, 2008; see also Raymond, 2002). 
For the first several years, the transition from the commercial Netscape to FOSS 
Mozilla Firefox was difficult and unsuccessful.  Shortly after initiating the Mozilla open 
source project one of its principals, Jamie Zawinski, resigned stating that “open source is 
not magic pixie dust'' and referred to problems with mismanagement and missed 
opportunities (Raymond, 2002). 
Mitchell Baker, one of Mozilla’s key leaders was fired early in the FOSS project 
which left the community without clear leadership.  Baker, the attorney who put together 
the open source structure that converted Netscape into Mozilla, was an unusual choice as 
a non-developer to become the leader of Mozilla.  Shortly after her appointment, she was 
laid off by the parent company, AOL, because the company was unable to see any 
prospects of returns.  Since Baker had already earned respect in the FOSS community 
and Mozilla was an independent organization, Baker stayed on as an unpaid volunteer.  
After nearly a year of unpaid volunteer work the non-profit organization Open Source 
Applications Foundation provided a small salary to Baker (Freedman, 2007). 
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In 2003, an independent nonprofit Mozilla Foundation was created with backing 
from AOL, IBM, Red Hat and Sun.  The Mozilla Foundation promoted free and open 
source software and released FOSS projects Thunderbird and Firefox. Months prior to its 
official November 2004 release date, Mozilla Firefox had already gained market share 
and increased downloads by 26%.  In November 2004 the Foundation released Firefox 
1.0 internet browser and within a year the Firefox software was downloaded more than 
100 million times (History of the Mozilla project, 1998-2010).16  
In June 2004 the US Department of Homeland Security’s CERT (Computer 
Emergency Readiness Team) recommended against using Microsoft’s proprietary 
Internet Explorer due to critical security vulnerabilities that inserted malicious code into 
IE users’ computers.  The code provided the hackers with stolen keystroke information to 
potentially steal credit card and other sensitive information.  There is some evidence that 
Microsoft was aware of the problem for nearly 9 months and did not fix it until it became 
public (Wheeler, 2007). 
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One study showed that Firefox had fewer “severe vulnerabilities” than 
Microsoft’s Internet Explorer – and that Firefox fixed the vulnerabilities much quicker. 
The study was undertaken between July and December 2004 by Symantec Corp. which 
found seven “severe vulnerabilities” in Mozilla Firefox and nine in Microsoft Internet 
Explorer.  Once identified, the number of days to fix the vulnerabilities was significantly 
longer (an average of 43 days) for the proprietary software, IE, compared to the open 
source software, Firefox (an average of 26 days) (Wheeler, 2007).  Additionally, during 
2004 and 2005, Microsoft took an average of 134 days to release patches for security 
problems compared to an average of 37 days for Mozilla (Wheeler, 2007).  Since 2004 
Firefox internet browser has received several quality awards in the industry, including 
(Mozilla awards, n.d.):  
• PC Magazine Editors’ Choice Award, 2009, 2008, 2006, 2005 
• CNET Editors’ Choice, 2008, 2006, 2005, 2004 
• American Business Awards Most Innovative Company, June 2008 
• PC World 100 Best Products of 2007, 2006 
• PC Magazine Editors' Choice, October 2006 
• CNET Editors' Choice, October 2006 
• PC Magazine Best of the Year Award, December 27, 2005 
• PC Pro Real World Award, December 8, 2005 
• CNET Editors' Choice, November 2005 
• UK Usability Professionals' Association Award Best Software  
            Application 2005 
• Forbes Best of the Web, May 2005 
• PC Magazine Editors’ Choice Award, May 2005 
• LAPTOP Magazine Editors' Choice Award - Best Web Browser,  
            October 2004 
• Innovation of the Year in the software category, by PC Professional  
            2004/2005 
 
In 2010, Firefox browser had increased market share around the world 
representing nearly 153 million users (or 39% of the market) in Europe.  Firefox was also 




(26% market share), 31.7 million users in South America (31.4%), 5.6 million users in 
Africa (29.7%), 68.7 million users in Asia (26.6% market share), 6.7 million users in 
Oceania (28.7% market share) (Mozilla metrics report Q1 2010, 2010).  As of June 14, 
2010, Mozilla Firefox reported 714,675,993 downloads of its Firefox 3.6 version 
(Firefox, 2010). In 2010, Firefox “celebrated its 6th birthday” and its website reports that 
Firefox is the browser of choice for over 400 million people worldwide and that it is 
available in 70 languages.  The Mozilla Blog states that the success of Firefox is “due to 
the passionate and dedicated Mozilla community, comprised of tens of thousands of 
developers, localizers, testers, ambassadors and campus reps” (Jostedt, 2010). 
In summary, this chapter reviews three FOSS case study groups that practice 
communitarian innovation of intellectual property.  Linux, Apache and Mozilla develop 
FOSS that competes successfully with proprietary software and is used for commercial 












INCENTIVES TO CONTRIBUTE 
 
In this chapter, I analyze incentives of FOSS contributors and show comparability 
to 19th century case study contributors’ incentives.  In spite of the differences between 
the19th century and FOSS case study groups, common incentives to participate 
strengthen the link between these communitarian innovation groups.  This commonality 
provides a foundation on which to compare the organizational structure across 
communitarian innovation groups.  
Nineteenth century communitarian experiments compared to online FOSS 
projects reveal several physical incongruities including common location and types of 
common-pool property.  Members of FOSS communitarian groups developed knowledge 
creation through electronic communication allowing wide geographic dispersion of 
members compared to 19th century communities that located physically close together in 
order to create a functional organization.  Electronic communication has allowed FOSS 
community members to remain geographically dispersed avoiding significant lifestyle 
changes to participate in the community.  Electronic communication has allowed FOSS 
communities to disaggregate not only geographically but also socially and economically. 
Physical disaggregation enabled communities to implement narrow membership 




innovation. The narrow membership requirements allowed FOSS community members to 
join several different groups and choose the amount of labor and intellectual property 
they wanted to commit to any community.  As a result, FOSS case study membership 
agreements did not require complete commitment of property, labor or ideas from any 
member.   
Incentives to contribute to communitarian innovation can be partially understood 
in terms of Frey’s intrinsic (personal) and extrinsic (group) psychological factors.  Not all 
motivation to participate in cooperative innovation is intrinsic to the participant; a great 
deal of incentive is focused externally on the success of the group rather than the 
individual. Extrinsic and intrinsic motivators frequently overlap for members of 
cooperative groups because the success of the group provides substantial individual 
satisfaction (Benkler, 2004).     
Based on my analysis of the 19th century and FOSS case study groups, I have 
identified five incentives that motivate contributors to participate in communitarian 
innovation.  Several of these key incentives have been scattered throughout the FOSS 
academic literature but have not previously been connected to the 19th century 
communitarian groups (Malone, Laubacher, & Dellaroca, 2009; Osterloh & Rota, 2004).  
These five incentives to contribute are to: 
• meet contributors’ unfilled need;  
• enhance contributors’ own or community reputation;  
• provide contributors with fun and enjoyment;  
• promote contributors’ personally important social agenda; and 
• encourage commercial potential of the innovation. 
 
Section 6.1 of this chapter addresses each of the five contributors’ incentives 




five incentives for contributors to the 19th century communitarian case study groups.  
 
6.1 Incentives for FOSS Contributors 
The discussion on incentives to participate in communitarian innovation has not 
been a high priority in academic literature until the recent success of FOSS products in 
commercial markets.  Within this body of literature written on the motivation question, 
several factors are identified but with little agreement on the outcomes.    
[A]fter several years of research, there is no agreement in the literature on what 
the primary motivation factors for open source participation are. Explanations 
vary from career management concerns and market signaling incentives (Lerner 
and Tirole), through gift culture reciprocities (Raymond) and a hacker ethic 
(Himanen) to personal profits induced by the non-rival nature of software 
(Weber). (David & Tsur,2005, p. 15) 
 
The influential work by Lerner & Tirole (2002) showed that much of the reward 
to FOSS contributors comes in the form of social status and future financial gain via 
better paying job offers based on demonstrated performance within the FOSS community.  
In other words, the motivation to contribute to FOSS is simply the ability to signal 
technical skills to future employers.  There have been several surveys with varying 
outcomes.  The results of a Boston Consulting Group (Bates, Lakhani, Wolf, 2002) 
survey showed that nearly 45% of the respondents contributed to FOSS because it is 
“intellectually stimulating.”  Also, just over 44% contributed to FOSS because they 
believed code should be open (33.1%) or to enhance open source reputation (11%).  Only 
41% of the responders stated that contributing to FOSS improved their skills (Bates, 
Lakhani, Wolf, 2002).    
What has come from these various studies is that there are several motivators and 




contributors’ motivation have focused on furthering the economic theories of rational 
behavior and utility maximization.  Neoclassical economists conclude that rational self-
interest does indeed still hold; however, the rewards may be postponed.   
 
6.1.1 Meets Unfilled Need 
Contributors to FOSS, whether the initial developer or those who provide 
subsequent enhancements, are often fulfilling an unmet personal need that commercial 
software cannot meet.  The fact that others may also benefit from the contributions of 
code is irrelevant because the individual’s (or firm’s) needs have been specifically met 
and the other users will have to take what they get unless they also provide code to 
customize to their own needs (von Hippel, 2002).  Some empirical surveys find that the 
most important incentive to FOSS innovation is need of the innovator (von Hippel & von 
Krogh, 2009). 
[FOSS contributors] face general needs in a marketplace but face them months or 
years before the rest of the marketplace encounters them. Since existing 
companies can’t customize solutions good enough for them, [FOSS contributors] 
go out there, patch things together and develop their own solutions. They expect 
to benefit significantly by obtaining solutions to their needs.  (Wheeler, 2007, 
“There is ample evidence” para. 5) 
 
Increasingly, the “user need” is that of corporations that are either implementing the 
software for their own internal business purposes or for improving the marketability of 
the software for which they provide technical support (von Hippel, 2002).   
Additionally, those who contribute FOSS code benefit from a large audience to 
review the work and locate errors and bugs for no cost thus improving their innovation.  
Thereby, both the code developer and the reviewer benefit from cooperation (von Hippel, 




feature enhancements, bug fixes, and support for others in public lists and newsgroups” 
("Apache, Http Server Project", 2011).    
 
6.1.2 Enhances Own or Community Reputation 
Individual reputation can also be a strong motivation for contributing to FOSS 
projects.  There are those who are willing to join the FOSS community and contribute 
time and creativity in order to enhance their own credentials within the software 
developer community.  “Ego boosting” is a form of utility maximization strategy among 
certain FOSS community participants.  “Egoboo” (short for ego boosting) is “the basic 
drive behind volunteer activity” (Raymond, 2002, “The Social Context of Open-Source 
Software,” para. 19). Eric Raymond (2002) core innovator of fetchmail FOSS project 
states:  
Both the fetchmail and Linux kernel projects show that by properly rewarding the 
egos of many other hackers, a strong developer/coordinator can use the Internet to 
capture the benefits of having lots of co-developers without having a project 
collapse into a chaotic mess. (Raymond, 2002, “The Social Context of Open-
Source Software”, para. 19) 
 
The online developer community provides substantial opportunity for FOSS contributors 
to demonstrate their skills.  The widespread practice of formally recognizing major 
contributors to FOSS tends to increase the contributors' reputation within the hacker 
community.  This reputation “signaling” can also be potentially beneficial to future 
employers who are seeking employees with proven talents.  Recognition of important 
contributors to a successful project increases the contributor’s reputation within the 




community esteem those with the best reputation within the community and seek them 
out as potential mentors (von Hippel & von Krogh, 2009).  
Also, social relations and enhanced privileges both in and outside the FOSS 
community can be motivation to join and contribute to the FOSS projects (von Hippel & 
von Krogh, 2009).  The incentive of increased credentials, social relations, or enhanced 
privileges is most likely to succeed in small groups according to one study (von Hippel & 
von Krogh, 2009).  FOSS projects, can also act as a sort of clearing house with 
developers demonstrating their skills and employers finding individuals to hire.  Because 
the code is available for all to see, FOSS projects act as forums for prospective employers 
to evaluate the skills of those contributing code.  Additionally, active volunteers on 
certain projects (such as Mozilla) may become paid employees (Wheeler, 2007).  With 
respect to those who worked on the Mozilla Firefox FOSS project, Walt Scacchi of the 
University of California at Irvine’s Institute for Software Research stated, “If you’ve 
contributed to a software system used by millions of people, you’ve demonstrated 
something that most software developers have not done” (Wheeler, 2007, “Will OSS/FS 
Destroy the Software Industry, para. 15). 
 
6.1.3 Fun and Enjoyment 
Even though finding and fixing software bugs has not become a widely popular 
form of entertainment, within the hacker community finding and fixing bugs or adding 
new functionality can be considered a recreational pastime.  The fact that what hackers do 
for fun might also help someone else is of secondary importance to their own enjoyment 




I want to suggest what may be a wider lesson about software, (and probably about 
every kind of creative or professional work). Human beings generally take 
pleasure in a task when it falls in a sort of optimal-challenge zone; not so easy as 
to be boring, not too hard to achieve. A happy programmer is one who is neither 
underutilized nor weighed down with ill-formulated goals and stressful process 
friction. Enjoyment predicts efficiency. (Raymond, 2002, “On Management and 
the Maginot Line”) 
 
Additionally, contributing to the FOSS community is an enjoyable means of 
creative interaction with others who have similar interests.  The Boston Consulting Group 
Hacker Survey (Bates et al., 2002) found that 61.7% of the survey respondents state that 
their contribution to FOSS was, or was equal to, their “most creative effort.”  Also, 72.6% 
of the respondents revealed that they “always” or “frequently” lost track of time when 
programming – potentially an indication of enjoying the work done in FOSS.    
 
6.1.4 Fulfills Social Agenda 
The ideal of free sharing of knowledge has, until relatively recently, been an 
important aspect of many other scientific and academic pursuits – ideas were freely 
shared among other researchers and scientists in the field (Hess & Ostrom, 2003).  The 
software developer community grew within a culture of freely shared ideas and provided 
the foundation for the FOSS community culture.   
Promoting a positive perspective of FOSS is critical for those who believe free 
access to ideas is an ideologically superior position over proprietary knowledge.  For 
those who are so motivated, “group fate” is of utmost importance and outweighs the cost 
of contributing time and creativity to the community (von Hippel & von Krogh, 2009). 
Some FOSS contributors are motivated mainly to provide a viable alternative to 




Mozilla Firefox and what might otherwise have been a browser software monopoly by 
Microsoft’s Internet Explorer.  Mozilla Firefox “achieved Netscape’s original goal, which 
was to deny Microsoft a monopoly lock on the browser market” (Raymond, 2002, 
“Epilog: Netscape embraces bazaar”).  Apache’s website declares its social agenda to be 
that of making software available to everyone and states that “the tools of online 
publishing should be in the hands of everyone” (Apache, Http Server Project, 2011, 
“Why Apache Software is Free”). The mission of Apache Software FOSS group is to 
build reliable software systems that remain open for both individual and commercial use 
and that the protocols of the internet must remain open source in order maintain a “level 
playing field” for all companies of every size (Apache, Http Server Project, 2011, “Why 
Apache Software is Free”).  “Thus, "ownership" of the protocols must be prevented. To 
this end, the existence of robust reference implementations of various protocols and 
application programming interfaces, available free to all companies and individuals, is a 
tremendously good thing” (Apache, Http Server Project, 2011, “Why Apache Software is 
Free”). 
 
6.1.5 Commercial Potential 
Within the cooperative community, innovating users may benefit financially from 
freely revealing their innovation and gaining a wider diffusion for their innovation (von 
Hippel, 2009).  A wide audience may help uncover bugs more quickly.  A wide diffusion 
of FOSS may provide for commercial opportunities such as technical support, add-on 
software, or other services and products not offered through FOSS. According to Joel 




software arena is explained in microeconomics through the increase in demand of a 
product by decreasing the price of a complementary good. As the price of an operating 
system drops there will be more demand for the complementary services of technical 
support and resulting in more revenue and profit for the company.    
Some of the largest and best known companies are participating in open source 
development.  Sony, Nokia, Samsung and others implement Linux into their products and 
work within the FOSS communities to ensure a quality product (Corbet, 2010).  James 
Boyle (2004), professor of law at Duke University, pointed out that “…IBM now earns 
more from what it calls “Linux-related revenues” than it does from traditional patent 
licensing, and IBM is the largest patent holder in the world.”  In 2003 HP reported $2.5 
billion in “Linux-related” revenue and Red Hat, a company which distributes a version of 
Linux, was valued at $2.3 billion in 2002 (Wheeler, 2007). 
 
6.2 Incentives for 19th Century Communitarian Contributors 
Research of historical records shows comparable incentives for 19th century case 
study communities as found in the FOSS communities. I have found that contributors to 
the case study communities show similar motivation in each of the five areas identified as 
incentives for FOSS contributors.  These five incentives to contribute are to: 
• meet contributors’ unfilled need;  
• enhance contributors’ own or community reputation;  
• provide contributors with fun and enjoyment;  
• promote contributors’ personally important social agenda; and 






6.2.1 Meets Unfilled Needs 
The 19th century case study groups innovated cooperatively in order to ease the 
burden and improve the efficiency of necessary tasks.  In each case, the need for these 
communities to find a better method prompted cooperative innovation.   The Shakers 
invented products based on the group’s need to make their work more efficient.  Shakers 
believed that work was a form of worship and any waste of time or productivity was a 
sin.  Shaker Elisha Myrick (as cited in Alexander & Keep, 1995, p. 366) wrote in his 
diary: 
… every improvement relieving human toil or facilitating labor [gives] time and 
opportunity for moral, mechanical, scientific and intellectual improvement and 
the cultivation of the finer and higher qualities of the human mind. 
 
Many of the labor saving inventions of the Shakers, including the circular saw, provide 
evidence of the need to become more efficient in everyday work so that higher-level 
activities could be pursued.  “Such innovativeness reflected in part the necessity to solve 
problems…” (Cooper, 1987, p 5). 
Mormons, emigrating by wagon train across the North American plains, 
developed a mechanism to more accurately measure distance travelled.  The need for 
accurate mileage count was critically important to the success of subsequent caravans 
travelling the same route to the Great Salt Lake basin.  The existing method of physically 
counting the wagon wheel rotations was too imprecise given the wide variation in 
estimates from the various counters.   
  In the case of the Oneida Perfectionists, most members of the group did not utilize 
the traps themselves.  However, innovation to improve manufacturing processes helped 




improved the type of materials used and the mechanism of the spring components.  Cast 
iron replaced wrought iron for several trap parts and machinery was invented to 
manufacture the trap spring from a steel bar.  The manufacturing process was mechanized 
to the point that the traps were produced “almost without the blow of a hammer” 
(Newhouse, 1865, p. 117).  The demand for the traps had increased beyond the 
production capacity of the Oneida community which prompted the need for more 
efficient production methods. 
 
6.2.2 Enhances Own or Community Reputation 
Personal and community reputation was an important motivator for the 18th 
century communities.  Shakers were zealous in their individual work efforts and 
distinguished themselves through the quality of their work.  Individual reputations were 
enhanced within the Shaker community through the quality of work performed. 
Additionally, the Shaker communities gained improved reputations by producing high 
quality products including furniture and herbal remedies (Carson, 2000).  Shakers 
periodically published “The Shaker Manifesto” which reads as though it is intended for 
readers both in and outside of the Society.  In these publications, several articles dealt 
with the innovative reputation and history of the Shaker community. The publication 
appears to focus on increasing the reputation of the community among its members as 
well as community outsiders who were interested in reading the publication.  
William Clayton provided evidence in his journal of his interest in individual 
reputation within the Mormon community.  On May 14, 1847, Clayton wrote of his 




both men along with others were involved. “I discover that brother Appleton Harmon is 
trying to have it understood that he invented the machinery to tell the distance we travel, 
which makes me think less of him than I formerly did” (Clayton, 1921, May 14 1847). 
The commercial success and quality of the Newhouse traps improved the 
reputation of the Oneida Community internationally.  The success of the traps increased 
the visibility of the community leader, Noyes, and the core inventor, Newhouse.  Many 
community publications included details about the traps and their economic importance.   
Based on interviews published in the Oneida Annual Report, I found Community 
members were generally more interested in group reputation rather than individual.  One 
community member stated that her “individual interests were being swallowed up in the 
general interests of the body [of the community] (Oneida Association, 1849, p.15). 
Another community member, Hial M. Waters, stated, “… I find that love, confidence and 
esteem, are a far stronger stimulus than money or necessity.  The thought that we are 
laboring for those who are dear to us, inspires us with new energy, and makes work 
sport” (Oneida Association, 1849, p.15). 
Additionally, each of the 19th century case study communities raised awareness of 
their successes through self-published newspapers, brochures, books and other 
informational articles.  Based on my reading of several of these publications, a common 
purpose shared by each publication is to inform the public and increase acceptance of the 
virtues of the communities’ nontraditional socioeconomic structure and enhance the 
community’s reputation, often for commercial purposes.  This was especially clear in the 
case of Oneida, the group enthusiastically promoted its reputation based on the success of 




6.2.3 Fun and Enjoyment 
Members of the 19th century case study communities had little time to pursue 
personal hobbies for pleasure in the same way 21st century community members pursued 
fun and enjoyment.  However, records show that “fun and enjoyment” motivated 19th 
century case study community members.  Members of the case study communities found 
enjoyment in laboring for the common benefit of the community.  Also, members of 
these communities were encouraged to perform the work that best met their own interests 
and desires.   Shaker members found joy and pleasure in their work because each member 
was allowed to do the work “he likes best” (Evans, 1888, p. 229).  The Shakers’ 
enjoyment is their service to community and God, “… when a Shaker is put upon the soil, 
to beautify it by his tilth, the difference between his husbandry and that of a Gentile 
farmer, who is thinking solely of his profits, is likely to be great. While the Gentile is 
watching for his returns, the Shaker is intent upon his service” (Dixon, 1867 as cited in 
Carter & Geores, 2006, p. 19).   
William Clayton’s journal provides insight into the motivation to contribute.  
Clayton shows a determination to provide an accurate mileage count and appears to enjoy 
the process of developing a device that will prove his theory that therefore the miles 
travelled had been miscounted (Clayton, 1921, Journal entry April 22, 1847). 
Several Oneida Community members expressed that labor took on a new meaning 
when working for a higher level goal and that enjoyment came from working together 
towards that goal and helping the community to succeed.  One Oneida community 
member, Stephen R. Leonard, stated that he found the “stimulus to labor to be far greater 




member, James L. Baker, that he now had “…an infinitely higher motive to action in 
doing all that I do for the glory of God, and find work unattended with exhaustion”  
(Oneida Association,1849, p.15). 
 
6.2.4 Fulfills Social Agenda 
 The 19th century case study groups were part of the religious movement that took 
their community model from the Bible rather than the contemporaneous popular socialist 
theory (Cosgel et al., 1997).  Shared goals and beliefs served as motivators to carry out a 
unique social agenda for each case study community.   Shaker members emphasized the 
importance of the community’s social agenda.  A key component driving the efforts of 
the Shaker members was the “public spirit of community…and a strong religious 
conviction of duty that ma[d]e members work together harmoniously for the common 
good” (Staff Correspondent, 1881, p. 5). 
Mormon contributors were also motivated by the desire to facilitate the safe 
removal of the community to the remote Great Salt Lake Basin.  By successfully moving 
the group members to a distant location, the Mormons could continue to practice their 
beliefs away from persecution.  The travel guide that resulted from the roadometer 
measurements became popular among Mormon emigrants who needed directions and 
information on the trail west (Crawley, 2005). 
Oneida Community members reflected on the significance of the community’s 
social agenda as motivator to contribute to the group.  One community member, Jonathan 
Burt, stated that “[t]o labor for the friends of God has a stimulus in it far exceeding 




“God’s kingdom” has provided more motivation to labor “far exceeding anything [he] 
had previously known” (Staff Correspondent, 1881, p. 5). 
 
6.2.5 Commercial Potential 
Some theories have suggested that communitarian experiments succeeded in the 
US because of its extensive frontier allowing growth and isolation for communitarian 
groups.  Importantly, most communities that remained close to commercial markets were 
more financially successful than those that moved into isolated areas (Bestor, 1953).  
Commercial potential motivated Shakers to develop and manufacture many of their 
innovations.  Shakers invented for their own use and also for commercial reasons to meet 
the “demands of the outside world” (Alexander & Keep, 1995, p. 370). The commercial 
potential of the innovation is an important motivating factor for members of the Shaker 
community (Cosgel et al., 1998).  Many of the labor-saving inventions created by the 
Shakers were motivated by “community self-sufficiency” they also produced goods to 
trade with other Shaker groups and also to sell to outsiders (Cooper, 1987). 
Although the Mormons’ first priority with the odometer was to help subsequent 
Mormon travelers to the Great Basin, ultimately the mileage record obtained from the 
invention developed into a commercial venture with the publication of a guide published 
and sold to travelers to California and Oregon.   
 Oneida’s founder recognized that staying close to commercial centers and 
manufacturing goods for profit was the basis for success in communitarian experiments 
(Bestor, 1953).  The ability to continue their way of life depended greatly on the business 




commercial potential and its success financially sustained the community.  The fact that 
the majority of the Oneida community members did not use the traps for themselves 
provides evidence that a significant motivating force was financial and commercial.   
Contributors to the FOSS case study groups share the same motivations as those 
who contributed to the 19th century case study groups.  This comparability of incentives 
provides a foundation on which an organizational structure can be established.  The 
dissimilar innovations and community locations (physical compared to online) of the 19th 
and 21st century communities are inconsequential in the factors that motivate 
communitarian innovation.  Establishing comparable contributor incentives across all 
case study communities helps provide the foundation for determining the organizational 








ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF  
COMMUNITARIAN INNOVATION 
 
“… Incentives clearly play an important role in the design of organizations but 
they are not the sole determinant of structure” (Beggs 2001, p. 298).  
 
           The recent success of FOSS has fueled an interest in the economic theories of 
cooperation.  An emerging body of literature discusses the motives of FOSS contributors 
but reveals little with respect to the organizational structure of successful communitarian 
innovation communities. An understanding of the institutional “design principles,” or 
organizational structure, of successful communitarian innovation groups could help move 
toward a general theory of communitarian innovation (Brumann, 2003).   
The challenge of structuring a successful communitarian innovation group is to 
create an organization that motivates members to contribute and maximizes the combined 
talents of the group.  In pursuit of understanding the organizational and structural aspects 
of cooperative innovation, I have analyzed the characteristics of the 19th century and 
FOSS case study communities and uncovered evidence of structural elements common 
among each group. These organizational attributes produced a community structure that 




In spite of the differences in physical concentration between the geographically 
aggregated (19th century groups) and disaggregated (FOSS groups) communities, each 
type of community shares significant organizational characteristics necessary for 
cooperative innovation.  These common organizational attributes of the case study 
communities serve to establish a foundation for a theory of communitarian innovation 
which can be transported to innovation in other industries.  
 I have identified five main areas of organizational structure with subcategories 






• socioeconomic design 
o property distribution 
o fundamental equality;  
 
• organization of labor 
o self-selected, not compulsory 
o subgroup structure; 
 
• internal communication 
o open communication 
o peer review; and 
 
• member commitment 
o membership levels 
o member agreements.  
 
I determined these organizational characteristics through first researching the 19th 
century case study communities and identifying common characteristics shared across 
these communities and then confirmed the application and importance of each 




Sections 7.1-7.5 of this chapter I provide evidence of organizational elements found in 
the 19th century communitarian case study groups and show comparability to the FOSS 
case study groups.  I provide evidence from each of the six case study groups for the 
organizational characteristic: leadership, socioeconomic design, organization of labor, 
internal communications and member commitment. For each of these categories, I first 
provide a general discussion on the organizational characteristic and then present 
evidence of importance for each of the 19th century and FOSS case study groups.  The 
case study application of each characteristic is summarized in table format at the 
beginning of each section.    
 
7.1  Leadership 
I began to appreciate the difference between acting on the principle of command 
and discipline and acting on the principle of common understanding. … the aim 
can be achieved only through the severe effort of many converging wills. 
(Brandes &  Kropotkin, 2009/1899, p. 216)  
 
My analysis of the case study groups revealed three common attributes of the case 
study community leadership.  First, motivational leaders defined the social agenda and 
motivated the community members to achieve the agenda.  Second, case study leaders 
broadly shared management and decision making responsibilities among community 
members.  Third, because of the shared leadership responsibilities, communities quickly 
adapted to the needs and abilities of the membership.  Table 7.1 summarizes the 




TABLE 7.1 – Leadership 
 
 Motivational  Shared  Adaptable 
Shakers Promoted contributions 
through inventor 
leadership and social 
agenda 
Many members 
involved in rotating 
leadership positions 
Flexible lifestyle codes 
based on abilities and 
needs of members 
Mormons Promoted contributions 
through inventor and 
community leadership 
Many members 
involved in rotating 
leadership positions 
Changed form of 
property sharing from 
Law of Consecration to 
Tithing  
Oneida Promoted contributions 




involved in rotating 
leadership positions 
Accepted trap-making 
in spite of earlier ban  
GNU/Linux Promoted contributions 
through inventor and 
community leadership 
Many members 
involved in rotating 
leadership positions 
Contributors determine 
outcome of project 
Apache Promoted contributions 
through inventor and 
community leadership 
Many members 
involved in rotating 
leadership positions 
Contributors determine 
outcome of project 
Firefox Promoted contributions 
through inventor and 
community leadership 
Many members 
involved in rotating 
leadership positions 
Contributors determine 
outcome of project 
 
 
7.1.1 Motivational Leadership 
Communitarian innovation leaders focused on motivating community members 
rather than monitoring employees.   By comparison, traditional corporate leaders 
structure their organization with “low-powered” incentives and “extensive administrative 
controls” (Garrouste & Saussier, 2004, p. 181). Traditional corporate leadership creates 
hierarchical pyramids to ensure productivity and efficiency and governance is based on 
the principle of command through a line of authority.   
Case study leadership rejected traditional power hierarchy and implemented 




community. Leadership by command is unlikely to succeed in a cooperative innovation 
community – contributors will leave under a power hierarchy organization.  Management 
of a group of volunteers, as in communitarian innovation, requires a leadership structure 
very different than the traditional corporate power hierarchy. Communitarian leadership 
must be focused on the “principle of understanding” and “converging of wills” (Brandes 
& Kropotkin, 1899/2009, p. 216). Cooperative innovation leaders “inspired and 
persuaded” others to create an environment conducive to cooperative innovation; leaders 
kept contributors focused on the goals of the community (Raymond, 2002).   
In order to build a development community, you need to attract people, interest 
them in what you're doing, and keep them happy about the amount of work they're 
doing. … The personality you project matters, too….it helps enormously if you 
have at least a little skill at charming people.  (Raymond, 2002, Necessary 
Preconditions for the Bazaar Style) 
 
Case study leaders established the social agenda of the community and unified members 
to achieve the social agenda by creating an environment in which individuals willingly 
contributed outside of the traditional hierarchy and profit structure.   
 
7.1.1.1 19th Century Case Studies   
Motivational leaders in the 19th century case study groups promoted the 
importance of their community’s social agenda.  Leaders of each community emphasized 
self-improvement and the importance of work to achieve that goal. Shaker, Mormon and 
Oneida communities produced innovation leaders who produced a core innovative 
concept to the group in the form of a functional idea. Shaker and Mormon religious 
leaders were only marginally or not at all involved in the innovation process but 




Shaker leadership taught that work improved self and society.  Members sought to 
produce high quality goods as a form of worship and self satisfaction and associated work 
with worship.  Shakers sought quality-improving and labor-saving innovation as part of 
their worship.  While watching the nail-making process performed by fellow Shakers, the 
core inventor observed that instead of rolling out each nail a more efficient method would 
be to cut the nails from a sheet of iron.  From her observation, a group of Shakers 
developed the idea into a successful innovation (St. Paul Globe, 1905). 
Mormon leaders taught that members are stewards and through work will improve 
self and benefit others. Mormon community members fulfilled their stewardship by 
improving upon their labor.  These teachings established a foundation for the core 
inventor’s proposal and functional design for the roadometer.  Leaders motivated interest 
in the invention through discussion of his design and convinced other group members of 
its need and likely success.   
Oneida leaders established the importance of individual and community 
improvement as part of the Perfectionist creed.  Noyes was involved in the innovation 
process after the core invention was brought to the community by Newhouse. Together 
they provided motivational leadership for further innovation on production and design of 
the traps.  
 
7.1.1.2 21st Century Case Studies 
As with the 19th century case study leaders, FOSS case study leaders motivated 
others to join and convinced contributors of the community’s potential of succeeding 




core innovative concept to the group in the form of a functional idea – in the case of 
FOSS, the functional idea was the software framework or “kernel.”  Innovation leaders 
motivated individuals to become community members in order to solve a personal need, 
satisfy curiosity or fulfill a social agenda.   Linus Torvalds initiated Linux and with a 
post on an internet newsgroup and provided the functional idea (the Linux kernel) to the 
right group of developers (MINIX newsgroup). Torvalds encouraged developers to 
engage in making the project better and within weeks the kernel was updated to include 
the contributors’ ideas and a software version was quickly released (Hasan, 2000).  Linux 
leadership established the community agenda and motivated participation by quickly 
updating the code to reflect member contributions and encouraging others with an interest 
to share in leadership positions. 
Apache leadership took an existing functional software program as its functional 
idea and created a user list to share information among developers in order to improve the 
software.  By maintaining open communication among interested developers, the 
community leaders were able to encourage improved innovation and within a short period 
released an updated software version (Apache, Http server project, 2011).   
Mozilla motivational leadership during the transition from commercial Netscape 
to open source Firefox was difficult as Netscape was still owned by AOL.  However, 
Mitchell Baker who had been laid-off from her position continued, without pay, to 
promote the open source agenda. Baker also continued to provide motivational leadership 
through the restructuring of the Mozilla Foundation, and encouraged contributions by 





7.1.2 Shared Leadership 
Each case study community implemented a broadly shared governance structure 
that involved many members of the community in decision making and leadership 
positions.  The division of community responsibility and decision making naturally 
followed from the communities’ shared property rights among members.  Shared 
property rights provided an “identity between authority and ownership” for the 
community members (Garrouste & Saussier, 2005, p. 181) and the need for layers of 
managerial hierarchy was eliminated as the shared community leadership created an 
environment in which members observed problems and helped to find potential solutions.   
 
7.1.2.1 19th Century Case Studies  
The Shakers created an organizational structure of small groups governed by two 
male and two female members and assisted by two deacons and two deaconesses (Evans, 
1888).  In one Shaker village there is record of 77% of the village as part of the group 
leadership (Alexander & Keep, 1995).  Shakers often rotated lay leadership positions 
among the members so that participation in organizational governance was widely 
shared.    
During the Mormon westward migration, the group organized into teams of ten 
wagons with each team headed by a team leader.  Every 5 teams had an additional leader 
with another leader over groups of 10 teams.  This organizational structure involved 
several group members in leadership responsibilities during the trek (Clayton, 1921).  




Oneida community leadership was widely shared with the group administration 
divided into 21 “standing committees” and 48 “functional departments.”  Even with the 
broadly shared leadership, the entire community shared decision making for major 
decisions (Cooper, 1987, p. 8). 
 
7.1.2.2 21st Century Case Studies 
Similar to the 19th century case study communities, the FOSS case study 
communities shared leadership widely throughout the community.  Member contribution 
and activity levels helped determine leadership roles and responsibilities in the case study 
communities.  Although complete commitment of resources was not required of FOSS 
community members, responsibilities were widely shared among members who were 
willing to do the work.  
The Linux kernel, initiated by Torvalds, is now managed by several community 
members due to the complexity and size of the project.  The Linux project has more than 
100 “subsystem trees” over which a “maintainer” reviews and signs off on each new code 
contribution that is to be added to the kernel (Corbet, 2010).     
Numerous managers are involved in the Apache project due to its size and the fact 
that management is comprised entirely of volunteers who have other jobs and cannot 
devote large amounts of time managing the project (Herbselb & Mockus, 2002).  Leaders 
on the Project Management Committee (PMC) are elected to the position based on merit 
and are responsible for the overall software project ("How The ASF Works," 2011).   The 




great deal of latitude in designing its own technical charter and its own governing rules” 
("How The ASF Works," 2011).  
Management of the Mozilla project is spread over many community members 
through module “ownership” (Mozilla Modules and Module Ownership, 2011).   
Modules are small sections of the project code for which the owners are responsible.  
Module owners receive help from “peers” who approve code for submission into the 
project.  Module owners rely on these peers to check their own code because no member 
is allowed to check their own contribution (Mozilla Modules and Module 
Ownership, 2011).  
The Mozilla project is far too big for any one person – or even a small set of 
people – to make ongoing decisions regarding code appropriateness, quality or 
readiness to be checked into the CVS source repository. … decision-making is 
distributed to a range of participants through its “modules” and module 
ownership.  A module is a set of files that implement a piece of functionality with 




7.1.3 Adaptive Leadership 
Another component of case study leadership is its adaptability to the various and 
diverse abilities of the community members.  The case study projects evolved and 
adapted through changes in membership and community objectives. Based on the 
changing environment, leaders took advantage of new opportunities and changed 
direction as required by circumstances.17  The shared governance discussed above 
                                                 
17
 Eric Raymond, originator of the FOSS fetchmail project and author of the seminal essay on FOSS “The 
Cathedral and the Bazaar”, recognized the importance of adapting the project to the abilities of the 




provided a structure in which member needs and abilities determined the direction of the 
community.  The ability to adapt to membership needs resulted in community success 
and longevity for each of the case study communities. 
 
7.1.3.1 19th Century Case Studies 
Leaders of the 19th century case study communities were aware of members’ 
aptitudes and weaknesses and at critical junctures changed course in order to keep the 
community intact. Adaptable leadership was better able to keep the community together 
and provide an environment which best utilized members’ abilities to contribute to 
cooperative innovation.  Oneida Perfectionists, Shakers and Mormons were viewed as 
strict doctrinal adherents; however, leaders of these communities were willing to adjust 
their religious requirements, as well as, work and community structure in order to adapt 
to their memberships’ abilities. 
Early Shaker leaders resisted written codification of beliefs and it wasn’t until 
1821 that the first “Millennial Law” was issued which set forth in writing the concepts 
practiced since the early Shaker period. Even with the Millennial Law in place, the Law 
was changed regularly and individual villages were “given permission to adapt the laws 
as needed according to the time and place in which the village existed” (Carter & Geores, 
2006).  Often only handwritten copies of the rules were kept due to the tendency to 
change – one version of the Millennial Laws lasted only 5 years before being rescinded 
(Alexander & Keep, 1995).  Regulations that had been enforced were “modified or 
                                                                                                                                                 
project originator will need to put aside their code in order to implement a better code contributed by 





dropped altogether” by Shaker leaders (Hinds, 1878, p. 99). Additionally, Shaker leaders 
adapted to new technologies and innovations whether developed from within the 
community or outside.  “Labor was allocated flexibly to the different branches of 
production, allowing communities to adapt to changing circumstances” (Cooper, 1987, p. 
4). 
Mormon leadership focused on the needs and abilities of the community members 
by discontinuing strict adherence to the Law of Consecration when it was seen to not be 
working and tithing was instituted in its place (Arrington, 1971; see also Smith, 1981, 
Section 89).  Leaders again implemented communitarian principles once established in 
Utah which they adapted to the harsh conditions of the Salt Lake Valley by cooperatively 
developing irrigation canals for agriculture (Gardner, 1917).  Mormon community 
members did not act according to “a definite code of rules and regulations previously 
drawn up, but because with their nature and ideals and under their environment, their 
course was the natural and logical one to follow” (Gardner, 1917, p. 472).  Both religious 
and innovation leaders encouraged the group to adapt to a potentially better method of 
counting miles through innovation (Wright, 1997-98).   
According the Hand-book of the Oneida Community (Oneida Community, 1867), 
Oneida Perfectionists were convinced that a community run by rigid laws and rules was a 
“grave mistake” and would serve to destroy the “affective bonds of community” with a 
focus on legal prescriptions.  As such, the community was able to change from its 
previous direction that restricted animal trap production to become an important producer 
of high quality animal traps when the opportunity for commercial success was presented 




[t]he point was to adapt as circumstances required yet always in the service of 
Community ideals” (Cooper, 1987, p. 8).  When the opportunity arose to make money 
from the production of traps, leaders motivated members to produce and improve the 
animal traps by reconciling the community’s peaceable and vegetarian practices with 
their teachings that the world would reach its perfect state only through ridding it of 
vermin and rodents facilitated by their traps.   Oneida members had a “preference for 
creative flexibility [which] helped to shape the economic practices that developed” 
(Cooper, 1987, p. 15). 
 
7.1.3.2 21st Century Case Studies 
The importance of adapting the project to the abilities of the contributors is seen 
in the flexible direction of each FOSS project.  Often the project originator puts aside 
their own code in order to implement a better code contributed by another volunteer.  
(Raymond, 2002).  Each of the case study projects illustrated the importance of moving 
the software in the direction of the developers’ talents and abilities.   
Linux moves in the direction of the best code contributions.  Any of the 
developers can “improve Linux and influence the direction of its development” (Corbett, 
2008, p. 2). The Linux leadership focused on including the best quality code and allowed 
the project to go in the direction of the best code contributions. 
Instead of letting the HTTPD web server project die when the core inventor left, a 
small online community of individuals formed in order to provide technical support and 
improve the software through online collaboration. This transition of leadership adapted 




software into Apache software.  As Apache software became the most used web server 
software, the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) was formed to meet the financial and 
legal responsibilities of the community and implemented a system through which its 
bylaws are modified and changed through the votes of its board members (Taft, 2010). 
Mozilla described its system of adapting to the best contributed code as a 
“meritocracy” and has determined it is a “resilient and effective” method in leading the 
community (Mozilla Roles and Leadership, 2011).  Leaders have a “fair amount of 
flexibility” in how they function.  Mozilla does not have an “elaborate set of rules or 
procedures” (Mozilla modules and module owners, 2011).   
 
7.2  Socioeconomic Structures 
Sin and self, produce private property. Innocence and self-denial, produce 
community of property (Evans, 1888, p. 186). 
 Table 7.2 summarizes the socioeconomic structure of each of the case study 
communities.  Distribution of property and equality is significant to the purpose and 
function of each case study community. 
Each of the case study groups created non-traditional socioeconomic structures 
that emphasized fundamental equality among community members. Fundamental 
equality, including access to community property, was a key principle of the six case 
study groups and influenced production and social relationships among group members. 
Table 7.2 summarizes the practices of communitarian property distribution and 





TABLE 7.2 - Socioeconomic Structure 
Property Distribution Fundamental Equality 
Shakers Shared property based on early 
Christian teaching 
Equal opportunity for male and female 
members.  Implemented celibacy to 
avoid unequal power 
Mormons Property re-distribution based on 
need according to “Law of 
Consecration” 
Implemented polygamy to provide 
fundamental equality to unmarried 
women 
Oneida Shared property based on 
“heavenly association” 
Women and men shared business 
leadership and work duties.  
Implemented Complex Marriage to 
share all thing 
GNU/Linux Free and open access to 
intellectual property  
Virtual community relationships based 
on meritocracy 
Apache Free and open access to 
intellectual property 
Virtual community relationships based 
on meritocracy 
Firefox Free and open access to 
intellectual property 




7.2.1 Equality of members 
The case study communities shared real or intellectual property and sometimes 
both among its group members which set the foundation for fundament equality in social 
and economic relations, including the organization of labor, community governance, and 
communication. Fundamental equality, as opposed to absolute equality, is defined as 
equality in “important relevant and specified respects” and not the “implausible principle 
of treating persons equally” (Gosepath, 2009, para. 2).  Based on the premise of 
fundamental equality, each case study community defined equality differently and, as a 
result, implemented different socioeconomic structures.  Based on the concept of 
fundamental equality, each of the socioeconomic structures implemented nontraditional 




7.2.1.1 19th Century Case Studies  
Nineteenth century case study communities based production and distribution of 
resources on nontraditional social and economic structure that emphasized fundamental 
equality. 18  The traditional 19th century family structure, with wife and children viewed 
as economic property of the male, established the prevailing relationship for production 
and distribution of property.  Much of the economic production and distribution was 
focused on family-based business, agriculture and in-home production.  The household 
was the “institutional nucleus” (Katz, 1997, p. 277) that served to reinforced the 
traditional family unit as the economically and socially relevant structure.  The 
communitarian movement created social and economic structures based on fundamental 
equality that challenged the status quo.  Each of the 19th century case study communities 
implemented very different socioeconomic structures of celibacy (Shakers), polygamy 
(Mormons) and polyandry (Oneida Perfectionists). Even so, each of these non-traditional 
socioeconomic structures emphasized fundamental equality and shifted the focus away 
from the existing economic unit of the traditional family to the larger economic structure 
of the community “family.” To reinforce the concept of community family, community 
members often used familial terms to reference each other: brother, sister, father, and 
mother.19  
                                                 
18
 In theory, the concept of member equality was critical to all 19th century communitarian experiments, at 
least in terms of real property ownership.  Even so, many of the groups that disbanded quickly were unable 
to practice the theory of property equality with success.  New Harmony fell apart as Owen tried to salvage 
his fortune and sold off parcels of land to the community members (Smith, 1897).  Other communities 
attracted members who were not committed to the concept of equality in practice leading to confusion, 
jealousy and ultimately dissolution.   
 
19
 Christoph Brumann compared monogamous communities with celibate and other nontraditional family 
arrangements.  He concluded that “communes built on monogamous marriage have proved more 




For Shakers the concept of equality through shared property was an essential 
component of their religious beliefs founded on the early “original Christianity.” The 
distribution of income and wealth was “essentially equal” and based on the idea of “to 
each according to his needs” (Cooper, 1987, p. 4).  The Shaker community was organized 
into smaller groups of “Families” which were economically independent of each other 
and shared their wealth with other members of their own Family.  During times of need, 
Shaker Families redistributed the available food equally to other Shaker Families (Cosgel 
et al., 1997).   
Inequality of males and females in traditional social and economic structures was 
resolved by the Shaker community through the practice of celibacy.  “Where there are 
husbands and wives and private property, there will be “fightings,” and these necessarily 
lead to disintegration and dissolution” (Evans, 1888, p. 184-85).  Shaker males and 
females were equal in government and work although they “were kept separate in 
occupation as in most other areas of life” (Cooper, 1987, p. 4).  Although separated in 
work and living arrangements women were “as free as men to speak in their meetings; … 
to write for their paper; … [and to] manage their own departments of industry 
independently of the men” (Hinds, 1878, p 102).   
The Mormon “Law of Consecration” 20 provided fundamental socioeconomic 
equality through re-distribution of property. “That you may be equal in the bonds of 
heavenly things, yea, and earthly things also, for the obtaining of heavenly things.  For if 
                                                                                                                                                 
longevity by “erasing the family as a potential competitor for members’ loyalties, they strengthen the larger 
social unit of the commune.” (Brumann, 2003, pp. 398 & 417)   
 
20
 The Law of Tithing, a law implemented to prepare for the higher Law of Consecration, also required 





ye are not equal in earthly things ye cannot be equal in obtaining heavenly things…” 
(Smith, 1981, p. 147). 
Members contributed property to a common storehouse from which the property 
was redistributed based on the needs and fair desires of each family.  It was left to the 
judgment and conscience of each individual steward and the Bishop (a leader of a small 
group) to determine what was fair (Gardner, 1922).  The practice of polygamy provided 
fundamental economic and social equality for women within the community who 
otherwise would be hampered in their practice of the Law and remain in a vulnerable 
economic and social position.   
Oneida Perfectionists based their shared property belief on Christian teachings 
and taught that “…one of the leading principles of heavenly Association, is the 
renunciation of exclusive claim to private property” (Oneida Association, 1849, p. 3).  
The Oneida Perfectionists created a socioeconomic structure in which shared property 
ownership extended to marriage relationships. “For Noyes and the rest of the Oneida 
Community, selfishness, the major sin of the outside world, was inherent in two basic 
institutions: exclusive marriage, which subjected women to a condition of slavery, and 
private ownership of wealth, which encouraged greed and acquisitiveness” (Olin, 1980, 
p. 291). 
Based on their interpretation of fundamental equality, the Oneida Perfectionists 
redefined the concept of marriage and instituted polyandry which they referred to as 
“Complex Marriage.” The practice of Complex Marriage restricted any one man to claim 
“ownership” of any one woman and promoted fundamental equality in social 




the genders, “…two of the leading businesses of the Community are superintended by 
women, … Women also keep the accounts of the community…and are allowed a fair 
chance with their brothers in education and labor” (Oneida Community, 1876, p. 19). 
 
7.2.1.2 21st Century Case Studies 
Similar to the 19th century case study groups, FOSS communities also challenged 
the prevailing socioeconomic structure of property rights – in these cases, intellectual 
property rights.  By the late 20th century, corporations held the “social, political, and 
economic context” of software production to which FOSS communities reacted and 
fought against (Cole & Lee, 2002).  FOSS communities transformed the prevailing 
proprietary development and distribution methods of software and implemented 
cooperative software development.  The FOSS case study communities discarded 
traditional corporate power structure and implemented fundamental equality by 
disregarding the member’s position or authority (Raymond, 2000).  All members of the 
community were respected for their contributions to the community and not for their 
position (Raymond, 2002).   
Contributing to Linux development is accessible to anyone with the necessary 
skills (Corbet, 2008).  The concept of equality extends to each community member, 
whether users or developers. Torvalds noted that the person who understands how to fix 
the problem is not necessarily the person who identifies the problem.  Both parts of the 
problem – finding and fixing – are equally important (Raymond, 2002).  Furthermore, 




users as co-developers is your least-hassle route to rapid code improvement and effective 
debugging” (Raymond, 2002, The Importance of Having Users).   
Apache software development was centered on virtual relationships which created 
physical, social and power relation anonymity among members and helped promote 
fundamental equality within the community (Apache, HTTP server project, 2011).  
Corporate affiliation or position did not determine priority of a contributor’s code – only 
the merit of the code determined inclusion in the software releases and the direction of 
the project.  Because of this, even board members or directors rarely acted in an official 
capacity within the cooperative innovation communities (Apache, HTTP server project, 
2011).  
As with the other FOSS case studies, any individual could participate in the 
Mozilla community through code development or through becoming a user.  For those 
who developed code, merit not position or authority determined which code was admitted 
to the final releases (Mozilla Roles and Leadership, 2011).      
 
7.2.2 Property Distribution 
All case study communities redefined traditional property ownership structures 
and disassociated the distribution of output from member contribution.  Access to 
knowledge created through cooperative invention was openly available to all community 
members. The inventions resulting from communitarian innovation were sometimes 
patented to protect the property from misappropriation. Intellectual property developed in 
both the 19th and 21st century case study communities was often used by those outside the 




7.2.2.1 19th Century Case Studies  
Regarding distribution of intellectual property rights, information is limited on the 
attitudes and beliefs of the 19th century case study groups. However, there is evidence 
that the inventions of these groups were often not patented except in rare cases and 
usually to protect against misappropriation by those outside the community.  
Shakers made their position clear on intellectual property and were, on moral 
principle, against patent and monopoly profits as “contrary to God and godliness, and 
destructive of the means of right living” (Evans, 1888, p. 255).21  Shakers believed that 
“whatever [a Shaker] invents is for the use of the whole world.” This attitude provided 
opportunity for others to appropriate and profit significantly from some of the Shakers’ 
inventions (White & Taylor, 1904; see also n.a., 1905).  
 There is no record that the Mormon roadometer innovation was ever patented.  
However, a guidebook titled “The Latter-day Saints' emigrants' guide” was published 
based on the mileage records obtained from the improved roadometer and was used 
extensively by other emigrants. 22   
There is no clear record that the Oneida Perfectionists rejected patent protection 
on religious or moral principles; however, a review of the US Patent and Trademark 
Office records shows no patent for Newhouse or Noyes for any trap innovations.  
                                                 
21
 Evans clarified that this position against monopolies applied specifically to those items essential to 




 The complete title is: The Latter-day Saints' emigrants' guide: being a table of distances, showing all the 
springs, creeks, rivers, hills, mountains, camping places, and all other notable places, from Council Bluffs, 
to the Valley of the Great Salt Lake. Also, the latitudes, longitudes and altitudes of the prominent points on 
the route. Together with remarks on the nature of the land, timber, grass, &c. The whole route having been 
carefully measured by a roadometer, and the distance from point to point, in English miles, accurately 





Additionally, there is evidence that other trap makers pirated the trap designs and name 
of the popular “Newhouse Trap” (Newhouse, 1865).   
 
7.2.2.2 21st Century Case Studies  
The basis of property distribution in the FOSS communities was to maintain free 
access to the intellectual property created by the community.  Community members who 
contributed to or who used the community’s intellectual property legally agreed to 
maintain free access to the innovation. 
The Linux license is designed to ensure “freedom to distribute” software copies 
and to “change the software or use pieces of it in new free programs” (GNU Operating 
System, GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE Version 2, 1991, Preamble). 
The Apache FOSS community was initially established through an online mailing 
list of interested users.  The intent was to keep the software freely available and to 
provide a forum for updates and patches – the objective of keeping the software freely 
available to all who want to use, access or change the software has continued throughout 
Apache’s growth and popularity (Apache, HTTP server project, 2011).   
Mozilla was created to take the Netscape browser from commercial software to 
openly available software.  Netscape changed the structure of its organization and 
became an open source project with the intellectual property freely available to anyone 







7.3 Organization of Labor 
…members of a commune might actually have a more positive attitude toward 
work itself.  Because communes, unlike private firms, attract individuals to a 
strong ideology or religious belief that often views work as good or even as 
worship, a self-selection mechanism might ensure that only hard workers join the 
commune. (Cosgel et al., 1998, p. 555) 
 
None of the six case study communities compelled its members to work but rather 
encouraged them to contribute labor based on self-identified abilities and interests. 
According to their interests and abilities, members formed subgroups to perform their 
work.  Table 7.3 summarizes the organization of labor in each of the case study 
communities. 
 
7.3.1 Labor Self-Selected, Not Compulsory 
According to Radner (1992, p. 1388) corporations centralize information and 
require managers to “monitor the actions of other firm members” and set the goals and 
values of each employee. Put differently, the “control of individual behavior through 
organization is what defines the modern managerial corporation” (Lipartito & Sicilia, 
2004, p. 96).23  Labor in the case study communities was seen as a means of enjoyment 
and self-improvement, as well as a way to meet individual and group needs and also 
enhance the individual’s or community’s reputation.  The organizational structure of each 
19th and 21st century case study community generated a cooperative environment in  
  
                                                 
23One example of rigid traditional hierarchy and control is within NASA which has been criticized for its 
“command and control” structure.  This rigid structure is blamed for hampering innovation and leading to 
unfortunate results. Crash investigators of the Columbia space shuttle failure stated that NASA’s culture 
“discouraged dissenting views on safety issues.”  The flow of information and the organizations view of 
criticism discouraged dissenting views from those who disagreed with the institutional results with 





TABLE 7.3 - Organization of Labor 
Method of Organizing 
Labor  
Subgroup Structure  
Shakers Self-selected and regularly 
rotated positions 
Communities organized into 
Families - cooperative 
innovation through subgroups 
Mormons Self-selected based on own 
abilities 
Community organized into 
small subgroups – cooperative 
innovation through a few 
individuals 
Oneida Self-selected and regularly 
rotated positions 
Community organized into 
various business subgroups - 
cooperative innovation sub-
groups improved technology 
and mechanized production  
Linux Self-selected and based on 
own abilities 
Subgroups led by core 
developers and assisted by 
periphery developers built on 
original “kernel”  
Apache Self-selected and based on 
own abilities 
Subgroups led by core 
developers and assisted by 
periphery developers built on 
original “kernel” 
Firefox Self-selected and based on 
own abilities 
Subgroups led by core 
developers and assisted by 
periphery developers built on 
original “kernel” 
 
which members participated based on the contributors’ self-identified skills. 
 
7.3.1.1 19th century case studies 
The objective of the 19th century community was not to make labor compulsory 
but to make it a means of worship and self-improvement.  Member commitment to 
advance the community’s social agenda was tied to religious teachings of labor as a 
joyous endeavor and a means to achieve personal improvement.  Work was considered a 




Work was a form of worship for the Shakers, and as such was an important part of 
the personal development process.  Efficiency in labor was sought after and any waste in 
time or energy was considered a sin (Alexander & Keep, 1995).  Shakers found a great 
deal of variety and personal expression in their work (Alexander & Keep, 1995).  
Individuals were encouraged to work in areas that they found interesting and enjoyed 
(Andrews & Andrews, 1974).  Each member was free to work in various areas and 
mastered several different skills.   
Under the Law of Consecration, Mormons worked as they chose in order to meet 
the mandate of faithful stewardship.  Individuals were expected to work in a manner that 
suited their own skills and talents and “laboring as far as practicable in the sphere of his 
choice” (Gardner, 1922).   
The Oneida Perfectionists encouraged labor as a desirable activity and means of 
self-improvement.  The Oneida Handbook (1867, p. 20) summarized the community’s 
position on labor:  “Compulsory labor is neither sought nor permitted in the 
Communities.  The aim is to make labor attractive, and a means of improvement.”  
Community members wrote on a slip of paper his or her preferred area of work. From 
these requests, the organizing committee would make work appointments based as 
closely as possible to the stated preferences of the members (Oneida Community, 
1867).24  The group encouraged members to invent new ways of producing goods and 
providing services in order to enhance efficiency and reduce necessary labor time.  
                                                 
24
 … a conspicuous bulletin invites every one to hand in a written slip, stating what department of 
business he would like to engage in, etc.  An organizing committee is appointed at this annual 
meeting who select foremen for the different departments of business, and apportion the help, 
keeping in view as much as possible the expressed choice of individuals. (Oneida Community, 




7.3.1.2 21st Century Case Studies 
FOSS case study groups created an organizational structure that encouraged 
members to self-select their own work.  Contributors to the FOSS case study 
communities determined which project best suited their own talents, abilities and interests 
and chose where and at what level to contribute (Benkler, 2002; see also Wheeler, 2007).  
The system of organizing labor in the FOSS case study groups was comparable to the 19th 
century groups even though FOSS members were widely dispersed and rarely met face-
to-face.   
Each community member chose how they wanted to contribute to the 
development of the Linux project.  Based on each member’s self-identified abilities they 
could contribute code, identify or fix bugs, or even contribute to Linux by adding 
information to the Linux website or contributing scholarly articles (Corbet, 2008). 
Contributors to the Apache software chose problems to work on based on their 
own interests – typically those areas of code with which they were most familiar.  The 
software is divisible into “core functionality of the server, which every site needs, from 
the features, which are located in modules”  (Herbsleb & Mockus, 2002).  This 
divisibility into smaller projects was important to the ability of workers to choose 
specifically the areas that interested them and where they wanted to contribute (Apache 
Foundation, 2010). 
Mozilla organized its code development into modules with module owners and 
contributors chose to develop in the module of most interest.  As with the other FOSS 




fixers of bugs and also those who simply used Firefox software (Modules and Module 
Owners, 2011). 
 
7.3.2 Subgroup Structure 
Group structure within cooperative communities is important in developing 
reciprocal relationships (Cosgel et al., 1997).  In the case study communities, subsets of 
the communities provided a structure in which members created reciprocal relationships 
through peer review of work which contributed to the efficiency and quality of 
knowledge creation (Cosgel et al., 1997). Communities created subgroups both formally 
and informally and members often moved between subgroups depending on their desire 
to contribute.  This subgroup structure provided an environment within which members 
contributed innovative ideas – as community members saw a need or observed an 
opportunity, they put forth ideas to others in the community and a subgroup of members 
brought the idea to a final success.   
 
7.3.2.1 19th Century Case Studies 
Nineteenth century case study communities developed innovation in subgroups of 
members who provided the needed skills for creating or improving the innovation.  The 
subgroup structure was informally implemented in the Mormon community and more 
formally in the Shaker and Oneida communities.   
Shakers organized into subgroup called “Families” dispersed in several states.  
These subgroups produced a variety of new knowledge made available to the larger 




(Rothschild, 1981), and the printing press used for printing seed bags was invented by the 
Shakers at Watervliet and improved by the Lebanon Shakers (Buckingham, 1877). 
The Mormon roadometer invention was initiated by two core inventors, Clayton 
and Pratt, and several other community members contributed to the invention through 
engineering skills, quality review and technical refinements.  The subgroup of 
cooperative innovators changed during different phases of the invention based on 
contributors who had the necessary skills for the job. 
Noyes, Newhouse and “several young men” formed a subgroup of the Oneida 
Perfectionists who developed improvements to the trap and to the trap-making process.  
Through the “ingenuity of [the community’s] machinists,” the production process was 
improved and the subgroup created machinery to produce the spring which before was 
handmade (Newhouse, 1865). 
 
 7.3.2.2 21st Century Case Studies 
According to Richard Stallman, the core inventor of GNU, coordinating many 
part-time workers to develop a new software program would normally be a very difficult 
problem; however, in developing a new Unix system this problem did not occur because 
the program “contains hundreds of utility programs, each of which is documented 
separately” (Gay, 2002, p. 35).  Software programming projects were easily divisible into 
various subcomponents which helped in coordinating members’ work contributions 
through online communications. FOSS contributors could simultaneously work on 




contributions.  The outcome was that many small contributions were added together to 
create an operating software (Gay, 2002).   
Among Linux developers there is a relatively small group of core contributors 
who contributed the majority of the code used in the Linux kernel.  The contributors on 
the “periphery” are sorted into those who contributed code and those who identified or 
fixed software bugs (Cole & Lee, 2003; see also Corbet, 2010).  
Separate subgroups within the FOSS communities worked on different aspects of 
the cooperative innovation which helped to organize hundreds of members “united by a 
common set of goals” (How the ASF works, 2011).  One study of the Apache Group 
(AG) shows that small subgroups of active “core” developers work on specific sections 
of code (or “projects”) at any given time.  “[C]ore developers at any point in time include 
the subset of AG [Apache Group] that is active in development (usually 4 to 6 in any 
given week) and the developers who are on the cusp of being nominated to AG 
membership (usually 2 to 3)” (Herbsleb & Mockus, 2002, p. 3).  
For the core developers who contribute the majority of the code and other changes, the 
size of the core team in those modules studied by the analysis ranged from 22 to 35 
members (Herbsleb & Mockus, 2002).  
The Mozilla community organized into subgroups based on skills, level of 
contribution, and area of the project. One study found that the team of “core developers” 
who submitted the majority of the code used in the Firefox software was relatively small 
(25 to 35 contributors) compared to the number of community members who submitted 




to 623 contributors) (Herbsleb & Mockus, 2002).  
 
7.4 Peer Evaluation and Open Communication 
Each case study community created an environment of peer evaluation which 
focused on improvement of the innovations.  Communities practiced open discussion 
among community members to disseminate objectives and outcomes.  The creation of 
new knowledge is based on open communication, with criticism and error correction as a 
fundamental aspect of the process (Popper, 1989 as cited in Cole & Lee, 2003).   A 
“communication network” through which individuals obtain and share knowledge is 
important for creation of new knowledge (Radner, 1992).  The case study groups 
developed organizational structures in which openly evaluating each other’s work and 
disseminating information was a key element within the cooperative communities.  Table 
7.4 summarizes the leadership attributes of each of the case study communities. 
 
7.4.1 Peer review 
Each of the case study groups developed a method to improve knowledge creation 
through peer evaluation.  Peer evaluation allowed case study communities to implement 
error correction in the communitarian innovation process.    
 
7.4.1.1 19th Century Case Studies 
Each of the 19th century case study groups relied on peer review as an important 
aspect of the knowledge creation process.  Critical review of colleagues’ work provided 




TABLE 7.4 – Communication and Peer Review 
Open Communication Peer Review 
Shakers Open communication 
through meetings and 
inter-community visits 
Informal process by 
peers working on 
project 
Mormons Informal open discussion 
among member and formal 
meetings 
Review of innovation 
by peer 
Oneida Formal community 
business meetings 
Mutual Criticism  
GNU/Linux Informal open email 
discussion among 
members 
Formal procedure for 
all code submitted to 
the software 
Apache Informal open email 
discussion among 
members  
Formal procedure for 
all code submitted to 
the software 
Firefox Informal open discussion 
among member and formal 
meetings 
Formal procedure for 
all code submitted to 
the software 
 
peer review process within their community; however, the Mormon and Shaker peer 
review process was less structured and based on informal communication between 
members.   
Shakers visited and communicated among different communities in order to freely 
share innovation knowledge between groups.  Representatives were often invited from 
other Shaker communities to share techniques and learn new methods of production 
(Carson et al., 2000).  The Shaker “Manifesto” states that to have a united and improved 
community, members must “… cherish and strengthen all that is worthy, and what is not 
try to correct and make it worthy...”  (Blinn, 1884, p. 155).  
Once arriving in the Salt Lake valley, leaders felt the roadometer should be 
improved and repaired before a group of men were to return east to help others make 




William King and others created additional improvements to the device (Wright, 1997-
98; see also Egan,1917). 
The Oneida Community formally practiced the concept of “Mutual Criticism” as 
part of their community interaction.  Mutual Criticism facilitated the community 
members’ goal of achieving perfection and made no distinction between business, 
physical or spiritual activities (Oneida Community,1876).  The system of peer review 
allowed each person to periodically stand before the body of the community and receive 
input on what the person must do to improve in their work and community life (Oneida 
Association, 1849). Based on the group’s observations, mutual criticism provided 
opportunity for recognition and praise.  Mutual criticism created an atmosphere of 
improvement as well as positive recognition (Oneida Community,1876). 
 
7.4.1.2 21st Century Case Studies 
Each of the FOSS case study groups practiced a formal peer review process in 
which code written by community members went through a peer evaluation process prior 
to inclusion into the software kernel.  Each innovation of software code was subjected to 
a review process performed by colleagues.  This review process improved the quality of 
the innovation through the diversity of reviewers’ skills and abilities (Cole & Lee, 
2003).25  “No matter how strong the original developer’s skills are, this review process 
invariably finds ways in which the code can be improved” (Corbet, 2010, pp. 15-16).    
                                                 
25
 Torvalds wrote in an email to the Linux kernel mailing list that the point of a peer 
review and open development is that people with diverse backgrounds will often catch 





Each contribution of code was openly available to every community member who 
could then choose to review and evaluate the proposed contribution.  Open access to code 
encourages criticism as a “cultural norm in the FOSS communities and increases the 
likelihood of uncovering error” (Cole & Lee, 2003, p. 639).  One FOSS leader stated that 
“decentralized peer review trumps all the conventional methods for trying to ensure that 
details don't get slipped” (Raymond, 2002, “On Management,” para. 22).   
It is a good idea to post “in-progress work” in order to get the community’s 
feedback on improving the code contribution (Corbet, 2010). The review process begins 
with a post to the appropriate Linux mailing list corresponding to a particular part of the 
Linux code in question.  After responses from the mail list members, there is a “wider 
review” which opens the review to the larger Linux community.  At this stage, any 
successful new code or patch will be merged into the main Linux kernel ( Corbet, 2010).  
“[C]riticism and error correction serv[ed] as a driving force for Linux development” 
(Cole & Lee, 2003, p. 640).26  
Apache PMC helped to develop and maintain a community culture of peer 
review.  Section 6.3 of the ASF Bylaws (How the ASF works, 2011).  
 …the role of the PMC is to further the long term development and health of the 
community as a whole, and to ensure that balanced and wide scale peer review 
and collaboration does happen. Within the ASF we worry about any community 
which centers around a few individuals who are working virtually uncontested. 
We believe that this is detrimental to quality, stability, and robustness of both 
code and long term social structures. 
 
Anyone can subscribe to the Apache mailing lists and proposed software code changes 
“…are reviewed by many people outside the core development community, which often 
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 The critical review process eliminates unacceptable code innovation – one study showed that only 23% 





results in useful feedback before the software is formally released as a package” 
(Herbsleb & Mockus, 2002, p. 175).  
Mozilla code changes are subjected to a peer evaluation process.  A minimum of 
two engineers who are familiar with the overall code must review the new code prior to 
further testing and evaluations.  At that point the code is released to the entire Mozilla 
community whose members review and test the code changes in the code test releases 
which occur two or three times a day  (Wheeler, 2007). 
Code review is our basic mechanism for validating the design and implementation 
of patches.  It also helps us maintain a level of consistency in design and 
implementation practices across the many hackers and among the various 
modules of Mozilla.  We currently have two levels of review, known as “review” 
and “super-review.” (Knous, 2011, “What is the purpose of code review?”) 
 
 
7.4.2 Open Communication 
In addition to peer review procedures, each of the case study communities 
developed an environment of open communication and discussion enhancing the process 
of cooperative innovation.   
 
7.4.2.1 19th Century Case Studies 
Each of the 19th century case study communities practiced open communication 
among group members and shared information and knowledge among each other.  
Oneida Perfectionists held official business meetings open to all members; Shaker 
communities also held open business meetings and traveled extensively among the 




was mostly informal and occurred spontaneously among individuals and in group 
meetings. 
At Union Village in Ohio, the Shaker family met once a week “male and female, 
young and old…were gathered to overhaul the accounts of the week and to discuss all the 
industrial occupations of the Family” (Hinds, 1878, p. 102).  Although these meetings do 
not appear to be universal among all Shaker Families, the Shakers published The Shaker 
Manifesto which provided an opportunity to communicate between community members.  
Also, Shakers designed community buildings to include a room large enough for “union 
meetings” where the men and women come together, sitting on opposite sides of the 
room, “spend an hour in conversation, or reading, or singing, as they choose” (Hinds, 
1878, p. 110).    Shakers openly shared knowledge and information among members of 
the communities and members would visit other Shaker communities to share new 
procedures and innovations.   
The Mormon community communicated ideas and information through formal 
and informal communication avenues.  Camp meetings were used as a communication 
venue for the entire community and spontaneous communication among individuals and 
smaller groups. Communitarian innovation was discussed in group settings (camp 
meetings) where the concept of the roadometer was discussed.  The merit of the idea was 
discussed with the group as was the estimated time to completion (Wright, 1997-98).  
Oneida Perfectionists practiced open communication through daily meetings and 
a weekly business meeting.  Every member of the community was invited to the Business 
Board meetings where all of the heads of the different Oneida business met to discuss 




secretary would read to the entire community the business report and the members were 
given the opportunity to discuss on any measure passed by the Board.  Business matters 
were frequently “referred for discussion and decision by the Board to the general 
meetings.”  The objective was to keep “constant communication” between the Board and 
the community and unanimity was sought by the committees, Business Board and the 
community (Oneida Community, 1865, pp. 12-13). 27 Oneida operated with broad 
management with input from the community members, “[a]dministration of the group’s 
affairs fell to the lot of 21 standing committees and 48 functional departments … but 
major decisions were taken at general meetings” (Cooper, 1987, p. 8). 
 
7.4.2.2 21st Century Case Studies 
Similar to the 19th century communities, the FOSS case study communities kept 
communication open to the entire community.  Unlike the 19th century communities, 
however, FOSS community communication occurred via asynchronous electronic means 
rather than face-to-face communication.    
Development work on the Linux kernel is done through email lists where anyone 
can join and email traffic is very high and conversations can be “severely technical.” This 
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 “…Business Board, comprising the heads of industrial departments and such others as choose 
to attend its sessions…. All the members of the Community are free to participate in the 
deliberations of this Board, and it is a limited body only because all who are not especially 
interested in managing, generally choose to stay away.  The report of the secretary is read to the 
entire Community on the evening following the session of the Board, and opportunity is then 
given for discussion of any measure resolved upon by the Board; and business matters are 
frequently referred for discussion and decision by the Board to the general meetings; so that 
constant communication is kept up between the Board and the mass of the Community…. In 
determining upon any course of action or policy, unanimity is always sought by committees, buy 





open electronic forum for the Linux kernel is the venue “where the kernel development 
community comes together as a whole” (Corbet, 2010, p. 9). 
For the Apache community, group communication is also generally done through 
mailing lists and online forums or “virtual meeting rooms.”  Anyone who wants to 
participate in the Apache software development can join a developer mailing list and 
receive messages, join technical discussions, changes in the code and reports of 
problems, among other types of messages (Herbsleb & Mockus, 2002). These 
asynchronous communications are archived and accessible to the FOSS community at 
any time (How the ASF works, 2011).  An example of the open communication policy is 
the ASF announcement in 2010 regarding the serious intrusion into the Apache systems.  
ASF explained in detail a full analysis of the attack and the weaknesses that were 
exploited.  This open communication to contributors, users and others is particularly 
remarkable when compared to the secrecy and closed communications that are practiced 
within proprietary software firms (Phipps, 2010). 
Mozilla similarly practices open communication.  Every week Mozilla holds a 
meeting for anyone who is interested and provides the meeting access information to 
community members as well as the general public.   Comments are not monitored and 
anyone can join the discussions and the minutes for each of the weekly meetings are 
archived at the Mozilla website (Knous, 2011.). Because of the constant and open 
communication within the community, the fanfare that would typically surround the 
release of proprietary software was missing when Mozilla announce the public release of 





7.5  Member Commitment 
The incorrigible idler seldom inflicts himself on them, and when by chance he 
does, it is he who is the miserable person, for the whole tone is “work and be 
happy,” and so he finds no suitable environment, and soon departs. (Evans, 1888, 
p. 261) 
 
Community members within each case study group committed to community 
requirements through a signed or verbal agreement. Members were free to choose the 
commitment level at which they would contribute real or intellectual property.  The level 
of membership did not determine the distribution of property.  
The case study groups allowed for different levels of membership dependent on 
the commitment level of each member.  Members determined the degree of commitment 
and contribution they were willing to provide to the community.  Nineteenth century case 
study communities united social and economic aspects into a comprehensive member 
commitment.  By comparison, FOSS membership agreements limited member 
commitment to intellectual property. Table 7.5 summarizes the member commitment 
attributes of each of the case study communities. 
 
7.5.1 Membership Levels 
Each of the case study communities offered levels of membership with varying 
degrees of commitment.  Those willing to contribute property and labor were subject to a 
different agreement than those with more narrow membership involvement.   
 
7.5.1.1 19th Century Case Studies 
Each of the 19th century case study communities provided a choice to potential 




TABLE 7.5 – Member Commitment 
 Membership Levels Member Agreements 
Shakers 3 levels: Novitiate, Junior and 
Senior 
Fully practicing members signed 
agreement to contribute all property. 
Rejected patents on moral principle but did 
patent some inventions for protection. 
 
Mormons  
Two levels of commitment - 
baptized members and Law of 
Consecration covenanted members 
 
Law of Consecration and Law of Tithing.  
No clear policy against patents, but did not 
patent roadometer; others appropriated 
written record based on invention findings. 
Oneida New members went through period 
of apprenticeship or period of 
testing. 
All property committed to the community. 
No available information regarding 
position on patents; no record of trap being 
patented; others appropriated name of trap. 
 
Linux Code contributors and users who 
are potential bug identifiers – other 
ways to contribute to community 
Agreement signed to license intellectual 
property to community  
 
Apache Code contributors and users who 
are potential bug identifiers– other 
ways to contribute to community 
Agreement signed to license intellectual 
property to community – additional 
changes could be kept proprietary 
 
Firefox Code contributors and users who 
are potential bug identifiers– other 
ways to contribute to community 
Agreement signed to license intellectual 
property to community  
 
 
of commitment determined the level of membership in the community; however, 
distribution of property was not dependent on the level of membership. 
The Shaker community was organized to accommodate different levels of 
member commitment.  Individuals joined one of three distinct groups: new members 
(Novitiates); more seasoned members (Junior Members) who did not practice all 
requirements; and the proven faithful (Senior Members) who freely contributed all 
property to the community (Hinds, 1878; see also Cosgel et al., 1997).  Members of the 
“Novitiate” level were similar to members of any traditional religious group in that they 
maintained their traditional family living arrangement and retained their own personal 




depending on their desire to sign a “covenant” that “consecrated self and service and all 
one possessed to the cause” (Andrews, 1963 as cited in Alexander & Keep, 1995, p. 364).  
At the Junior Level, property contributions were optional and property would be returned 
if a Junior member left the community.  Senior Level members committed all of their 
possessions, time and efforts to the Society.  Shakers at this level also agreed that they 
will not be able to recover any of their committed property if they leave the community 
(Hinds, 1878). 
Membership commitment in the Mormon community consisted of two levels.  
Each member on being initiated into the group was baptized, indicating a commitment to 
the teachings in the doctrinal works of the Mormon Church. Those Mormons who 
advanced and were considered worthy based on past performance to the community 
ideals were presented with the opportunity to enter into a more in-depth commitment to 
the principles of property sharing and community ideals (the Law of Consecration) and 
verbally committed to these ideals in a covenant ceremony (Endowed from on high, 
2003).  Those who accepted to the Law of Consecration committed property and labor for 
the benefit of the community. Those who were baptized only were not required to 
commit to the Law of Consecration. 
The Oneida Perfectionists provided two levels of membership comprised of a 
probationary membership period which was implemented to determine if new members 
could live the community standards and contribute to its success.  No claim by 




when and if a probationary member was ready to join in full membership (Estlake, 1900; 
see also Oneida Association, 1849, p. 16).28 
 
7.5.1.2 21st Century Case Studies 
In each of the FOSS case study communities, there were two broad levels of 
membership: contributor and user.  The FOSS user is anyone who uses the software and 
is the most basic community member. FOSS users can also be distinguished between 
those who find bugs and alert the rest of the community and those who use the software 
as developed.  FOSS users are critically important in finding and reporting bugs. Both 
parts of the problem – finding and fixing – are equally important (Raymond, 2002).  
FOSS case study groups treated their users as co-developers which led to code 
improvement through debugging (Raymond, 2002; also Cole & Lee, 2003). 
Linux, Apache and Mozilla contributors were organized into an informal two-
tiered organization comprised of the relatively few “core contributors” and the much 
more numerous “periphery contributors” (Cole & Lee, 2003).   The Linux community 
encourages input at several levels, including developer and user contributions.  Other 
contributions include writing articles or tutorials, creating a blog, ask friends to join 
Linux.com”, or create a new developer group (How to participate in Linux.com, 2011). 
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 As to the legal [emphasis in original] titles of land and other property, no special measures were 
taken to secure the Association from individuals.  Those who owned or purchased lands in their 
own names at the beginning, retained their deeds, and no formal transfer of any property brought 
in by the members, was made to the Association.  The stock of the company was consolidated by 





Apache defines a user as a person who “uses” the Apache software.  Users 
contribute by giving feedback on bugs and new feature suggestions.  Developers are 
those members who contribute code or documentation to an Apache project.  Developers 
are also included in the management of the Apache projects including the “committer” 
who is allowed access to the code (How the ASF works, 2011). 
As with Linux and Apache, Mozilla also had membership levels among 
contributors and users.  Users were encouraged to submit “crash” reports if a software 
application unexpectedly quits (Get involved with Mozilla, 1998-2010).  Code 
contributors determined their level of commitment and activity in the development of the 
project. Mozilla also encouraged users to contribute in ways other than source code.  
Writers and designers contribute skills to develop and improve websites (Get involved 
with Mozilla, 1998-2010).  Mozilla included several minimum levels of commitment 
including those members who only want to contribute unused bandwidth which allows 
Mozilla to increase service to millions of people (Get involved with Mozilla, 1998-2010).  
 
7.5.2 Member Agreements 
The case study agreements dealt with property contributed by members and the 
manner in which property would be distributed among the members.  No person was 
forced to join any of the communities and no member was prevented from leaving.   
 
7.5.2.1 19th Century Case Studies 
Each member that joined one of the19th century case study communities was 




membership. This commitment was made either in writing or verbally, and sometimes 
both. None of the 19th century case study member agreements separately accounted for 
intellectual property contributions which were considered part of the membership 
commitment to work for the benefit of the group. 
A list of Shaker membership requirements included the requirement that each 
prospective member must join the group voluntarily and that “[n]o considerations of 
property are ever made use of by this Society to induce any person to join it, nor to 
prevent any person from leaving it” (Hinds, 1878, p. 90). 
During the formal practice of the Law of Consecration, the Mormon bishop 
provided a written contract deeding the property to each individual.  However, only the 
portion deeded to the individual was considered property that a departing member could 
keep – the portion given to the bishop would remain with the community of Mormons.  
(Smith, 1981) 29 During the informal practice of the Law, Mormon commitment was 
verbal and included the covenant to “devote both talent and material means” to the 
growth and benefit of the group (Talmage, rev ed. 1976).   
The Oneida community agreement made clear that any work performed while a 
member of the Community was compensated through the benefit of the education and 
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 Section 51: 2-9. Wherefore, let my servant [bishop] Edward Partridge, and those whom he has 
chosen, in whom I am well pleased, appoint unto this people their portions, every man equal 
according to his family, according to his circumstances and his wants and needs.  And let my 
servant Edward Partridge, when he shall appoint a man his portion, give unto him a writing that 
shall secure unto him his portion, that he shall hold it, even this right and this inheritance in the 
church, until he transgresses and is not accounted worthy by the voice of the church, according to 
the laws and covenants of the church, to belong to the church.  And if he shall transgress and is not 
accounted worthy to belong to the church, he shall not have power to claim that portion which he 
has consecrated unto the bishop for the poor and needy of my church; therefore, he shall not retain 




care received while a member.30  Members agreed that the benefits received during 
membership of the community were sufficient compensation if they ever decided to leave 
the community. 
 
7.5.2.2 21st Century Case Studies 
FOSS case study agreements, referred to as open source licenses (OSL), were 
much more detailed than the 19th century case study agreements.  Although there are 
numerous different OSL agreements, the most commonly used is the General Public 
License or GPL which, as of 2005, was implemented by approximately 70% of FOSS 
projects (David & Tsur, 2005).  The GPL ensures perpetual free access and distribution 
rights for the software by utilizing US copyright laws (David & Tsur, 2005). 31  
Not only are contributors of code subject to a strict licensing agreement, but also 
FOSS users who download the software are required to accept a licensing agreement 
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 If the member subsequently left the Community, the defector would be entitled to a “refund” of the 
contributed property or an “equivalent” amount.  As a result of several legal actions, the practice of 
returning contributed property or other compensation to disaffected ex-members became a common 
practice among Utopian Socialists.  (Rappites, Mormons, Amana and others.) A departing member would 
receive any real property, or its equivalent, with which he entered the Community.  The Association 
maintained that it was doing this through generosity and not through obligation and no claim to anything 
other than the individual’s original belongings would be returned.  When joining the Oneida Community, 
individuals would sign the following: 
 
On the admission of any member, all property belonging to him or her becomes the property of the 
Community.  A record of the estimated amount will be kept, and in case of the subsequent 
withdrawal of the member, the Community, according to its practice heretofore, will refund the 
property or an equivalent amount.  This practice, however, stands on the ground, not of obligation, 
but of expediency and liberality; and the time and manner of refunding must be trusted at the 
discretion of the Community.  While a person remains a member, his subsistence and education in 
the Community are held to be just equivalents for his labor and no accounts are kept between him 
and the Community, and no claim of wages accrues to him in case of subsequent withdrawal.  
(Oneida Community, 1867, pp. 17-18) 
 
31
 Because of the unusual use of copyright laws, GPL and other FOSS licenses are often referred to as 
“copyleft”.   GPL is also referred to as a “viral” license because any other software that is released with 




which gives the right to use and modify the software but restricts any attempt to limit the 
property rights through appropriation of the software (Lerner & Tirole, 2005). 32   FOSS 
case study members did not confer IP copyright of their contributions to the community 
but licensed their IP to each user which made it difficult for either the contributor or a 
third party to re-appropriate the IP (Benkler, 2004).   
The Linux operating system was powered by the various programs developed in 
the GNU project and was itself licensed under the GNU General Public License (GPL) 
(Hasan, 2000). 
Torvalds initially distributed Linux under a licensing agreement that restricted any 
payment for the program, as well as requiring that all programs distributed or used 
with Linux be freely available. After half a year, however, he relaxed these 
restrictions.  The number of users grew rapidly, from about one hundred in one 
year to half-a-million in 1994. (Lerner & Tirole, 2005, p. 209) 
 
However, free access does not necessarily mean that the software is free in price (GNU 
License, Preamble), but rather that the freedom to access and redistribute the code and 
that contributors of code do no maintain legal rights (Wheeler, 2007). The Linux software 
is licensed under the GPL. 
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 That does not mean, however, that all OSL are the same.  Some OSL are much more permissive in 
redistribution of the source code than is the GPL.  The Berkeley Software Distributions (BSD) license is an 
early and well-known OSL which allows those who modify and add to the original source code to 
redistribute the resulting software without restrictions on the type of license.  Based on the type of 
restrictions or permissions the kernel author wants to impose on the FOSS project will also likely determine 
the type of contributors to the project.  Those who do not want to see their FOSS contribution potentially 
redistributed as proprietary software will be less likely to contribute to a project licensed under the BSD 
than the GPL (Lerner & Tirole, 2005, p. 108). 
Examples of cases where we would expect a restrictive license are 
projects geared for end users who are unlikely to appreciate the coding, 
such as computer games, or those sponsored by corporations, who 
potential contributors might fear would “hijack” the project and use the 





The Apache Software license is similar in intent to the GPL in allowing users to 
“freely download and use” the software for personal or commercial purposes.  The 
Apache license requires that each contributor grants a “perpetual, worldwide, non-
exclusive, no-charge, royalty-free, irrevocable” license on the software (Licenses – The 
Apache Software Foundation, 2010, para. 2 and 3). However, unlike GPL projects the 
source code of proprietary or personal modifications to the Apache software do not need 
to be included in further free redistribution of the software (Apache license and 
distribution FAQ, 2011).  GPL projects are not compatible with the Apache licensed 
projects and cannot be combined in Apache licensed projects because of the different 
license requirements (Apache license v2.0 and GPL compatibility, 2011).  “Some 
licenses (e.g., BSD and its close cousin the Apache license) are relatively permissive, 
while others (e.g., GPL) force the user to distribute any changes or improvements (share 
them) if they distribute the software at all” (Lerner & Tirole, 2002, p. 229). 
The Mozilla Public License 1.1 (Mozilla Public License Version 1.1, n.d., 2.2 
Contributor Grant) states that “each Contributor hereby grants You [the user] a world-
wide, royalty-free, non-exclusive license.”  Similar to GPL projects, code contributors 
must agree that their code will be freely available to redistribute and any modifications to 
the code are also subject to the terms of the original license (Mozilla Public License 
Version 1.1, n.d.).  Initially, when Netscape was converting to FOSS the proposed license 
was to allow Netscape to “take pieces of the open source code and turn them back into a 
proprietary project again.”  Mozilla settled on the Mozilla Public License which specifies 
that Netscape cannot “regain proprietary rights to modifications of the code” (Lerner & 




In summary, the case study groups share common organizational characteristics 
that provide a foundation for a communitarian innovation business model.  The shared 






• socioeconomic design 
o property distribution 
o fundamental equality;  
 
• organization of labor 
o self-selected, not compulsory 
o subgroup structure; 
 
• internal communication 
o open communication 
o peer review; and 
 
• member commitment 
o membership levels 






APPLICATION OF COMMUNIATARIAN BUSINESS 
MODEL TO BIOTECHNOLOGY 
 
An interesting question is whether the open source model can be transposed to 
other industries.  … a number of ingredients of open source software are not 
specific to the software industry.  Yet no other industry has yet produced anything 
quite like open source development. (Lerner and Tirole, 2000, p. 115) 
 
While the academic community has focused efforts into understanding incentives, 
a broader question is whether the communitarian innovation business model can be 
successfully transported to other industries.  Because of the lifesaving potential of more 
abundant food crops and medicine for neglected diseases combined with the high cost of 
research and development, biotechnology has received attention as a hopeful candidate 
for successful collaborative innovation.  Several alternatives to the traditional business 
model have already been attempted including private-public partnerships and 
development prizes funded by governments (Orti, 2009).  One area that provides hope of 
achieving societal goals of healthcare and food security is the communitarian innovation 
demonstrated by FOSS.  A model of successful communitarian innovation groups is 
important to understand how biotechnology groups may benefit from communitarian 
innovation.  According to Shulman and Schweik (2011, p. 162), the next step in the 




… study the domains in detail where the OSS principles have been adopted and 
make case studies, then identify the similarities and differences, strengths and 
weaknesses in those approaches. This would finally lead to building analytic 
models that try to specify conditions that favor or hinder the experiments in open 
source. 
 
In Chapter 7, I analyzed organizational characteristics common to cooperative 
innovation across six case study communities, three case studies from 19th century 
communitarian projects and three from 21st century FOSS communities.  The purpose of 
this chapter is to apply these organizational characteristics to the biotechnology industry 
and determine the potential for success of communitarian innovation in this field.  I have 
identified three cooperative biotechnology innovation communities for a case study 
analysis: CAMBIA, Tropical Disease Initiative (TDI), and Open Source Drug Discovery 
(OSDD).  CAMBIA focuses on agricultural collaborative innovation while OSDD and 
TDI focus on collaborative innovation of drugs for neglected tropical diseases such as 
malaria, tuberculosis, schistosomiasis and leishmaniasis. These diseases receive little 
attention from the traditional patent-based research and development because of the 
relatively few people suffering from these diseases that could afford to pay for the 
patented drugs (Orti, 2009). 
In Section 8.1 of this chapter, I review the development of intellectual property 
rights in biotechnology and the impact on pharmaceutical and agriculture industries.  The 
traditional structure drives the need for an alternative organizational structure to achieve 
broader societal goals than is currently motivated by the status quo. Section 8.2 provides 
an overview of the three case study communities and in Section 8.3, I compare the five 
structural characteristics discussed in Chapter 7 to the three biotechnology case study 




8.1 Impact of IPRs on Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Industries 
The 1980 Supreme Court decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty transformed the 
pharmaceutical and agricultural industries and launched the modern biotechnology 
industry.33 (See Appendix C for further discussion on the pharmaceutical patent system.) 
This decision ruled in favor of patentability of “genetically engineered bacteria” and 
biological living organisms (Gallini, 2002; see also, Carrier, 2004).  Since the 1980 
Chakrabarty decision, the USPTO has granted patents for genes and gene fragments and 
other biological living organisms.  To obtain a patent on a gene or gene fragment the 
USPTO requires that “inventors must (1) identify novel genetic sequences, (2) specify the 
sequence’s product, (3) specify how the product functions …[and] (4) enable one skilled 
in the field to use the sequence for its stated purpose” (Human Genome Project 
information, Genetics and patenting, 2008, Patenting Genes, Gene Fragments).  
Biological organism patents were only recognized and enforceable in a few countries 
until the TRIPS agreement globalized IPRs to biotechnology organisms (Kothari &  
Anaruadha, 1999). 
Controversy surrounded the relative ease of obtaining a patent on gene sequences 
and fragments and in 2001 the USPTO increased patent requirements to show “specific 
and substantial utility that is credible” (U.S. Human Genome Project Research Goals, 
                                                 
33
 Although patents have been awarded for centuries on mechanical inventions, ethical and philosophical 
concerns have delayed support for patent protection of living organisms until relatively recently (Iwasaka, 
2000).  It was not until the passage of the Plant Patent Act in 1930 that the USPTO ended this restriction by 
granting intellectual property protection to asexually derived plant varieties (“United States Patent and 
Trademark Office, n.d., What is a plant patent?). Currently, the USPTO grants monopoly rights for 20 
years from the date of filing to “exclude others from asexually reproducing, selling or using the plant so 
reproduced.” (“United States Patent and Trademark Office, n.d., What is a plant patent?). The patent law 
defines a plant “inventor” as a person who contributes to one of two steps: (1) the discovery of a new plant, 
and/or (2) the asexual reproduction of the plant (“United States Patent and Trademark Office, n.d., What is 





n.d., Genes and Gene Fragments; see also Masum, Schroeder, Khan, & Daar, 2011). The 
requirement for increased specificity was intended to better demonstrate how the 
inventions function in nature.  Even so, patenting gene fragments put the patent holder in 
a position to act as a gatekeeper and “exercise undue control over the commercial fruits 
of genome research” (U.S. Human Genome Project research goals, n.d., Genes and Gene 
Fragments). As disease genes were identified, corresponding tests were developed and 
patented to screen for the disease (U.S. Human Genome Project research goals, n.d.).   
The patent holder then controls any use of the test and maintains a monopoly allowing 
the possibility of excluding other users from further research.  As an example, in 1994 a 
University of Utah researcher identified and patented the genes responsible for hereditary 
breast cancer, BRCA1 and 2.  The university licensed the gene discovery to Myriad 
Genetics which actively protects its monopoly by enforcing its patent through blocking 
other researchers in using the gene (Cukier, 2006). 
Responding to the concerns of increased control by private organizations of 
patented biological genes, government and private organizations have created projects to 
identify and map the human genome in order to maintain the information in the public 
domain. The US Department of Energy and the National Institutes of Health initiated the 
Human Genome Project in 1990 in order to identify the genes in the human DNA and 
determine chemical pair sequences.  With the participation of 18 countries, the human 
DNA sequence was completed in 2003 (Human Genome, 2010).   
In 2002, scientists in Japan, UK, Canada, China, Nigeria and the US developed a 
project to create a haplotype map of the human genome called the International HapMap 




expected to be a key resource for researchers to use to find genes affecting health, 
disease, and responses to drugs and environmental factors” (HapMap Project, 2006, 
About the International HapMap Project; see also Human Genome, Genetics and 
patenting, 2010).   
 
8.1.1 Open Source Biotechnology Research and Development 
Although these collaborative gene identification projects provide open access to 
information, “[o]pen access to information by itself, while often the easiest step to take, 
may be of little value without the freedom and collaborators with which to apply such 
information to create solutions” (Masum et al., 2011, p. 66).  Because biotechnology has 
become increasingly an “information-oriented science,” there is hope that collaborative 
innovation can work with biotechnology as well as it has with software (Munos, 2006).  
Some of the first collaborative biotechnology innovation projects using open source as its 
model were bioinformatics software projects including Biojava, BioPerl, BioPython, and 
Generic Software Components for Model Organism Databases (GMOD).  It is important 
to note, however, that while FOSS was privately funded, bioinformatics software has 
often been publically funded.  This distinction is important because funding entities 
typically have the authority to determine the type of license for the software which is not 
always open source (Shulman and Schweik, 2010; see also Todd, 2007). 
 
8.2 Three Biotechnology Case Study Communities 
Although no biotechnology “open source” project has matured past its infancy, 




achieved to date and the available information on the community.  My analysis reveals 
that two of the three case study communities, CAMBIA and TDI, have applied few of the 
organizational characteristics and as a result the communities have had a difficult time 
achieving the goals of the organization. OSDD shows an organizational structure very 
similar to the 19th century and FOSS case study communities.  Chronologically, 
CAMBIA and TDI are an early attempt of cooperative biotechnology innovation while 
OSDD was organized much later and appears to have learned from the earlier 
communities and implemented an organizational structure that more closely matches the 
19th century and FOSS case study communities.  
 
8.2.1 CAMBIA 
Richard Jefferson, trained as a molecular, cellular and developmental biologist, 
initiated CAMBIA as an international nonprofit organization based in Canberra Australia 
in 1991.  With this organization, Jefferson intended to “up-end” the established 
biotechnology system of exclusion through patents (Mair, 2011). His theory was to 
charge only what each technology user could afford to pay – large commercial labs 
would pay a substantial amount while small research organizations might receive access 
to the same technology free of charge.  Earlier in his career, Jefferson developed GUS 
which is “widely credited for enabling many breakthroughs in plant biotech” including 
Monsanto’s Roundup Ready soybeans (Dreyfuss, 2006, p. 31; see also BiOS, Executive 
staff, n.d.).   
CAMBIA offers for license several technologies including, TransBacter which 




(Singh, 2008, p. 201; see also Dreyfuss, 2006).  Another technology offered is Diversity 
Arrays which is a genome diversity mapping technology (Singh, 2008, p. 201).  
According to CAMBIA’s website, these technologies are research tools used for further 
biotechnology research and are available through the BiOS license, which is intended to 
make these technologies “open source” in order to “advance rapid development and 
debugging” of the technologies (What BiOS-compatible agreements are available, n.d.).   
BiOS licenses provide that:  
• “Ownership of technology stays with the owner 
• “A world-wide, non-exclusive, royalty-free non-assertion covenant to make 
and use the technology and improvements. 
• “Mechanisms for sharing information that is desirable to share, such as public 
safety information” (What BiOS-compatible agreements are available?, n.d., 
para.4) 
 
CAMBIA founded BiOS (Biological Innovation for an Open Society) in 2006 to 
improve world nutrition and food security through collaborative innovation and making 
biotechnology research tools equally available to research groups within developed and 
developing economies (BiOS, Home, n.d.).  CAMBIA’s biotechnology resources are 
openly available to the research community through BiOS licensing agreements and a 
“protected commons approach which allows “users to access, improve, and modify 
enabling technologies without infringing on proprietary rights” (Masum, 2011; see also 
Hilgers, Muller-Seitz, & Piller, 2010). A user of the BiOS research tools is required to 
“grant-back any improvements and modifications into the [BiOS] open patent pool” 
(Penin, 2011, p 15-16).  The grant-back requirement in the BiOS licensing agreement is 
often found in commercial licenses; however, in the BiOS license the grant-back allows 
other licensees to use the improvements of the innovation. (“Do BiOS agreements allow 




Licensees are allowed to patent their improvements but  “set aside” proprietary 
rights for others who have agreed to the BiOS license (How do BiOS Agreements 
encourage and ensure Access and Benefits-Sharing?, n.d.). However, innovation 
developed as a result of using the BiOS research tools is not subject to the viral license 
and licensees have the “liberty to individually control new strains of plants, through 
patents if so wished” (Penin, 2011, p. 16).  This is because BiOs desires to keep the 
research tools free for members to use but does not want to impede the “commercial 
exploitation of their direct applications” (Penin, 2011, p. 16).   
The BiOS website states that the CAMBIA technology is available at “no cost” 
but it is “costly to maintain an exchange of materials and improvements, and to serve up 
and maintain the information technology commons” (What is the cost of a BiOS 
agreement?, n.d., para. 1).  Therefore, the BiOS agreement requires that “for-profit 
licensees” pay a flat rate fee based on the size of the organization.  However, nonprofit 
organizations are not required to pay any fee for use of the technology, “other than cost 
recovery for materials handling (postage etc.)” (What is the cost of a BiOS agreement?, 
n.d., para. 3).  The “capital-intensive and highly privatized biotechnology sector” has 
been reluctant to accept the BiOS licenses and there are relatively few licensees of the 
CAMBIA technology. Further, CAMBIA technology has attracted few licensees because 
they cannot mix CAMBIA technology with their already proprietary technology 
(Kloppenburg, 2008).  
Another CAMBIA project, BioForge, hopes to return to practices in the “first few 
thousand years of agricultural development” by establishing a structure that encourages 




organization developed to facilitate the open interaction between scientists (Porceddu & 
Jefferson, 2004; see also BiOS, Home, n.d.).  Similar to SourceForge for FOSS, BioForge 
was intended to be a centralized location for community member contributions and peer 
review within a “protected commons” where members could discuss inventions and 
improvements without invalidating future patent applications or having the innovation 
misappropriated by nonmembers (CAMBIA, What is a ‘protected commons’?, n.d.).  
Within its first 2 months, BioForge attracted 2,000 participants but within a short time 
CAMBIA shut down BioForge as it was clear that online collaboration was not occurring.  
Differing protocols from one lab to another might be one reason for the failure of 
BioForge which was discontinued.  Jefferson suggested that the failure of BioForge may 
be due to the lack of attribution to members’ contributions (Masum, 2011). 
 
8.2.2 Tropical Disease Initiative 
Five attorneys and scientists associated with Duke University, Berkeley, UCSF 
and Prince Felipe Research Center in Spain established The Tropical Disease Initiative 
(TDI) in 2004 (Tropical Disease Initiative, What, who, how and more…, 2008). The 
purpose of TDI is to develop drugs to treat neglected tropical diseases such as 
leishmaniasis, schistosomiasis, dengue fever and African sleeping sickness.  The current 
market model fails to motivate pharmaceutical companies to invest in research and 
development for drugs in these diseases because of the small number of people who are 
able to pay patented-drug prices for the treatment (Shulman & Schweik, 2011). 
TDI was funded in part by the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovacion and the 




the collaborative project but rather will “act as a generator and steward of the kernel it 
has provided and hopes that others will develop the drug candidates that arise from this 
collaboration” (Goulding, 2009, p. 12).   The TDI kernel is a group of possible drug 
development targets developed by a group of researchers.  The contributors to TDI would 
determine drug leads, which ultimately would be sent to “Virtual Pharma” that would 
then choose which candidates to work on with corporate partners (Shulman & Schweik, 
2010). The TDI kernel is available through the WordPress package which allows for 
“creation, storage and dissemination of each target entry” and allows for members to rate 
the potential success of each proposed target (The Tropical Disease Initiative, Methods, 
2008).   
TDI utilizes The Synaptic Leap (TSL) as its online collaboration website which, 
like CAMBIA’s BioForge, has been compared to SourceForge used for FOSS projects 
(Goulding, 2009; see also About the Synaptic Leap, 2006).34  TSL incorporated in 2005 
in order to “create an online community that could connect and collaborate on research 
efforts for neglected tropical diseases” (Singh, 2008, p. 202).  TSL provides web access 
to those who want to contribute and allows members to start their own projects based on 
different ideas to develop drugs.  Anyone can go to the TSL projects page and see 
contributions and add contributions to existing projects or start their own project.  The 
TSL website under “Get involved with an open research project” (2006) on the Malaria 
Research Community states, “Go to our current projects page for a list of projects in 
process. You can comment directly or "add a child page" … to start something new (a 
                                                 
34





"fork" in open source software development) and describe your own open research 
project for malaria.”   
  TDI intends to reduce costs of drug development through volunteers who donate 
time and knowledge; through market competition rather than patent monopolies and 
allowing the company with the lowest bid to develop the drug candidate provided by 
TDI.  TDI compares this off-patent drug development to the development of the polio 
vaccine which was sponsored by the March of Dimes.  The March of Dimes then signed 
“guaranteed purchase contracts” with drug makers that were willing to produce the drug 
on a large scale (Maurer, Rai, & Sali, 2004, p. 184). 
TDI has achieved some success through its research on schistosomiasis.  The 
World Health Organization identified as a priority the development of a low priced 
“single enantiomer” which would make the current treatment for schistosomiasis, 
Praziquantel (PZQ), more accessible to administer to patients (Woelfle, Olliaro, & Todd, 
2011).  PZQ is difficult to administer due to size and taste of the pill. The WHO and the 
Austrian Government funded the initial process of establishing an online electronic lab 
notebook on which all data and experiments could be deposited.  Work by TDI on the 
PZQ project led to a potentially successful outcome in identifying dibenzoyl tartaric acid 
as a “superior resolving agent” which was posted openly (Woelfle et al., 2011). 
Praziquantel… is a perfect example of where open source can really deliver.  The 
iterative improvement of the route to a drug that is of great importance to 
underdeveloped countries is of little interest to for-profit companies, but neither is 
it a priority for academia.  We see open source collaboration as the only way to 






Since January of 2010 there have been approximately 100 comments in TSL regarding 
the TDI project and 60 of those were from outside contributors who were not involved in 
the kernel project.  The majority of the outside comments came from industry rather than 
academic sources (Woelfle et al., 2011).    
TDI implements computational “pipeline” programs, MODPIPE and AnnoLyze, 
to organize and make the target genome sequences available to the community.  The 
software programs make the information easy to search protein models and predicted 
locations of binding sites (“The Tropical Disease Initiative, Methods, 2008).   
TDI does not seek IPR protection but rather implements a Science Commons 
protocol for maintaining open access to all outcomes of the collaborative innovation. The 
license is based on the Creative Commons 3.0 License.  The Science Commons protocol 
has no restrictions on how TDI data are used and, according to TDI, does not contain a 
“viral” condition requiring users to donate back any improvements or changes to the 
community but requires proper attribution based on “customary academic attribution 
norms” (Goulding, 2009; see also Orti, 2009). TDI, however, hopes that those 
implementing the information in any innovation will promise “not to seek patents of their 
own” (Orti et al., 2009; see also Shulman & Schweik, 2011, p. 176). 
 
8.2.3 OSDD 
In 2007, India’s Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) under the 
direction of Samir Brahmachari initiated Open Source Drug Discovery in order to focus 




The traditional pharmaceutical model of innovation invests very little in neglected 
tropical diseases due to high investment costs and relatively low potential profitability.  
Although there is currently a drug to treat TB, the disease kills two people every 3 
minutes in India and drug resistant strains of TB (Multiple Drug Resistant TB and 
Extensive Drug Resistant TB) have increased due to the long-term duration of the current 
therapy and tendency for patients to quit therapy before completion (Bhardwaj, 2011). 
The Indian government provided US $27 million to fund OSDD’s first project of finding 
a better treatment for tuberculosis (TB). 
OSDD also intends to pursue additional funding from public and private sources 
(Goulding, 2009; also see Masum, 2011).  “The funds raised would be used for 
conducting Quality Control activities and tests. It would also be used to reward 
contributors and fund scholarships” (Open Source Drug Discovery, FAQs, n.d., Who is 
funding OSDD?).  Current OSDD partners include universities, nonprofit organizations 
(including CAMBIA) and industry partners including Sun Microsystems, Infosys and 
AstraZeneca (Open Source Drug Discovery, FAQs, n.d., Who are OSDD partners?).  As 
one of its long-term partners, Sun Microsystems manages OSDD’s information 
technology (IT) systems and provides open source software for the project (Singh, 2008). 
Similar to FOSS, OSDD created a community of volunteers who contribute knowledge 
online. The community intends to discover new chemical entities (NCEs) that lead to 
effective drugs for TB and will make the innovation available to numerous drug 
manufacturing and marketing organizations in order to create affordable and available 




OSDD members contribute research and knowledge through Sysborg 2.0, a web-
based system that logs member contributions and peer review (“Open Source Drug 
Discovery, n.d., What is OSDD).  Other web-based tools for collaborative innovation 
include Computational Resources for Drug Discovery (CRDD) which facilitates the 
interaction of drug research tools and also Open Access Archive which assists in disease-
related research (Shulman & Schweik, 2010). OSDD also implements TBrowse, a 
resource that brings together nearly 50 different research resources into one format (Open 
Source Drug Discovery, FAQs, n.d.).  OSDD’s online structure “provides bioinformatics 
tools, biological information, data on the pathogens, projects for participation in drug 
discovery, and discussion forums” (Masum, 2011, p. 65). 
OSDD leadership breaks down the drug discovery process into “Work Packages” 
(WPs) and opens them up to all members of the community to contribute (Datta, 2009).  
Each WP sets forth the problem that must be solved and its connection to other WPs.  
WPs include target identification, screening, lead generation and break these complex 
problems into simpler and smaller projects with a defined scope of expected deliverables 
(Scaria, 2010; see also Shulman & Schweik, 2010). Contributions of WP solutions are 
peer reviewed before attribution to the contributor is awarded (Singh 2008). As of 
November 2011, OSDD reported more than 5,000 registered participants contributing to 
over 100 projects on its web portal (Open Source Drug Discovery, FAQs, n.d., After 
registration on OSDD, what I have to do?; see also OSDD crosses 5000 registered users, 
2011).  
OSDD created its TB kernel through collaborative re-annotation of the 




were trained in annotation methods using web-based materials and completed the 
annotation in April of 2010 – an estimated 300 “man years” into 4 months (Munos, 
2010).  From this annotation, a “kernel” of 20 pairs of proteins and ligands was identified 
for OSDD’s use in TB research (Anderson, 2010). OSDD is structured to follow its 
innovation model through the point of human drug testing which would then be 
outsourced to Contract Research Organizations (CROs) in countries like India that are 
already set up to carry out clinical trials on drugs for global pharmaceutical companies.  
These trials would be conducted with cooperation by governments and private industry 
which would “bring down the cost considerably.” CSIR, OSDD’s sponsoring 
organization, has experience taking drugs through clinical trials and bringing them to 
market and will be able to guide OSDD through these steps.  (Open Source Drug 
Discovery, What is OSDD, n.d., OSDD Approach to Clinical Trials; see also Bhardwaj, 
2011). 
OSDD plans to limit the risks and individual expense of high-cost clinical trials 
by using public funding to obtain the necessary trial information and results. All data 
created during OSDD clinical trials will be openly available (“About Us”, n.d.).  This 
model of keeping all clinical results open to anyone provides the foundation of bypassing 
potential pharmaceutical monopolies moving the outcomes into the generic sector of the 
industry resulting in potentially lower-priced drugs (Open Source Drug Discovery, What 
is OSDD, n.d.).  “To ensure affordability, the drugs that come out of the OSDD platform 
will be made available like a generic drug, without Intellectual Property encumbrances. 




delivery of drugs” (Open Source Drug Discovery, What is OSDD, n.d., OSDD Approach 
to Clinical Trials). 
OSDD’s license is similar to the FOSS GPL license which incorporates a “viral” 
clause that requires any improvement to be contributed back to the OSDD community 
(Shulman & Schweik, 2011).  The OSDD license allows its information to be used 
commercially or noncommercially; however, users must “grant back an unencumbered 
worldwide nonexclusive right to OSDD for use of any IP rights acquired for their 
improvements or modifications” (Masum, 2011, p. 65). 
 
8.3 Five Organizational Characteristics 
       Although none of these case study communities has yet replicated the success of the 
earlier communitarian innovation communities, it is worthwhile to examine the 
organizational structure of these communities in order to understand the potential for 
success of each community.  In the following pages, I analyze each of the organizational 
structure categories discovered in Chapter Six as they relate to the biotechnology case 
study groups.  These structural characteristics found in the 19th century and FOSS case 






• socioeconomic design 
o property distribution 
o fundamental equality;  
 
• organization of labor 




o subgroup structure; 
 
• internal communication 
o open communication 
o peer review; and 
 
• member commitment 
o membership levels 




 Leadership motivates participation in the community activities by establishing the 
importance of the group’s mission and by providing the innovative concept on which the 
community could improve and expand. “Enticing people to join is a challenge. A good 
website helps, but it’s not enough. It takes a sustained effort to build trust with 
stakeholders. It also takes a leader who can connect with people, understand their 
motivation and foster trust” (Shulman & Schweik, 2011, p.177). Table 8.1 summarizes 
the leadership attributes of each of the biotechnology case study communities. 
 
8.3.1.1 Motivational Leadership 
Within each of the biotechnology case study communities’ leadership has worked 
diligently to promote its social agenda of freely accessible data within drug and 
agricultural development.  Each has provided a type of “kernel” on which other 
contributors can improve upon or add to.  Even so, the type of kernel is somewhat 
different in each of the biotechnology case study communities.  CAMBIA leadership is 





TABLE 8.1 – Leadership 
 
 Motivational Adaptable Shared 
CAMBIA Active community 
leader and evidence of 
“kernel” contributed by 
leader 
 




TDI Active community 
leader and evidence of 
“kernel” contributed by 
leader 
Evidence of adaptable 





OSDD Active community 
leader and evidence of 
“kernel” created by 
community 
Evidence of adaptable 
leadership 
Evidence of shared 
leadership 
 
kernel.  Since CAMBIA requires a license fee that increases to $500,000 depending on 
the size of the organization there has been little improvement on the existing technology 
that has been granted back to the community (“What BiOS-compatible agreements are 
available”, n.d.). Although there are several individuals listed on the TDI board of 
directors, there is no clear leadership and there is little chance at leadership due to the fact 
that no one knows who exactly is working on any aspect of the TDI kernel (Anderson, 
2010).  TDI has posted what it identifies as a “kernel” on which contributors can work.  
The kernel is used to predict success of potential drug candidates and is comprised of 143 
potential drug targets from ten pathogen genomes.  The kernel is maintained in the public 
domain and contributors seek only traditional academic attribution under the Science 
Commons license (The Tropical Disease Initiative, Methods, 2008). 
Samir Brahmachari, Director General of CSIR, leads the OSDD initiative 
for collaborative online innovation.  He hopes to raise money from governments, NGOs 
and charities to fund the discovery of new drugs for TB and other neglected diseases 




collaborative online efforts.  OSDD established its kernel through community 
participation by re-sequencing the mycobacterium tuberculosis genome (Munos, 2010).     
 
8.3.1.2 Shared Leadership 
Shared leadership, with a broad governance structure involving many community 
members, is implemented in varying degrees by the biotech case study communities.  
CAMBIA and TDI have several participants on their Boards of Directors but there is no 
evidence that either have implemented a broad leadership structure utilizing community 
members who share community responsibilities and decision making.  OSDD, however, 
has in place a system that implements a shared leadership structure with mentors and 
others who lead different segments of the cooperative innovation.  Also, OSDD has 
implemented a system to track the level of contribution and participation in the 
community by each member, which will put the most active members in a leadership 
position.  OSDD has been more successful at establishing a structure which shares 
leadership with community members. Leadership of the collaborative innovation is 
shared through Principal Investigators and the Board of Mentors (Open Source Drug 
Discovery, FAQs, (n.d.) How is OSDD project managed?). 
 
8.3.1.3 Adaptable Leadership 
CAMBIA implements a fixed fee royalty license structure to access the 
community’s kernel.  Very few organizations have signed a license and CAMBIA has not 
adapted its structure to meet the needs and resources of potential community members.  




instead of adapting to the needs of the community, BioForge was discontinued.  TDI 
identified certain potential targets for an improved PZQ and changed course when a 
community member provided input on a different potential target, leading to publication.  
OSDD has demonstrated adaptability through its creation of the TB kernel, which was 
developed by the community and the leadership adopted the results. 
 
8.3.2 Socioeconomic Design 
Critical to the case study communities was a nontraditional socioeconomic 
structure which organized the community differently than that of the status quo.  Within 
the 19th century and FOSS communities, fundamental equality and property distribution 
provided the new socioeconomic structure. Like software and other goods, the production 
of drugs is traditionally done through a hierarchical corporate structure with contributors 
meeting face-to-face.  CAMBIA, TDI and OSDD have changed this aspect of traditional 
innovation model where contributors meet online and are dispersed throughout the world; 
however, some of the case study communities have not significantly changed other 
aspects of their socioeconomic design sufficiently to succeed at cooperative innovation. 
Table 8.2 summarizes the socioeconomic design of each of the biotechnology case study 
communities. 
 
8.3.2.1 Fundamental Equality and Property Distribution 
CAMBIA has changed very little of the status quo with its current IP licensing 





TABLE 8.2 – Socioeconomic Design 
 
Fundamental Equality Property Distribution 
CAMBIA No evidence of fundamental 
equality 
No evidence of equal property 
distribution 
 
TDI Contributions based on merit 
not position 
 
Property distribution is not based 
on members’ contributions 
OSDD Contributions based on merit 
not position 
Property distribution is not based 
on members’ contributions 
 
The requirements imposed by the BiOS license are not comparable to the earlier 
communitarian requirements – CAMBIA requires a specified contribution prior to 
obtaining access to the technology.  Although the lump sum royalty is defined by 
CAMBIA as a fee to cover costs of the organization, it has many of the same 
disadvantages of the existing IPR status quo – costs that must be passed on to the end 
user, and no evidence of distribution of the resources to the rest of the community. Unlike 
most royalty licenses, however, the CAMBIA royalty amount is not based on the 
potential for profit but rather the size of the organization.  CAMBIA offers for “license” 
research tools that can help biotechnology research organizations discover agricultural 
innovations.  This “grant-back” requirement is not uncommon in traditional licenses. 
However, the license also requires that any improvements or changes made by users of 
the research tools must be granted back to the community – but this applies only to 
improvements made to the licensed research tools and not to the innovations made using 
the licensed technology.  The terms of the CAMBIA license do not meet the requirements 
of fundamental equality because it does not treat profit and non-profit organizations 




the lump sum royalty fee is distributed among the community members.  There is no 
evidence of fundamentally equal property distribution among the community members.   
TDI states that it does not require users of its technology to grant back the rights 
to any improvements; however, the Science Commons license that TDI uses for its 
technology does require the grant back of improvements.  The distribution of property is 
available for any organization or person who would like to use the technology, similar to 
earlier cooperative communitarian innovations in that anyone could use the innovation 
regardless of contribution. The community practices fundamental equality and accepts 
contributions from all members based on merit of the contribution.  The proposed 
changes to PZQ that resulted in a published paper was proposed by a member outside of 
the main Australian group indicating a structure based on merit rather than position 
(Woelfle et al., 2011).  However, TDI does not plan to distribute the knowledge created 
by the community equally among its members.  TDI states that its innovations will not be 
patented and that “sponsors” would be awarded development contracts based on the 
“company that offered the lowest bid” (The Tropical Disease Initiative, What, who, how, 
and more…2008). 
OSDD has created a protected commons where community created innovation is 
protected from misappropriation and is kept available to all who want to use the 
technology within a licensed structure.  The community practices fundamental equality 
among its members based on the level of contribution by each member.  Members’ 
contributions are involved in the community based on their own abilities. Each 
contribution is peer reviewed and accepted based on the merit of the contribution and not 




8.3.3 Organization of Labor 
Similar to the FOSS and 19th century case study communities, each of the 
biotechnology case study communities has organized in such a way that contributions are 
self selected and not compulsory.  There is evidence that the communities have 
established online structures that allow each member to contribute in specific areas that 
allow individuals to organize into subgroups based on interest and skills.  Table 8.3 
summarizes the organization of labor for each of the biotechnology case study 
communities. 
 
8.3.3.1 Labor Self-Selected, not Compulsory and Subgroup structure  
In each of the biotechnology case study communities contributions were 
determined by the community member and were not compulsory (see Table 8.3).  Each of 
the communities has structured itself so that community members can select where to 
contribute.  However, through its WPs, OSDD is the only biotechnology case study 
community that shows evidence of a formal subgroup structure allowing community 
members to work on limited and well-defined aspects of each project.  
 
8.3.4 Peer Review and Open Communication 
Peer review and open communication are attributes found in the earlier case study 
communities.  Table 8.4 summarizes the leadership attributes of each of the case study 
communities CAMBIA and TDI do not show evidence of a formal peer review process or 









CAMBIA Members select areas of 
contribution 
Website is broadly structured into 
targeted areas of research 
TDI Members select areas of 
contribution 
Website is broadly structured into 
targeted areas of research 
OSDD Members select areas of 
contribution based on the WP 
structure 
Organization is structured into 
specific WPs which help 
subgroups focus on specific tasks. 
 
community members can voice their input. OSDD does have a formal peer review 
process in order for member contributions to complete WPs.  Although there is 
significant amount of communication from OSDD to its members, I was unable to 
observe open communication where members freely contributed input into the 
organization’s decision making process.   
 
8.3.5 Member Commitment 
The three biotechnology case study communities built their organizational 
structure in response to the existing IPR system that requires potentially expensive and 
time consuming patent filing rather than the automatic IPR protection of copyright which 
covers software code written by FOSS contributors.  As a result, these communities have 
set up systems to avoid misappropriation of the cooperative innovation including the 
protected commons, open access or Science Commons licenses which have been 
implemented to work around the current IPR system. 
Because biotechnology innovations are protected through patents rather than 





TABLE 8.4 – Peer Review and Open Communication 
 
Peer Evaluation Open Communication 
CAMBIA No structural evidence of 
peer review 
Difficult to locate open communication 
of organizational changes and progress 
on community website 
 
TDI No evidence of peer 
review beyond publication 
of academic paper 
No evidence of open communication 
through which members can contribute 
to decision making process.    
 
OSDD  Formal peer review 
process implemented for 
each contribution 
No observation open communication 
through which members can contribute 
to decision making process.    
 
biotechnological realm” (Hilgers, Muller-Seitz, & Piller, 2010, p. 9). The IPR system 
creates challenges for cooperative biotechnology communities because patents are 
expensive and require a lengthy approval process with the USPTO.  “Obtaining 
copyrights on the code in an open source project does not add any time or cost to the 
project.  Open source projects concerning biological material, on the other hand, are not 
as easily grounded in intellectual property” (Beck, 2010, p 201). Table 8.5 shows 
membership commitment for each of the biotechnology case study communities.  
In order to better allow collaborative innovation in biotechnology without the concerns of 
misappropriation, a derivative of the Creative Common license was developed for 
patentable projects called the Science Commons (Cukier, 2006).  The Science Commons 
license keeps the innovation free from potential misappropriation and also requires users 
to grant back any improvements to the community.  Another method of protecting 
cooperative communities’ innovations is to create a “protected commons” where 
community members must agree to specific terms granting legal use of any contribution 




TABLE 8.5 – Member Commitment 
Membership Levels Member agreements 
CAMBIA No evidence of specific 
membership levels 
Member agreements for those 
that license the technology.  No 
evidence of agreements for those 
who contribute to the community 
 
TDI No evidence of specific 
membership levels 
No evidence of membership 
agreements 
 
OSDD Defined levels of 
membership based on levels 
of contribution 




8.3.5.1 Member Agreements 
CAMBIA requires written agreement (the BiOS license) for those community 
members who want to license the available technology.  However, since BioForge is 
defunct there is no current evidence of membership agreements for those who contribute 
to the innovation without first licensing the existing CAMBIA technology.  CAMBIA 
appears to have already patented its technology and is now licensing it with grant-back 
requirements.  From The CAMBIA “Biological Open Source” (BiOS) License for Plant 
Enabling Technologies Version 1.5, paragraph B: 
It is the goal of the BIOS Initiative to ensure common access to the tools of 
innovation, to promote the development and improvement of these tools, and to 
make such developments and improvements freely accessible to both academic 
and commercial parties under substantially similar conditions… (BiOS PMET 
License Agreement 1.5, n.d.) 
 
Licensees are not “prohibited” from patenting their inventions but are expected to provide 
the same “nonassertion” of IPR to community members as was provided to the licensee 




improvements?).  This part of the BiOS agreement is ambiguous but appears to be an 
agreement structure with no enforcement of the “nonassertion” expectations of the 
community.  BiOS licenses allow licensees to assert IPRs on derivative innovations of the 
CAMBIA technologies without a nonassertion obligation (Beck, 2010).  The BiOS 
licenses do not “prohibit licensed technology from being used to develop downstream 
proprietary products” (Masum, 2011, p. 69).  In other words, licensees are able to 
innovate new products using the licensed research tools under the BiOS licenses and can 
patent the innovations without concern for sharing the technology with other BiOS 
members. 
TDI (through its partnership with TSL) apparently does not require any written 
agreement from those who contribute to the community projects.  TDI states that its 
innovations are subject to the Science Commons license but it is not clear how the 
innovations are protected from misappropriation since there is no evidence of a protected 
commons. TDI does not intend to patent any collaborative discovery but rather “could” 
award a contract to the low bidder for further development (Gould, 2009). Further, TDI 
recognizes that there is no reason why any researcher should share findings with TDI.  
One of TDI’s founders stated that he has no idea who is working on TDI’s projects 
(Anderson, 2010). 
OSDD requires written agreements for those who become members in the 
community.  OSDD has created a protected commons within which community members 
can contribute.  OSDD’s license states that “[a]nyone accessing the Protected Collective 
Information has an obligation to contribute any addition or improvements made to or 




generated out of the Protected Collective Information…” This applies whether the 
information is patented or not and if it was used only partly for the invention (Open 
Source Drug Discovery, FAQs, 2011, Proprietary Rights). 
 
8.3.5.2 Membership Levels 
Although each of the three biotechnology case study communities has users and 
developers, only OSDD shows evidence of different membership levels within the 
innovation community.  OSDD has four levels of contributor membership based on the 
activity of each contributor.  Anyone can contribute to OSDD and contributions include 
laboratory access, computing bandwidth, datasets, as well as, ideas and intellectual 
property.  Different from TDI and CAMBIA, OSDD has implemented an attribution 
system that tracks all member contributions and level of involvement in the community.  
OSDD divides the process of drug discovery into specific, individual problems which are 
then solved by the community members and peer reviewed. “Credit points” are then 
awarded after the peer review for correctly solving the problem (Open Source Drug 
Discovery, FAQs, 2011, What can be contributed?). Points are given for each 
contribution based on type of contribution.  Each member begins as a “blue” member and 
is upgraded to either a “silver,” “gold,” or “platinum” member depending on the 
contributions made.  Each of these membership levels come with “rights, privileges and 
responsibilities in the entire process” (Shulman & Schweik, 2010, p. 172; see also 
Bhardwaj, 2011).  Some contributions are financially rewarded and the payment is 
determined on “a case-by-case” basis (“Open Source Drug Discovery, FAQs”, 2011, Will 




CAMBIA’s and TDI’s community structure did not include several of the five 
organizational characteristics (as shown in gray in Table 8.6) found in the earlier case 
study communities.  OSDD’s community structure is much more closely aligned to the 
characteristics found in the 19th century and FOSS case study communities.  OSDD has 
implemented nearly all of the five organizational attributes of the earlier case study 
communities.  My analysis of the biotechnology industry and the three case study 
communities reveals a progressive application of the communitarian innovation business 
model.  The early biotechnology projects were structured to organize and develop 
research tools including gene sequencing and haplotype mapping.  Beyond open access 
databases other projects formed around bioinformatics software tools. These projects 
created research and communication tools which were made available to researchers and 
commercial entities.   
Because of lengthy physical testing and costly regulatory compliance required for 
pharmaceutical development,  some have argued that “open source” drug research and 
development cannot progress beyond the point of providing research tools (Shulman & 
Schweik, 2010; see also Srinivas, 2006).35  However, as online biotechnology tools have 
become more powerful and more accessible, the next generation of cooperative 
biotechnology communities, CAMBIA and TDI, utilized BioForge and The Synaptic 
Leap web portals, respectively, to organize online contributions and discussions for 
targeted research projects.  Innovation was based on a kernel of knowledge to which 
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 The “rule-based” portion of drug discovery includes Good Laboratory Practices, Good Clinical Practice, 
Good Manufacturing Practice, as well as, FDA approval (Munos, 2006). Regulatory oversight not only 
increases costs but also delays time to market and returns on investment for pharmaceutical innovations.  
Additionally, contributions to the pharmaceutical R&D process that are sloppy and inaccurate could 





TABLE 8.6 - Summary of Organizational Structure  
for Biotechnology Case Study Communities 
 




leader and evidence of 
kernel contributed by 
leader 
Somewhat active Board 
of Directors and 
evidence of kernel 
Active community leader 
and evidence of kernel 





No evidence of 
adaptable leadership 
Some evidence of 
adaptable leadership 
with the PZQ project 
 
Evidence of adaptable 
leadership 
Leadership: shared No evidence of shared 
leadership outside of 
main leadership group 
No evidence of shared 
leadership outside of 
main leadership group 
 






No evidence of 
fundamental equality 
Some evidence of 
contributions based on 
merit  
Contributions based on 





No evidence of equal 
property distribution 
Property distribution is 
not based on members’ 
contributions 
Property distribution is 







areas of contribution 
Members self-select 
areas of contribution 
Members self-select 
areas of contribution 




Community is broadly 
structured into targeted 
areas of research 
Community is broadly 
structured into targeted 
areas of research 
Community is structured 
into specific WPs which 
help subgroups focus on 
defined tasks within 
broader targeted areas of 
research 
 
Peer Review No structural evidence 
of peer review 
No evidence of peer 
review beyond 
publication of academic 
papers 
Formal peer review 





No evidence of open 
communication and 
members’ contributions 
to decision making 
process 
No evidence of open 
communication and 
members’ contributions 
to decision making 
process 
 
No observation of open 
communication and 
members’ contributions 










TABLE 8.6 – Continued 
 




No evidence of specific 
membership levels 
No evidence of specific 
membership levels 
Defined levels of 







Member agreements for 
those who license 
CAMBIA technology.  
No evidence of 
agreement requirements 
for those who 
contribute to 
cooperative innovation 
No evidence of 
membership agreements. 
Members are required to 






community members were to contribute additional improvement and innovation.  The 
innovation results were protected through either traditional patent rights or through a 
protected commons approach which encouraged users to contribute improvements back 
to the community.  However, at this stage of biotechnology communitarian development, 
CAMBIA’s and TDI’s community structure did not include several of the five 
organizational characteristics (as shown in gray in Table 8.6) found in the earlier case 
study communities. 
The current stage of cooperative biotechnology, as manifest in OSDD, provides 
community members with a business structure much closer to the characteristics found in 
the 19th century and FOSS case study communities.  OSDD has implemented nearly all of 
the five organizational attributes of the earlier case study communities.  While it is still 
too early to determine whether OSDD will be successful in its projects, observation of its 
future performance will help determine the accuracy of the communitarian business 
model introduced in Chapter 5. 
 
8.4  Conclusions 
In this dissertation I develop a communitarian innovation business model in order 
to extend the communitarian innovation method to other industries.   “Forming [a] viable 
business model is of paramount importance for the sustenance of any activity, and open 
source is no exception” (Shulman & Schweik, 2011, p 181).   
The next stage of communitarian innovation in biotechnological is to apply this 
business model through clinical trials.  In order to succeed at the next stage of 




experiments.  This stage of biotechnology communitarian innovation requires financing 
of the costly lab experiments and clinical trials, as well as, the development and 
promotion of the final product.  To do this, it is necessary to encourage the communities’ 
commercial motivation.  As discussed in earlier chapters, there are several incentives that 
motivate contributions to communitarian innovation; one of these is the commercial 
potential of the innovation.   Commercial motivation was a key factor for the 19th century 
and FOSS case study groups.  For example, the Shaker and Oneida communities 
supported and sustained their communities through sales of products based on their 
communitarian innovation.  The Mormons utilized the mileage results from the 
roadometer for commercial purposes.  Likewise, FOSS case study communities were 
commercially motivated or had commercially motivated supporters and partners.   
Although a nonprofit 501c-3 corporation, The Linux Foundation was formed 
initially as the Open Source Development Labs (OSDL) by a consortium of commercial 
ventures including IBM, Hewlett-Packard, Intel, AMD, RedHat, Novell (The Linux 
Foundation Staff, 2011, “Fellows”).36  These corporations earn significant revenues from 
the use of FOSS with Linux-related revenue estimated to reach $4.8 billion dollars in 
2011(The Linux Foundation, VMware Joins The Linux Foundation, 2011).    
OSDD’s current plan for bringing pharmaceutical targets to market is to outsource 
to generic corporations.  This may not solve the problem of the millions of individuals 
afflicted with TB or neglected tropical diseases such as leishmaniasis and 
schistosomiasis.  For the poorest individuals even a generically priced drug would be too 
costly.   
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 In 2007 OSDL merged with The Free Standards Group and became The Linux Foundation (The Linux 




One solution to this problem is to apply the communitarian innovation business 
model to the clinical trial, regulatory approval and marketing stages of the innovation 
process.  To finance these additional stages of product development and marketing, the 
community would emphasize contributors’ commercial incentives.  Similar to Linux, 
cooperative biotechnology innovation could be funded and sponsored by corporations 
who encourage employees to contribute to the communitarian innovation project.  Each 
company benefits separately and jointly because risk of development is spread over many 
companies and the cost is greatly reduced through spreading the production over many 
contributors, some of whom are volunteer and others employees of the commercial 
corporation.   
 Another approach to solving the problem of extending the communitarian 
business model to the marketing stage is similar to the for-profit commercial motive seen 
in the Shaker, Oneida Perfectionist and Mozilla communities.  The communitarian 
innovation was sold or licensed for profit to support the communities.  Similar to Mozilla, 
in order to fund advanced stages of pharmaceutical development a biotechnology 
community could license the innovation to commercial entities.  Governments and NGOs 
will be able to license the product at low or no costs in order to distribute to clinics and 
organizations that serve the poorest populations.  This does not violate the business 
model requirements of equal distribution and fundamental equality because these entities 
would not be part of the community but, like those who purchased Oneida traps or paid 
Firefox royalties, are payments by nonparticipants to the community for use of the 
innovation.  As with the earlier communitarian groups, these payments support the 




social agenda for communitarian innovation is for the biotechnology innovation 
communities to encourage the development of pharmaceutical products that have a 
market in the developed world and can be licensed for higher royalties which in turn 
could finance the projects for neglected tropical diseases.  The communitarian innovation 
communities must be structured so that profit maximization is not the sole incentive but 
rather the profit incentive is used for advancing a common social agenda. 
Economists often assume that the “momentum for change must come from 
outside the situation” and ignore the creativity of those personally involved to adequately 
“restructure their own patterns of interaction” (Ostrom, 2010).    Individuals may be more 
capable of handling a perceived “perverse situation” than any “external officials” such as 
the government.  Ostrom (2010, p. 3) quotes Richard Sugden’s (1986) commentary on 
the “distorted view” that the government must respond to and resolve collective 
problems.  
...The government is supposed to have the responsibility, the will and the power 
to restructure society in whatever way maximizes social welfare; like the US 
Cavalry in a good Western, the government stands ready to rush to the rescue 
whenever the market “fails,” and the economist’s job is to advise it on when and 
how to do so.  Private individuals, in contrast, are credited with little or no ability 
to solve collective problems among themselves.  This makes for a distorted view 
of some important economic and political issues.   
 
In this dissertation I provide a business model that functions within the market 
economy to achieve social goals such as drug discovery for neglected tropical diseases.  
This communitarian innovation business model can potentially be utilized to achieve 
other societal goals, such as education for the poor that are currently neglected by 




In Chapter 2 I looked at existing incentive structure of patent monopoly and 
discussed the literature on patents and the impact on innovation; I also discuss the 
literature on cooperative innovation.  Chapter 3 briefly delves into the progression of 
private property rights and the devolution in some communities to a communitarian 
property structure. Chapters 4 and 5 provide details on the 19th century and FOSS case 
study innovations, respectively; and Chapter 6 connects the incentives to participate in 
communitarian innovation for the 19th century and FOSS case study communities.  
Chapter 7 analyzes five categories of organizational structure of communitarian 
innovation discovered through analysis of the case study communities.  This analysis 
creates the foundation of a business model for communitarian innovation which I applied 










GLOBAL HARMONIZATION OF IPRs 
 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is an attempt to “strike a balance between the long 
term social objective of providing incentives for future inventions and creation, and the 
short term objective of allowing people to use existing inventions and creations.” (World 
Trade Organization, 2006, Philosophy: TRIPS attempts to strike a balance).  According 
to the WTO (2006), this balance works in three ways: 
1) Protection of intellectual property and encouragement to develop more -- 
‘private rights also bring social benefits’ 
2) Disclosure of patented knowledge benefits other who study the new 
technology 
3) TRIPS provides flexibility for governments to ‘fine tune the protection 
granted in order to meet social goals’ 
 
Under TRIPS, member nations of the WTO must “provide patent protection for any 
invention, whether a product (such as a medicine) or a process (such as a method of 
producing the chemical ingredients for a medicine), while allowing certain exceptions.” 
(World Trade Organization, 2006, Obligations and exceptions).  There are certain 
requirements to be met in order to qualify for patent protection.  In return for the patent, 
details of the invention must be made public in the form of the patent application; thusly, 




monopoly status (World Trade Organization, 2006, Obligations and exceptions).37  A 
major aspect of the TRIPS Agreement is Article 30, which states: 
Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a 
patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal 
exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third 
parties.  (World Trade Organization, 2006, Obligations and exceptions) 
 
A thoughtful reading of the above WTO Article yields many questions and 
concerns regarding the role of intellectual property in world health, and especially in 
resolving various epidemics of the developing world.  It is the stated role of the WTO to 
balance the rights of the patent holders along with the human desire for health and 
progress.  In very broad terms the WTO declares that governments can prevent patent 
owners from “abusing intellectual property rights, ‘unreasonably’ restraining trade, or 
hampering the international transfer of technology” (World Trade Organization, 2006, 
Developing countries’ transition period).  Under this agenda, the WTO conference in 
Doha (called the Doha Declaration) created refinements and clarification to TRIPS 
regarding patent rights and healthcare concerns.   
Not surprisingly, developed countries produce the majority of patents.  As much 
as 86% of all patent applications occur in developed countries, as well as, 97% of 
worldwide earnings for royalties and licensing fees (UNDP, 2000). These numbers, 
however, do not mean that the poor developing countries do not create advances in 
innovation; however, they are frequently on a small scale and not likely to be formalized 
through the legal infrastructure of IP.  Poorer nations do not have the required 
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 Under Article 27 of the TRIPS agreement, exceptions to patentability include diagnostic, therapeutic and 
surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals.  Also, excluded from patentability under this 
Article is any invention’s commercial exploitation that would jeopardize “human, animal or plant life or 




infrastructure with which to create a strong IPR system. Only a very small fraction of 
worldwide patents are issued in developing nations which makes a strong patent system a 
poor return on a high investment.  Similarly, patented products from developed countries 
also receive weak patent protection in developing countries.   
Many less developed countries rely heavily on knowledge passed down from 
generations and disseminated within the community for all to benefit.  Modern 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology researchers are interested in the potential of TK and a 
few have appropriated this heretofore commonly-held knowledge through patent 
protection. This so called biopiracy includes the unauthorized and uncompensated taking 
of traditional knowledge, as well as the unauthorized use of any biological resource 
contained in rain forests, jungles, and areas within the geographical scope of indigenous 
peoples, whether or not such use or knowledge had been previously understood. The 
International Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) established a complex set of 
guidelines in an attempt to overcome the rising concerns of traditional knowledge piracy. 
Under these guidelines, pharmaceutical companies, universities, and indigenous groups 
have entered into several contracts and licensing agreements. One supporting group of 
the CBD, the International Cooperative of Biodiversity Groups (ICBG), sponsored a 
license agreement between the pharmaceutical corporation Searle, Washington 
University, and the Aguarana people of the Andean region.  Even though the license was 
not made public, it was nonetheless acquired and published by an NGO, Rural 
Advancement Foundation International (RAFI). It is RAFI’s position that the royalty 




Aguaruna people for their traditional knowledge and comparable to biopiracy (Greene, 
2004). 
A case that has been much discussed and reported in the media involves an 
Amazonian rainforest plant called Ayahuasca which has traditionally been used in 
religious and curative ceremonies by the indigenous tribes of that area for at least 500 
years (Fecteau, 2001).  The plant is a potent psychotropic providing strong hallucinogenic 
and purgative responses in its users.  Loren Miller visited the Cofan tribe in Ecuador and 
was introduced to the ayahuasca plant which apparently was of a different strain than 
otherwise grown in the Amazonian region.  Miller owned a small pharmaceutical lab in 
California and upon returning to the US, he processed the necessary paperwork to patent 
the Ayahausca plant in 1986 (Fecteau, 2001). 38   The US patent office, not having any 
prior art in the plant, granted the patent. Upon discovery of this alleged biopiracy, the 
indigenous organization COICA (Coordinadora de las Organizaciones Indigenas de la 
Cuenca Amazonica) proceeded to fight against the monopoly protection issued by the US 
Patent and Trade Organization on the ayahuasca vine and through its efforts helped 
motivate the USPTO to overturn the patent in 1999.  
Groups of farmers, scientists and NGOs are working to protect TK and allow 
access to valuable knowledge for developing countries.  
Farmers in many countries have warned corporations and governments not to 
establish IPRs for crop varieties, and have opted to openly violate such IPRs, even 
if it means being jailed.  Indigenous peoples everywhere are acquiring a deeper 
                                                 
38
 While Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) protection has been available for centuries in the US, it wasn’t 
until 1930 that the US Plant Patent Act was passed protecting intellectual property of asexually derived 
plant varieties.  In 1961 an International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants was 
signed by mostly industrialized countries – a Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) 
was also formed and the treaty came into force in 1968.  In a 1980 Supreme Court decision it was held that 





understanding of IPR regimes, and ways of challenging them when they impinge 
on their human or resource rights. (Kothari & Anaruadha, section 5.3) 
 
TRIPS induced power imbalances have caused concerns to developing nations including 
the problem of actually developing and funding an effective patent system, as well as the 
concern that TRIPS does not adequately address biopiracy and traditional knowledge 
(Ragavan, 2001). Global harmonization of a US style patent system is increasingly 
criticized as an inhibitor to dissemination of knowledge and innovation. One of the main 
problems with imposing a strong patent requirement on less developed economies is the 
ability, or desire, of the governments of those countries to enforce the IPR laws (Maskus, 









THREE SHORT-LIVED 19TH CENTURY COMMUNITARIAN GROUPS 
 
B.1 Owenites 
Robert Owen first established his reformist ideas in New Lanark, Scotland where, 
as manager and partner of a mill, he attempted to improve working conditions and raise 
moral character.  However, his attempts were, at first, rebuffed by his partners as well as 
the workers.  His partners refused a shorter working day and the workers were suspicious 
of any so called attempt to help them.  Owen persisted and established an incentive 
system to motivate workers to stay sober and work diligently (Loubere, 1974).    
His management system involved a spindle painted a different color on each of its 
four sides hanging by each worker.  At the end of each day, every worker’s spindle was 
turned to indicate the level of worker performance for that day (Tour Guide, Harmony 
Scotland, October 2010).  Unlike the more brutal management style of the day, Owen’s 
simple device motivated his workers to produce without the physical abuse of some of his 
colleagues. Owen also insisted that children should be educated until at least the age of 
10 and built schools for the mill worker’s children -- a radical idea for that time.  These, 
along with other managerial and social reforms, produced high productivity among the 




Pleased at the economic and social outcomes of his reforms, Owen determined to 
create a “new moral world” and began proselytizing other capitalists to implement his 
system.  Few were convinced that his reforms would translate into higher profits for 
themselves and were not willing to implement his system into their mills and factories.  
He did, however, receive intellectual support from William Thompson and John Stuart 
Mill (Loubere, 1974).   
Finally, Owen decided to take his own wealth and begin a new society that would 
prove the effectiveness of his ideas to the world.   To achieve success as quickly as 
possible, in1825 Owen purchased an existing community established by the Rappites in 
Harmonie, Indiana.39 Harmonie had been a successfully operating communitarian society 
and it seemed success could be achieved quickly and easily from this foundation.  Based 
on a letter from his son who was in the US preparing for the community, Owen was made 
aware of one of the major problems of intentional communities – attracting the wrong 
kind of participant.  Owen received a letter from his son who was to help establish and 
administer the new community.  The letter illustrates one of the biggest concerns of an 
intentional community of that era: 
Although I do not perceive opposition to your plans in any quarter & although 
there is often an appearance of interest excited for a time, yet the character of the 
people is so little enthusiastic & parties have been so long accustomed to be 
dilatory in business & to be thinking only of overreaching others & acting an 
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 Founded as a religious group in Germany by George Rapp, the Rappites fled persecution in Germany to 
the New World.  Originally organized in Pennsylvania, in 1815 they claimed land in Indiana and 
established their community of Harmonie [sic].  The group desired only to be able to practice their religion 
without outside interference.  Few members of the group had contact with the outside world and practically 
no one learned the English language.  They did not proselytize or allow outsiders (even other Germans) to 
join their group.  This communitarian effort seemed a very practical response to a hostile environment and 
society.  At its peak, Harmonie was a well-organized operation with the largest population in Indiana.  
Jealous neighbors took advantage of their situation and the Rappites gave up their new community and 





insincere part, that an entire change must be effected in order to make them 
valuable members… I have seen only one or two persons, who as they are, I 
should consider desirable associates.  I certainly look forward with more 
favorable expectations to those, who come from Europe. (Bestor, 1953, p. 508) 
 
Calling the location New Harmony, Owen proceeded with his plan and 
encouraged all types of individuals to join the community.  Owen continued to travel and 
promote his new social order while leaving his son in charge of New Harmony.  As one 
of the communitarian experiments not based on religious or moral like mindedness, and 
without a strong motivational leader present at the community, some problems quickly 
developed in the system (Harrison, 1969).   
Owen’s original communitarian plan called for four classes of society with 
distinct amounts of property and consumption.  However, by the time New Harmony was 
established he professed more egalitarian ideas (Loubere, 1974).  Although he preached 
an equal division in New Harmony, he and others of the upper class contributors never 
practiced it nor hid their higher living standards from the rest of the group.  There was 
extreme distinction between those who came to the project with large amounts of money 
and those who did not.  Confusion and envy reigned in the 2 years, 1825-27, that the 
Owenites occupied New Harmony (Loubere, 1974).   
‘Class’ structure in a so called egalitarian society did not strike Owen as ironic or 
implausible.  In fact, it was not the class structure as much as the family unit that, in 
Owens opinion, caused lack of community.  He felt the family was the basis for private 
ownership of property and selfish behavior in general.  Owen attacked the family and 
refused to see class division as a primary problem.  In his view, society should be one 




Further cause for contention at New Harmony came from Owen’s application of 
the labor theory of value.  Owen, accepting the theoretical underpinnings of this theory of 
value, attempted to put it into active practice.  However, the subjective nature of the 
pricing method as practiced in New Harmony led to a great deal of disagreement as to the 
“real” value of goods (Loubere, 1974, p. 84). Additionally, Owen’s theories expounded 
mechanized production but his New Harmony experiment never matched the 
mechanization or success of the New Lanark mills.  The main source of production at 
New Harmony was agrarian output.  In an address to U.S. House of Representatives on 
February 25, 1825, Owen testified regarding the social order he brought to America: 
In the new system, union and co-operation will supersede individual interest, and 
the universal counteraction of each other’s objects; and, by the change, the powers 
of one man will obtain for him the advantages of many, and all will become as 
rich as they will desire. … We cannot fail to be alive to the superiority of 
combined over individual efforts. (Johnson, 1970, p. 45) 
 
However, these high moral ideals were not sufficient to keep New Harmony alive for 
more than 2 years (Loubere, 1974).  
 
B.2 Fourierists                                                                                                                             
It was not until Francois Fourier died that his communitarian ideas were put into 
practice.  As a social reformer, and one who had inherited an annual pension, he was able 
to write prolifically on the specific details of how a new social order should be structured.  
More than any other utopian socialist, Fourier created an elaborate theoretical system of 
detailed instructions and anticipated potential problems and their solution.  Fourier did 
not limit himself to the mere economic reform of society, but as with many other Social 




Mormons), he attempted to reform and restructure social relations at many levels 
including gender and marital roles.  Unlike his economic ideas, Fourier considered some 
of his other ideas (involving sexual relations, as well as, the afterlife) as too radical for 
publication at the time.   
Early followers of Fourier were among the many in France looking for social 
reform during the first half of the 19th century.  However, throughout his life, Fourier 
searched without success for a wealthy patron to finance his phalanstery -- the name 
given to the physical application of his socialist theories.  Fourier’s economic ideas were 
not practiced until Victor Considerant became an advocate and missionary for the cause, 
and Albert Brisbane decided to adopt Fourierist ideas in America (Taylor, 1982). 
Phalansteries (or phalanxes as they were called in America) were the common 
buildings central to the Fourierist community.  Every detail was specified including the 
dimensions and the number of individuals to be included in each phalanx.  The phalanx 
would house sixteen to eighteen hundred persons on three square miles of land.  The land 
was to be divided for field crops, orchards and gardens.  The living quarters were formed 
into groups of at least seven individuals representing ‘ascending and descending tastes 
and abilities’ (Taylor, 1982). 
Like Owen, Fourier addressed the issue of ‘unpleasant work’ and decided that a 
battalion of junior workers would be in charge of cleaning and would learn to make it 
‘fun.’  Each phalanx would have a concert hall, library, community dining chambers, 





The movement was not completely egalitarian.  Shares were sold, but not all 
members were required to own shares.  Further, the profits of the phalanx were divided 
five-twelfths to labor, four-twelfths to capital and three-twelfths to skill.  Eleven-twelfths 
of the members would be farmers and mechanics and the remainder were to be artists, 
scientists and capitalists (Rexroth, 1974).  Many individuals tested the Fourier principals 
but typically only for a short period.  The already existing Brook Farm community, 
established by prominent intellectuals prior to the popularity of Fourierism, converted to 
the Fourierist program but soon failed and disassembled.  The few Fourierist experiments 
that worked, organized a more practical communal arrangement than prescribed by 
Fourier.  The North American phalanx in New Jersey was probably the most successful 
experiment of Fourierism.  The members modified the exact specifications of Fourier and 
created a strict policy of not allowing more members than what the system could support 
and then only after a rigid screening and probationary period (Rexroth, 1974).  
Not strictly socialist or egalitarian, Fourierism was a popular movement for a 
short period.  Some thought Fourier to be mad.  Aside from his economic reforms, he 
believed the earth would reach a state of perfect communalism, men would grow long 
tails with eyeballs at the end, and the oceans would turn to lemonade.  Upon death, the 
body would turn into cosmic perfume.  Although Fourier considered his social system as 
a perfect balance, he was unable to advance his more radical ideas -- ideas of free love 
among all genders and ages to indicate love and friendship.  Fourier claimed these radical 
ideas would need to be introduced very slowly and only after re-education of the people 






Along with Fourier, Etienne Cabet was another product of the French 
revolutionary movement.  He was exiled to England (Belgium refused asylum) in 1834 
due to his advocacy of workers’ rights and forceful revolution.  While in exile Cabet met 
Robert Owen and other radical social reformers.  Greatly influenced by Thomas Moore’s 
Utopia, he wrote his own utopian novel, Journey to Icaria, published in 1840.   
You are right if you think that the city is perfectly illuminated, as well as Paris 
and London, even much better, because the source of light is not absorbed by the 
shops, since there are none, or by the factories, since nobody works at night. 
Illumination is then concentrated on the streets and public monuments; and not 
only is the gas odorless because means have been found to purify it, but the 
illumination combines to the highest degree the pleasing and the useful, through 
the elegant and varied forms of the street lamps and the thousand shapes and 
colors which they give the light. I have seen fine illumination in London in some 
streets on certain holidays; but in Icara the illumination is always magnificent, 
and sometimes it creates a veritable fairy-land. (Cabet, 1842/1946, What follows 
is the text…) 
 
His efforts from that time forth were to establish an ‘Icarian’ movement that 
would practice the principles of utopian socialism as he saw it.  Along with this emphasis 
on practical application, he wrote a work describing Christianity’s connection to 
communitarian thinking.  “He placed increasing emphasis during the 1840s on 
communism as a new Christian doctrine…[s]uch a suggestion was hardly original, yet it 
did much to reinforce the image of Icarianism as a perfectly respectable movement” 
(Taylor, 1982, pp. 162-63).   
Even so, it became clear that the French government would not allow an Icarian 
community to ever be established in France.  In 1847, Cabet announced to his followers 
that they would move to the United States and establish an Icarian community.  At that 




a communist organization for the working class in France.  Cabet had earlier attacked the 
ideas of Owen and Fourier as too small scale – Cabet originally fought for a whole nation 
of communism.  The decision to move to America and attempt a small scale socialist 
community undoubtedly cost Cabet many followers.  However, a larger problem for the 
Icarian movement and its American experiment was that shortly after setting sail for the 
US, the French revolution successfully overthrew the monarchy and many of Cabet’s 
followers left the Icarian movement to influence the new French government (Taylor, 
1982).   
In order to succeed at his communitarian project, Cabet contacted Robert Owen 
for ideas on property location in the U.S. and other practical application of 
communitarian socialism.  After a failed attempt in Texas without Cabet present, Cabet 
came to the U.S. in 1849 and the Icarians reconvened in Nauvoo, Illinois, previously 
abandoned by the Mormons fleeing to the arid west (Taylor, 1982).     
The Icarians legally incorporated in Illinois and issued capital stock.  A company 
was established with six directors and a General Assembly (comprised only of adult 
males.)  No person was allowed to own more than one share, thus keeping a form of 
equality as part of the movement.  Along with these practical requirements, Cabet 
required love for each other and organization and discipline from the members.  Further, 
there was a requirement to know the appropriate Icarian texts and abstain from tobacco 
and strong alcohol and to allow the community to control the education of the children 
(Taylor, 1982).     
As to the productive efforts of the community, few details are known aside from 




contributions from the mass of sympathetic workers to the communist ideal (Taylor, 
1982).  The implication of this funding is that the communitarian production was not 
sufficient to meet the needs or wants of the group.  As with other experiments in social 
equality, it was understood that the first generation may have a difficult time changing 
their old thinking.  This was the case with the Icarian community, but it also seemed the 
youth growing up in the utopian culture failed to receive the appropriate education to 
change their ways and make Icarian community stronger and more productive.  Much of 
the idealism was just that -- there were few practical ways to motivate members to want 
to work and contribute to the success of the community.  Cabet solved the problem in 
theory by assuming machines would perform the most unpleasant tasks -- in practice, 
however he found no solution.   
Another problem with the Icarian society was its governance.  The position of 
President, which Cabet held continuously between 1850 and 1855, was a completely 
authoritarian post.  As Cabet became increasingly despotic over the years, there was 
mounting opposition to his authoritarian style of governance and a significant group of 
dissidents left the main community (Taylor, 1982).  Gradually, the numbers who 
remained with Cabet diminished until his death in 1857 when there were less than 200 
followers.  The remaining Icarians attempted to continue a style of Icarian community but 
failed to agree on how it should be carried out.  Faction after faction left the body until 
the Icarian movement finally died out (Taylor, 1982). Finally, in 1863 the last of the 
Icarians dissolved -- the young men rebelled against the old and the common property 








Within the pharmaceutical industry, increased government oversight during the 
20th century drove up the costs of innovation and simultaneously decreased the term of IP 
protection.  In 1938, prompted by the disastrous effect of sulfanilamide that killed 107 
individuals, government regulators passed the Food, Drug and Cosmetic (FDC) Act 
which required new drugs to be proven safe prior to marketing.   This Act charged the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to provide safety standards to the public but did 
not distinguish between those drugs that must be dispensed with a prescription and those 
that could be sold over-the-counter (OTC) – this distinction was left to the 
manufacturers’ discretion (Kaplan, 1995).  In 1951 the Durham-Humphrey Amendment 
entrusted to the FDA to determine if a prescription was necessary based on whether the 
drug presented risks “beyond the ability of laymen to safely assume,” or whether it was 
intended to treat a condition that was “beyond the layman’s capacity to recognize and 
treat” (Kaplan, 1995, pp. 179-196).  It wasn’t until 1962 and the devastation of 
Thalidomide on infants that the FDA was required to approve new drug safety and 
efficacy.40   
                                                 
40
 An additional change to the pharmaceutical industry from this same 1962 Act provided the opportunity 
for generic manufacturers to obtain FDA approval through a ‘paper’ New Drug Application (NDA.)  This 




FDA approval increased costs pharmaceuticals length of time to market which often 
exceeded 10 years. (Congressional Budget Office, July 1998, section 6.)  Extended FDA 
oversight also increased cost of development and reduced the effective length of patent 
protection due to the necessity of obtaining patent protection on the pharmaceutical 
invention prior to initiating the FDA approval process.  In 1978, the Carter administration 
reviewed domestic policy on industrial innovation and recommended “term restoration of 
pharmaceuticals and any other product that required regulatory review – to compensate 
for, or restore to the term of the patents, the time lost in regulatory review”  
(Mossinghoff, 1999, p. 187).  This recommendation provided momentum for the Hatch 
Waxman Act which combined patent term restoration along with increased generic drug 
competition and was passed into law in 1984 (Congressional Budget Office, 1998, 
section 6; see also Mossinghoff, 1999).  The patent extension aspect of the Hatch-
Waxman Act restored some of the time pharmaceutical patents lost while in the FDA 
approval process.  The extension length varies based on the length of time for FDA 
approval but cannot exceed 5 years nor can it extend the patent beyond 14 years after 
product approval (Congressional Budget Office, July 1998, section 6).41  
  
                                                                                                                                                 
medical literature; a generic manufacturer  could get its drug approved by showing that learned articles had 
been written about the chemical demonstrating that it was safe” (Mossinghoff, 1999, p. 187).   
 
41
 For 43 drugs approved between 1992 and 1995 that applied for an extension under Hatch-Waxman, the 
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